The role of institutions in reputation models of sovereign debt

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 45-64

  Cole, Harold L ^a   Kelbe, Patrick J ^a,b,c  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Default; Reputation; Sovereign debt

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010859622     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(94)01165-7     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
2. International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
3. A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt
4. Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget?
5. Servicing the public debt: The role of expectations
6. Reputation spillover across relationships with enduring and transient benefits: Reviving reputation models of debt
7. Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
8. Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations
9. Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: Excusable default, repudiation, and reputation
10. Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing
11. Sovereign debt renegotiation in a consumption-smoothing model
12. Reputation and imperfect information
13. Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
14. On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing