Governance system effectiveness following the crisis: The case of Korean business group headquarters

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 85-97

  Chang, James Jinho ^a   Shin, Hyun Han ^a  

^a Yonsei University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Asian crisis; Business group; CEO turnover; Chaebol; Corporate governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644783066     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2006.00489.x     Document Type: Article

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