In America we (Used to) trust: U.S. hegemony and global cooperation

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 120, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 619-636

  Kydd, Andrew ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644770376     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2005.tb00559.x     Document Type: Review

References (72)

1. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 35.
2. This is the conclusion of the Senate intelligence committee; see U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Cong., 2nd sess. 7 July 2004, 14-15.
3. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, 2002), 13-16.
4. Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 291-292. For other analyses of hegemony in the world economy, see
5. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28 (April 1976): 317-347;
6. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and
7. Robert Pahre, Leading Questions: How Hegemony Affects the International Political Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
8. Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985): 579-614.
9. For the theory of public goods, see Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities: Public Goods and Club Goods (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
10. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 28-29.
11. This result does not hold in some more general models of public goods provision; see Pahre, Leading Questions, 23.
12. Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 2.
13. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9-15; and for a similar argument, see
14. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
15. For a fuller exposition of this perspective, see Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 142-149.
16. For an early exposition of the tipping game, see Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 213-243; and for later applications, see
17. David D. Laitin, "The Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game: Political Linguistics in Ghana," American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994): 622-634;
18. and Rasma Karklins and Roger Peterson, "Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes: Eastern Europe 1989," Journal of Politics 55 (August 1993): 588-614.
19. For an analysis of how information revelation promotes cooperation, see James D. Morrow, "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution vs. Information," International Organization 48 (Summer 1994): 387-423.
20. An exception is G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
21. United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 617.
22. For an extensive discussion of Potsdam and the issue of treating Germany as a unit, see Mark Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: the Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 20-33. Trachtenberg argues that Secretary of State James Byrnes agreed to an "amicable divorce" at Potsdam, but the United States and Britain subsequently did push strongly for unified institutions. On French goals, see
23. John W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance 1944-49: French Foreign Policy and Post-war Europe (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1990), 25-27, 46-49; and
24. William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 43-45.
25. He also wished to use food aid as leverage with France, but was prevented from doing so; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. V (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 1969), 540.
26. Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1990), 93-97; and
27. James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 112-116.
28. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. V (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 1969), 506;
29. Michael Creswell and Mark Trachtenberg, "France and the German Question, 1945-1955," Journal of Cold War Studies 5 (Summer 2003): 5-28.
30. Deighton, The Impossible Peace, 110-113.
31. Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 49-62.
32. For overviews of this period, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-1949 (London: Macmillan, 1993)
33. and Hitchcock, France Restored
34. Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 1955), 899-900.
35. John W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951 (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1984), 14.
36. The French-Soviet alliance earned De Gaulle little respect in Moscow, and Roosevelt viewed him as a prima donna; Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 31. French troops, nominally under U.S. command, participated in the fighting in 1944 and 1945, but almost came to blows with U.S. forces over territorial claims in Italy.
37. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 47;
38. Creswell and Trachtenberg, "France and the German Question."
39. For overviews, see Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe: 1945-1951 (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984);
40. Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985);
41. and Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
42. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 67.
43. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 90-125.
44. John Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment," International Affairs 60 (Autumn 1984): 615-629.
45. Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 70.
46. Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 92-100.
47. Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Ibid., 80-82.
48. Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Ibid., 100;
49. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 215-216.
50. Costigliola, France and the United States, 71.
51. Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment";
52. Saki Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-1955 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9.
53. John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
54. The U.S. was pressing for the reduction of control over German industry, so the ECSC can be considered an indirect response to U.S. pressure, but Germany and Britain were also pressing in this direction, and France's response was on its own initiative.
55. David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 62-81.
56. Hitchcock, France Restored, 148.
57. Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950-55 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000);
58. Spencer Mawby, Containing Germany: Britain and the Arming of the Federal Republic (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999);
59. and Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community: A History (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1980).
60. McAllister, No Exit, 194.
61. McAllister, No Exit, Ibid., 199;
62. Large, Germans to the Front, 104.
63. McAllister, No Exit, 208-215;
64. Large, Germans to the Front, 125;
65. Hitchcock, France Restored, 155, 173.
66. For the debate over the "Stalin Note," see Rolf Steininger, The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990);
67. Ruud Van Dijk, "The 1952 Stalin Note Debate: Myth or Missed Opportunity for German Unification?" Working Paper #14, Cold War International History Project, Washington DC (1996);
68. and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1997), 127.
69. Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 136.
70. Hitchcock, France Restored, 199;
71. Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 145.
72. Costigliola, France and the United States, 104.