Averting failure in Afghanistan

Survival

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 111-128

  Jones, Seth G ^a,b  

^a RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644627005     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396330600594306     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. I define stability operations as comprehensive efforts after major combat to establish security and rebuild state institutions. Several terms, such as peacebuilding, complex peace operations and nation-building, have been used to describe these activities. See, for example, Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 38;
2. Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Lessons from the Imperial Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 4;
3. James Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), pp. 1-2;
4. James Dobbins, 'The UN's Role in Nationbuilding: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq', Survival, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 2004, pp. 81-102;
5. James Dobbins, 'America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq', Survival, vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 2003, pp. 87-110.
6. ABC News Poll: Life in Afghanistan (New York: ABC News, December 2005);
7. Voter Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2004);
8. Afghanistan: Election Day Survey (Kabul: The International Republican Institute, 9 October 2004).
9. There are no good statistics on the numerical strength of Taliban forces, though most indicators suggest they are weaker than they were in 2001. Data extrapolated from several sources suggest that they may possess between 2,000 and 4,000 full-time fighters. Interviews with US Army personnel, July 2004 through August 2005;
10. Security and Foreign Forces: Afghanistan (Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group, 2004), available at http://www.janes.com.
11. RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/ terrorismdatabase/. Based on a review of data collected from such sources as the Afghanistan Non-Governmental Organisation Security Office, it appears that the RANDMIPT Terrorism Incident Database slightly underestimates the number of attacks and deaths.
12. I use the term 'foreign jihadists', rather than al-Qaeda, because these individuals are an unorganised amalgam of salafi jihadists from the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa. The term 'al-Qaeda' erroneously implies a structured organisation, which is incorrect in the Afghan case.
13. Michael O'Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 15 September 2005).
14. 'Country Risk Assessment: Afghanistan', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 16, no. 5, May 2004, pp. 38-41;
15. Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan and Philip Wilkinson, Minimal Investments, Minimal Results (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2004), pp. 1-8;
16. Anthony Davis, 'Afghan Security Deteriorates as Taliban Regroup', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 15, no. 5, May 2003, pp. 10-15.
17. ANSO Security Situation Summary, Weekly Report 039, 24-30 September 2004, p. 15.
18. Carlotta Gall, '21 Killed in Afghanistan Attacks Directed at Provincial Governor', New York Times, 15 August 2004;
19. ANSO Security Situation Summary, Weekly Report 039, 24-30 September 2004, p. 7;
20. ANSO Security Situation Summary, Weekly Report 036, 3-9 September 2004, p. 5;
21. ANSO Security Situation Summary, Weekly Report 038, 17-23 September 2004, pp. 7-8.
22. Asia Foundation, Voter Education Planning Survey;
23. International Republican Institute, Afghanistan: Election Day Survey. Opinion polls are a useful outcome measure for the security environment because they provide a gauge of public perceptions. Ideally, we would analyse poll results over time and identify changing patterns in public views of the security environment, but with only two polls available this is impossible.
24. International Republican Institute, Afghanistan Election Day Survey, p. 16.
25. ABC News Poll: Life in Afghanistan.
26. Frederick S. Starr, U.S. Afghanistan Policy: It's Working (Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University, Central Asia - Caucasus Institute, 2004), pp. 4-5.
27. Author interviews with senior US and Afghan officials, Afghanistan, October 2005.
28. Interview with senior Afghan government officials, Afghanistan, November 2005;
29. Barnett R. Rubin and Andrea Armstrong, 'Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan', World Policy Journal, vol. 20, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 34;
30. Mark Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2002).
31. 'Country Risk Assessment: Afghanistan', pp. 38-41;
32. Bhatia, Lanigan and Wilkinson, Minimal Investments, Minimal Results, p. 6;
33. Davis, 'Afghan Security Deteriorates', pp. 10-15.
34. Interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, former US envoy to Afghanistan, Washington DC, 21 September 2004.
35. Raymond A. Millen, Afghanistan: Reconstituting A Collapsed State (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April 2005), pp. 8-11.
36. Rubin and Armstrong, 'Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan', p. 34.
37. Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2004 (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004);
38. Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2005 (Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005);
39. The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem, 2nd ed. (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003);
40. Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2003 (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003), pp. 1-10;
41. Barnett R. Rubin, Road to Ruin: Afghanistan's Booming Opium Industry (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2004).
42. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005).
43. Interview with Deputy Minister of Justice Mohammad Qasim Hashimzai, Kabul, Afghanistan, 26 June 2004; Rama Mani, Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2003), p. 2.
44. Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective (Washington DC: Headquarters United States Air Force AF/XOL, February 2005);
45. Paul L. Hastert, 'Operation Anaconda: Perception Meets Reality in the Hills of Afghanistan', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 28, no. 1, January-February 2005, pp. 11-20;
46. Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Books, 2005).
47. RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database.
48. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990);
49. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000);
50. William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New York University Press, 2001).
51. Halima Kazem, 'Amnesty Offers Taliban Chance to Come Home', Los Angeles Times, 3 June 2005, p. A8;
52. Declan Walsh, 'Taliban Officials Brought in From the Cold', Guardian, 19 May 2005, p. 19;
53. Victoria Burnett, 'Taliban Leader Included in Amnesty', Financial Times, 10 May 2005, p. 9;
54. Carlotta Gall, 'Top Suspects in Afghanistan are Included in Amnesty', New York Times, 10 May 2005, p. 7.
55. Interview with senior Afghanistan government official, 6 September 2005.
56. Key Afghan cities for the support network include those along the ring road, such as Kabul, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Qalat, Kandahar and Herat. In addition, the main auxiliary lines include the old trade routes and way stations that connect Afghan cities to Iran and the rest of Afghanistan. Examples include the old Silk Road to Tehran, Pepper Route through Peshawar and on to India, route through the Khyber Pass to Peshawar, and route from Spin Boldak to Quetta.
57. David W. Barno, Afghanistan: The Security Outlook (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004);
58. David W. Barno, 'Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan', PowerPoint presentation, 2005;
59. Joshua Kucera, 'Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan: Paving the Way For Peace', Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 December 2004.
60. Author interviews with senior US officials, Afghanistan, October 2005. When the Taliban fell from power, Haqqani told local reporters: 'We will retreat to the mountains and begin a long guerrilla war to reclaim our pure land from infidels and free our country like we did against the Soviets ... we are eagerly awaiting the American troops to land on our soil, where we will deal with them in our own way.' Scott MacDonald, 'Minister's Visit Hints at Taliban Split', Reuters, 20 October 2001.
61. On salafi jihadists see Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 219-22;
62. Guilain Denoeux, 'The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam', Middle East Policy, vol. 11, no. 2, June 2002, pp. 69-71.
63. Joshua Kucera, 'Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan: Paving the Way For Peace', Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 December 2004;
64. Davis, 'Afghan Security Deteriorates'.
65. Lester Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996);
66. Lester Grau, Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1997).
67. Levon Sevunts, 'Coalition Forces Rise in Afghan Suicide Attacks', Washington Times, 23 June 2005, p. 1;
68. 'Suicide Bomber Attacks U.S. Military Vehicle in Afghanistan', Houston Chronicle, 13 June 2005.
69. The official counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan had five key pillars: PRT and NATO expansion; enabling the Afghan security forces; regional development zones; regional brigades and area ownership; and engagement with Pakistan. Barno, Afghanistan.
70. William Flavin, Civil-Military Operations: Afghanistan (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2004).
71. Robert Borders, 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: A Model for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development', Journal of Development and Social Transformation, vol. 1, November 2004, pp. 5-12.
72. James T. Quinlivan, 'Force Requirements in Security Operations', Parameters, vol. 25, no. 4, Winter 1995-96, pp. 59-69;
73. James Dobbins, America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003);
74. Dobbins, The UN's Role in Nation-building.
75. Interview with senior Afghan government officials, Afghanistan, November 2005.
76. This ratio assumes a 2005 Afghan population of 29,928,987. Source: US Census Bureau, International Data Base, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/ idbprint.html.
77. Seventh United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, 1998-2000 (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2000). The data are from the following years: Jordan, 1994; Kazakhstan, 2000; Kyrgyzstan, 2000; Russia, 1994; United States, 1999; and Germany, 2000.
78. Dobbins, 'America's Role in Nation-Building';
79. Dobbins, 'UN's Role in Nation-Building'.
80. Halima Kazem, 'Amnesty Offers Taliban Chance to Come Home', Los Angeles Times, 3 June 2005, p. A8;
81. Declan Walsh, 'Taliban Officials Brought in From the Cold', Guardian, 19 May 2005, p. 19;
82. Victoria Burnett, 'Taliban Leader Included in Amnesty', Financial Times, 10 May 2005, p. 9;
83. Carlotta Gall, 'Top Suspects in Afghanistan are Included in Amnesty', New York Times, 10 May 2005, p. 7.
84. Author interviews with senior Afghan and US officials, Afghanistan, October 2005;
85. Barno, Afghanistan;
86. David L. Buffaloe, Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82nd Airborne in Firebase Shkin (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, 2004), pp. 16-17.
87. Stephen T. Hosmer, The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990), pp. 30-31.
88. Ahmed Rashid, 'Who's Winning the War on Terror?', YaleGlobal, 5 September 2003.
89. Interview with senior Afghanistan government official, Washington DC, 6 September 2005;
90. Davis, 'Afghan Security Deteriorates', p. 13.
91. Joshua Kucera, 'Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan: Paving the Way For Peace', Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 December 2004;
92. Davis, 'Afghan Security Deteriorates'.
93. Gary Schroen, First In: An Insider's Account of how the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), p. 359.
94. Seth G. Jones, Jeremy Wilson, Andrew Rathmell and Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005);
95. Dobbins, America's Role in Nation-building;
96. Dobbins, UN's Role in Nation-building.
97. Afghanistan at a Glance (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005).
98. David M. Edelstein, 'Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail', International Security, vol. 29, no. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 49-91.
99. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp. 369-71.