Motivations for medico-legal action: Lessons from New Zealand

Journal of Legal Medicine

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 55-70

  Bismark, Marie ^c   Dauer, Edward A ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DENVER   (United States)

^b HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETENCE; HEALTH CARE; HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HUMAN; INSURANCE; MEDICAL CARE; MEDICAL PRACTICE; MEDICOLEGAL ASPECT; MOTIVATION; NEGLIGENCE; NEW ZEALAND; NURSING CARE; REVIEW; SKILL; UNITED STATES;

COMPENSATION AND REDRESS; HUMANS; MALPRACTICE; MOTIVATION; NEW ZEALAND; UNITED STATES;

EID: 33644777553     PISSN: 01947648     EISSN: 1521057X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01947640500533317     Document Type: Review

References (42)

1. Edward A. Dauer, The Four Dimensions of the Accountability Motive: Sanction, Correction, Restoration, and Communication, XXIXth International Congress on Law and Mental Health (July 4, 2005);
2. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 J.A.M.A. 1359, 1362 (1992);
3. Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994).
4. Edward A. Dauer, The Role of Accountability in Legal and Ethical Responses to Medical Error (forthcoming 2006).
5. Hickson et al., supra note 1, at 1359; FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 65-68 (1993).
6. Vincent, supra note 1, at 1609.
7. See Dauer, supra note 2.
8. See generally Peter Davis et al., Compensation for Medical Injury in New Zealand: Does "No-Fault" Increase the Level of Claims Making and Reduce Social and Clinical Selectivity?, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 833, 836 (2002) (analyzing claims accepted and paid by the ACC from 1994 to 1996).
9. See David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 251 (2000) (stating "[f]or example, physicians complain that malpractice law is deeply flawed because suits strike haphazardly, unrelated to the quality of care. Many attorneys argue that regulatory interference . . . frustrates the litigation process and causes much medical negligence to go unscrutinized").
10. See generally Ron Paterson, The Patients' Complaints System in New Zealand, 21 HEALTH AFF. 70, 74-75 (2002) (dicussing the impact of the New Zealand patients' complaint system and its focus on "resolution of complaints at the lowest appropriate level, acknowledgment of a patient's concerns, and . . . review and rehabilitation of a substandard practitioner or system");
11. Marie Bismark & Ron Patterson, No-Fault Compensation in New Zealand, 25 HEALTH AFF. 278 (2006).
12. See ACCIDENT COMP. CORP., WHAT AM I ENTITLED TO?, available at http://www.acc.co.nz/wcm001/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&nodeId=3883 (last visited Aug. 14, 2005).
13. This case and others throughout the article are taken from the files of New Zealand's Health and Disability Commissioner, on file with Dr. Bismark. Patient names and other details have been changed to protect anonymity.
14. See generally Stephen Todd, Privatisation of Accident Compensation: Policy and Politics in New Zealand, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 404 (2000) (discussing the development of no-fault compensation in New Zealand);
15. see also Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001, 2001 pt. 3, § 53 (N.Z.) (requiring claimants under the system file within 12 months).
16. See Davis et al., supra note 6, at 833-34.
17. COPIC, Lessons Learned, COPIC'S 3R's PROGRAMME, June 2005, at 1, available at http://www.callcopic.com/publications/3rs/vol_2_issue_1_jun_2005. pdf;
18. Jerome D. Buckley, M.D., COPIC Insurance Company, Early Reporting and Intervention: The COPIC 3 R's Program, Presentation at the PIAA Chief Physician Executives Meeting (Apr. 2, 2005).
19. Hickson et al., supra note 1, at 1362; see Vincent et al., supra note 1, at 1612.
20. JOINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK RI-12 (2003).
21. R. Lamb, Open Disclosure: The Only Approach to Medical Error, 13 QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE 3, 3 (2004).
22. See Ron Paterson & Marie van Wyk, Candour and the Code, 4 O & G 100 (2002), available at http://www.ranzcog.edu.au/publications/o-g_pdt's/OG- 2000-2003/OG-June-2002.pdf (discussing patient rights and physician duties under New Zealand law).
23. Peter Davis et al., Acknowledgement of "No-Fault" Medical Injury: Review of Patients' Hospital Records in New Zealand, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 79, 79 (2003).
24. Carol B. Liebman & Chris Stern Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model to Manage Disclosure of Errors and Adverse Events to Patients, 23 HEALTH AFF. 22, 31 (2004);
25. see Sorryworks!, available at www.sorryworks.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
26. Id. at 27.
27. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135(1) (West 2005).
28. Edward A. Dauer, Apology in the Aftermath of Injury: Colorado's "I'm Sorry" Law, 34 COLO. LAWYER 47, 47 (2005).
29. Liebman & Hyman, supra note 19, at 30.
30. Hickson et al., supra note 1, at 1362 (including the "desire to prevent injuries to others" among contributory factors in the decision to file a malpractice claim); Vincent et al., supra note 1, at 1612.
31. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (2002) (critical analysis of studies attempting to establish the tort system's deterrence of negligence).
32. Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality Improvement, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 193-95 (1997) (recognizing the tort system focuses on "bad apples," while quality improvement examines "how and why [an] infraction came about").
33. See Barry C. Dorn, The Evolving Doctor, in RENEGOTIATING HEALTH CARE 237, 252 (1995) (although legal advice "makes perfect legal sense, the perversions and repercussions of malpractice fright make little sense for patient care").
34. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN 49-68 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
35. Paterson, supra note 8, at 74-76 (providing two case studies where changes were implemented to improve patient care in pharmaceutical and hospital practices upon the recommendations of the Commissioner). Furthermore, "[c]omplaints offer a 'window of opportunity' to improve health services . . . ." Id. at 75.
36. Carole Schneider Houk & Barbara I. Moidel, A Practical Innovation Whose Time Has Come, 2 ACRESOLUTION 30, 31 (2003), available at http://www.chi-resolutions.com/docs/acr-03spring.pdf.
37. Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003, 2003 pt. 3, § 34-44 (N.Z.).
38. See generally Hickson et al., supra note 1 (discussing several factors, in addition to money, that may contribute to the decision to file a malpractice action).
39. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 510-11 (2003).
40. See generally Dauer & Marcus, supra note 26, at 205-12 (examining cases where a pilot mediation program, using face-to-face patient/physician discussion, settled potential negligence claims).
41. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631, 647-48 (1980) (stating quot;[c]ourts . . . may transform the content of disputes because the substantive norms they apply differ from rules of custom or ordinary morality"). Felstiner et al. argues courts transform disputes by individualizing remedies by, for example, awarding money damages when similar plaintiffs may desire increased safety in defective product manufacture. Id. at 648.
42. See generally Richard Gaskins, The Fate of "No-Fault" in America, 34 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 213 (2003) (discussing the history of no-fault proposals in the United States, comparing such proposals to the success of New Zealand's Accident Compensation Commission).