Leaders' motivations and actions: Explaining government-dissident conflict-cooperation processes

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 73-90

  Shellman, Stephen M ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^b Dept of Economics and Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy at the College of William and Mary   (United States)

Author keywords

Conflict processes; Cooperation; Dissent; Repression

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644680378     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940500503820     Document Type: Article

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