Crowding effects and work ethics

Labour

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 125-138

  Grepperud, Sverre ^a   Pedersen, Pål Andreas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^b Bodø School of Business   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT; ETHICS; MODEL;

EID: 33644789027     PISSN: 11217081     EISSN: 14679914     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9914.2006.00315.x     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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