Legal effects of world trade organization decisions within european union law: A contribution to the theory of the legal acts of international organizations and the action for damages under article 288(2) EC

Journal of World Trade

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 45-66

  Von Bogdandy, Armin ^a,b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Germany)

^b OECD   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EUROPEAN UNION; LEGISLATION; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION;

EID: 33644620127     PISSN: 10116702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (161)

1. A. Randelzhofer, Das Recht der europäischen Gemeinschaften und das nationale Recht (1971) 135 ZHR 227.
2. The term "municipal legal order" includes the EU legal order. The term "municipal institutions" includes the institutions of the EU.
3. They concern a claim by a company in liquidation (Biret International SA, Case C-93/02 P), and the claim of the parent company (Etablissements Biret et Cie SA, Case C-93/02 P). The decisions and opinions are the same on all the legal issues, however they are, by way of the different status of the companies, slightly diverging, which leads to different numbering of paragraphs. The following text refers solely to the decision in the latter case, C-94/02 P.
4. Concerning the fundamental parallelism between the Community and Member State liability, see ECJ, Case C-46/93 and Case C-48/93 Brasserie [1996] ECR I-1029, para. 42; see for detail Tesauro AG, ibid., 1100 et seq; Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm [2000] ECR I-5291, para. 41 et seq; from the commentary literature,
5. see W. Berg, "Art. 288 EGV", in Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar (Baden Baden: Nomos, 2000), paras 1 and 72 et seq;
6. M. Ruffert, "Art. 288 EG-Vertrag", in Calliess and Ruffert (eds), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag (2nd edn, Neuwide: Luchterhand, 2002), para. 1;
7. A. von Bogdandy, "Art. 288 EGV", in Grabitz and Hilf (eds), Das Recht der Europäischen Union (Munich: Beck, 2001), para. 5;
8. H.G. Schermers and D.F. Walbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001), §1111.
9. A. Alemanno, Judicial Enforcement of the WTO Hormones Ruling within the European Community: Toward EC Liability for the Non-Implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 45 Harvard Int'l L.J. (2004), p. 547;
10. S. Bartelt, Die Haftung der Gemeinschaft bei Nichtumsetzung von Entscheidungen des WTO-Streitbeilegungsgremiums, Europarecht (2003), p. 1077;
11. N. Lavranos, Decisions of International Organizations in the European and Domestic Legal Orders of Selected EU Member States (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2004), p. 40;
12. M. Pere, Non-Implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions and Liability Actions, 1 Nordic J. Commercial L. (2004), p. 1;
13. J. Wiers, One Day You're Gonna Pay: The European Court of Justice in Biret, 31 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2004), p. 143;
14. G.A. Zonnekeyn, EC Liability for Non-Implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions - Advocate General Alber Proposes a "Copemican Innovation" in the Case Law of the EC), 2 J.I.E.L. (2004), p. 761;
15. G.A. Zonnekeyn, EC Liability for Non-Implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions - are the Dice Cast?, 3 J.I.E.L. (2004), p. 483.
16. EC Directive 81/602/EEC of 31 July 1981, OJ L 222/32; Article 6 of EC Directive 88/146/EEC of 7 March 1988, OJ L 70/16; Article 2 of EC Directive 96/22/EC of 29 April 1996, OJ L 125/3.
17. On account of the ambivalent legal nature of the dispute settlement process between a judicial and an administrative procedure, the application of both the terms res judicata and "administrative finality" is problematic. That is why the neutral formulation of "final" is used. Similarly, P.T. Stoll and F. Schorkopf, WTO - Welthandelsordnung und Welthandelsrecht (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 2002), para. 482.
18. The term "WTO agreements" stands for the WTO Agreement itself, plus all other agreements falling thereunder that are listed in the annex of the WTO Agreement.
19. ECJ, Case C-104/97 P Atlanta v. Commission and Council [1999] ECR I-6983, para. 19 et seq.
20. For a definition of direct effect, see H. Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts (Berlin: Springer, 2003), p. 13. There is little terminological agreement in this respect. Sometimes this feature is also termed as direct applicability, invocability or self-executing nature. Some authors try to differentiate among various categories, e.g.
21. E. Klein, Unmittelbare Geltung, Anwendbarkeit und Wirkung von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrechts (Saarbrücken: Europa-Institut, 1988).
22. For the exclusion of WTO violations from the regime under Article 230 EC, see ECJ, Case C-146/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395, para. 47,
23. with annotation by F. Berrod, 36 R.T.D.E. (2000), p. 419;
24. M. Hilf and F. Schorkopf, EuR (2000), p. 74;
25. G. Zonnekeyn, 25 European L. Rev. (2000), p. 293;
26. Case 377/98 Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079, para. 52;
27. Stoll and Schorkopf, as note 7 above, paras 90, 680 et seq;
28. W. Weiss and C. Herrmann, Welthandelsrecht (Munich: Beck, 2003), paras 133, 140;
29. H.J. Priess and G.M. Berrisch, WTO Handbuch, in same (eds) (Munich: Beck, 2003), para. 22 et seq;
30. R. Mehdi, Journal du droit international (2002), p. 426;
31. A. Scott, European Intellectual Property Rev. (1999), p. 212.
32. ECJ, Case T-210-00 Biref v. Council [2002] ECR II-47, para. 77.
33. The CFI should have seen this on account of the case law on the Association Agreement with Turkey and the decisions of the corresponding Association Council, compare P. Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems, 34 C.M.L. Rev. 11 (1997), p. 54 et seq;
34. A. Weber and F. Moos, Rechtswirkungen von WTO- Streitbeilegungsentscheidungen im Gemeinschafisrecht, EuZW (1999), pp. 229, 234;
35. A. Reinisch, Entschädigung für die unbeteiligten Opfer des Hormon- und Bananenstreites nach Art. 288 II EG?, EuZW (2000), pp. 42, 48; further see extensively section III below.
36. Para. 65 et seq; this allows the ECJ to reject liability in the present case, as the liquidation proceeding regarding the complainant had already begun in 1995.
37. With this the ECJ obliges the CFI to a highly refined argumentation style: every argument of the parries, which is not absurd, must be handled in a convincing argumentative manner. On the judicial duty to state reasons, see U. Everling, Zur Begründung der Urteile des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, EuR (1994), p. 127.
38. ECJ, Biret decision, para. 55; as well as the opinion of the AG, para. 54.
39. This request is a binding order. H. Sauer, Die innergemeinschaftlichen Wirkungen von WTO-Streitbeilegungsentscheidungen, EuR (2004), pp. 463, 469.
40. This is not a decision of the WTO's DSB, but the decision of an arbitrator, Article 21(3) DSU. The arbitrator is to be understood as an organ of the WTO. Report of the Arbitrator J. Lacarte-Muro of 29 May 1998, WT/DS26/15 and WT/DS48/13.
41. The term "protective norm" (in German, Schutznorm) as it is used here refers to a superior rule of law that is intended to confer rights on individuals; for this requirement in an action under Article 288(2), see Bergaderm, as note 4 above, para. 42.
42. The implied assumption is that the attribution of direct effect is an autonomous EU decision that is not determined by WTO law. This remains one fundamental difference between WTO law and EU law, because, since van Gend & Loos, it is the ECJ that decides on the status of Community law in the legal order of Member States.
43. Para. 46. The ECJ does not mention the protective-norm requirement. Yet, the ECJ has never found liability when the infringed norm was not of a protective character, see ECJ joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder [1992] ECR I-3061, para. 12; CFI Case T-571/93 Lefebvre Frères [1995] ECR II-2379, para. 32; Case T-390/94 Schröder et al [1997] ECR II-501, para. 52.
44. See for detailed analysis, J. Klabbers, International Law in Community Law. The Law and Politics of Direct Effect, 21 Yearbook of European Law (2001-02), p. 263.
45. P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 274 et seq;
46. H. Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts (Berlin: Springer, 2003), esp. pp. 13 et seq, 42 et seq, 550.
47. ECJ joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139-01 Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk [2003] ECR I-4989, para. 100.
48. The constitutional (and not merely technical) nature of this issue is increasingly recognized, T Cottier, "A Theory of Direct Effect in Global Law", in von Bogdandy, Mavroidis and Mény (eds), European Integration and International Co-ordination, Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002), pp. 99, 115 et seq; Klabbers, as note 22 above;
49. B. Schoiwohl, Haftung der Gemeinschaft fir WTO-Rechtsverletzungen ihrer Organs, ZeuS (2001), p. 689. However, this dimension is not recognized by everybody; see e.g. Sauer, as note 17 above, pp. 465, 473.
50. On the interpretation of international law as having a constitutional function C. Tomuschat, Der Verfassungsslaat im Geflecht der internationalen Beziehungen, 36 WdStRL (1978), pp. 7, 51 et seq;
51. C. Tomuschat, "International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century", General Course on Public International Law, Receuil des cours 281, The Hague 1999 (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 42, 95; J. Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004), p. 134.
52. A further basis as to why the conclusions of the AG are unconvincing is his disregard of the relevant scientific discussion. The only scholar quoted is E.U. Petersmann, an important voice, who, however, advocates a contested project. Even the critical voice of the former General Director of Legal Services and later member and President of the Appellate Body is not considered; see C.D. Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court", 36 J.W.T. 4 (2002), pp. 605, 637;
53. in more detail C.D. Ehlermann, "On the Direct Effect of the WTO Agreements", in T Einhorn (ed.), Liber Amicorum Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 413, 415. For further literature see the references in note 13 above; Schoißwohl, as note 25 above;
54. D. Thürer, "WTO-Teilordnung im System des Volker- und Europarechts", in Thürer and Kux (eds), GATT 94 und die Welthandelsorganisation (Zurich: Schulthess, 1996), pp. 41, 52 et seq;
55. G. Zonnekeyn, "EC Liability for Non-Respect of Adopted WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports", in Kronenberger (ed.), The European Union and the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 251
56. . 28 For the parallel debate in political science see M. List and B. Zangl, "Verrechtlichung internationaler Politik", in Hellmann, Wolf and Zum (eds), Die neuen Internationalen Beziehungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), pp. 361, and 371 et seq;
57. J. Goldstein, M. Kahler, R. Keohane and A. Slaughter, Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 Int'l Organization (2000), p. 385 et seq.
58. This corresponds to an established theoretical position, A. Kojève, Outline of a Phenomenology of Right (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 146.
59. From the AG's conclusions in para. 48 et seq, it appears that the employed "principle of legality" is a principle of Communicy law, whereas the principle in para. 99 appears to be one of international law.
60. On these procedures in detail, see C. Carmody, Remedies and Conformity under the WTO Agreement, 5 J.I.E.L. (2002), p. 307;
61. P.C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 E.J.I.L. (2000), p. 763;
62. C.M. Vazquez and J.H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 Law and Policy in Int'l Business (2002), p. 555.
63. In detail, see A. von Bogdandy, "Legal Equality, Legal Certainty, and Subsidiarity in Transnational Economic Law - Decentralized application of Art. 81.3 EC and WTO law: why and why not", in von Bogdandy, Mavroidis and Mény, as note 25 above, p. 30 et seq.
64. P. Huber, Konkurrenzsschutz im Verwaltungsrecht (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1991), pp. 507 et seq.
65. Portugal v. Council, as note 11 above, para. 45.
66. See also S. Hörmann and G. Götische, Bleiben europäische Unternehmen rechtsschutzlos bei Verstößen der EG gegen das Welthandebrecht?, EuZW (2003), p. 449; Schoißwohl, as note 25 above, p. 691 and passim.
67. Eeckhout, as note 13 above, p. 50.
68. US - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Panel Report, WT/DS152/R, 22 December 1999, in particular note 661.
69. Council Decision 94/800, OJ L 336/1, which internally ratifies the WTO Agreement.
70. The attribution of direct effect is an autonomous decision of the EU organs, the organs of the WTO - contrary to those of the EU - cannot decide over the legal status of their law within the legal systems of their own members, see in detail Schoißwohl, as note 25 above, p. 699.
71. Case 26/72 van Cend & Loos [1963] ECR 1 and 24.
72. Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, para. 24.
73. In detail, see E. Grabitz, "Über die Verfassung des Binnenmarktes", in J. Baur, K. Hopt and K. Mailänder (eds), Festschrift für Ernst Steindorff (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1990), p. 1229 et seq.
74. C. Goodhart, Economics and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traffic?, 60 M.L.R. (1997), pp. 1, 4 et seq;
75. D. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe - Protecting Prometheus (New York and Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 232, 246.
76. In fact, Manin convincingly presents direct applicability as the most important expression of the principle of integration; P. Manin, Les Communautés européennes et l'Union européenne. Droit institutionnel (5th edn, Paris: Pedone, 1999), pp. 309 et seq.
77. "Coordinated interdependence" can, in fact, serve as a general approach to interpret WTO law, see A. von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO - Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship, 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2001), pp. 609, and 651 et seq.
78. Ibid., p. 659 et seq.
79. In detail on this argument, see Pere, as note 5 above, pp. 32-33; Wiers, as note 5 above, p. 148;
80. G. Zonnekeyn, EC Liability for Non-Implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions-Advocate General Alber Proposes a "Copernican Innovation" in the Case Law of the ECJ, 2 J.I.E.L. (2004), pp. 764-765.
81. ECJ joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357, para. 40; Case C-5/94 Hedley lomas [1996] ECR I-2553, para. 25; joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer [1996] ECR I-4845, para. 30 et seq; Case C-140/97 Rechberger [1999] ECR I-3499, para. 21 et seq. and 27 et seq; the opinion of Tesauro AG in Brasserie, as note 4 above, p. 1087. There remain considerable doctrinal uncertainties. See W. van Gerven, "Non-contractual Liability of Member States, Community Institutions and Individuals for Breaches of Community Law with a View to a Common Law for Europe", in van Gerven and Zuleeg (eds), Sanktionen als Mittel zur Durchsetzung des Gemeinschaftsrecht (Trier: ERA Schriftenreihe, 1996), pp. 29, and 40 et seq;
82. S. Kadelbach, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht unter europäischem Einfluss (Munich; Mohr-Siebeck, 1999), p. 173 et seq.
83. K. Larenz and C. Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (3rd edn, Berlin: Springer, 1995), p. 202 et seq;
84. H. Koch and H. Rüssmann, Juristische Begründungskhre (Munich: Beck, 1982), p. 259 et seq; Schoißwohl, as note 25 above, p. 703.
85. Compare the evidence in note 13 above.
86. For the view of a judge, see D. Edward, "Judicial Activism - Myth or Reality?", in Campbell and Voyatzi (eds), Legal Reasoning and Judicial Interpretation of European Law (London: Trenton, 1996), pp. 29, and 66 et seq;
87. see also L. Moral Soriano, A Modest Notion of Coherence in Legal Reasoning, 16 Ratio Juris (2003), pp. 296, 298, and 321 et seq.
88. In detail, see A. von Bogdandy, J. Bast and F. Arndt, Handlungsformen im Unionsrecht - Empirische Analysen und dogmatische Strukturen in einem vermeintlichen Dschungel, 62 ZaöRV (2002), pp. 77, and 144 et seq. 53 See Eeckhout, as note 23 above, pp. 283 et seq. and 288 et seq.
89. ECJ, Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, para. 5; Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR3641, para. 13.
90. First in ECJ, Case 30/88 Greece v. Commission [1989] ECR 3733, para. 13.
91. ECJ, Case C-192/89 Sevince [1990] ECR I-3461, para. 7 et seq; Case C-355/93 Eroglu [1994] ECR I-5113, para. 11; Case C-262/96 Sürül [1999] ECR I-2685, para. 74; annotation by M. Zuleeg on Case C-355/93 (Eroglu), in 33 CMLRev (1996), p. 93. In reaction to this decision, the EU institutions started to publish the decisions of cooperation bodies regularly in the Official Journal. In accordance with its current rules of procedure, the Council should have already decided by the conclusion of the agreement whether acts of its decision-making bodies are to be published, Article 17 V Rules of Procedure of the Council.
92. A. Weber, "Art 238 EGV", in von der Groeben, Thiesing and Ehlermann (eds), Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag (5th edn, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997), para. 46; compare for decision 2/80 of the Association Council EC-Turkey ECJ, Case 204/86 Greece v. Council [1998] ECR 5323, para. 20 et seq.
93. See, especially, R. Mögele, "Art. 300 EGV", in Streinz (ed.), Kommentar EUV/EGV (Munich: Beck, 2003), para. 82.
94. Ogee
95. H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (2nd edn, Wien: Springer, 1960), pp. 237, and 239 et seq;
96. F. Mueller and R. Christensen, Juristische Methodik (8th edn, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002), p. 149 et seq.
97. ECJ, Case C-192/89 Sevince [1990] ECR I-3461, para. 8 et seq.
98. ECJ, Case C-188/91 Deutsche Shell [1993] ECR I-363, para. 18; also the opinion of Alber AG in Case C-94/02 P Biret, para. 48.
99. Ibid., para. 60 of ECJ in Deutsche Shell; ibid., para. 94 of the opinion of Alber AG in Biret.
100. D. Booss, "Art. 230 EGV", in Grabitz and Hilf, as note 4 above, para. 119; Eeckhout, as note 23 above, p. 274 et seq.
101. Reinisch, as note 13 above, p. 47; in detail, Schoißwohl, as note 25 above, p. 695 et seq.
102. ECJ, Case 4/69 Lütticke [1971] ECR 325, para. 6; joined Cases 9/71 and 11/71 Compagnie d'approvisionnement [1972] ECR 391, para. 4 et seq; CFI, Case T-185/94 Geotronics [1995] ECR II-2795, para. 38; Case T54/96 Oleifici [1998] ECR II-3380, para. 62 et seq.
103. Such is the suggestion from Reinisch, as note 13 above, p. 47; weighing in against an uncoupling is the notion that direct effect in Community law serves for the protection of EU legal constitutional positions (inter alia property, freedom of profession, protection against discrimination). Such positions are not provided by WTO law. This argument amounts to the attempt to derive the direct effect out of an alleged "legal-protection deficit".
104. Francovich, as note 48 above; J. Gundel, Neue Grenzlinien für die Direktwirkung nicht umgesetzter EG-Richtlinien unter Privaten, EuZW (2001), p. 143.
105. See at II.C.3. above.
106. Insightful, W. Höfling, Primär- und Sekundärrechtsschutz im Öffentlichen Recht, 61 VVDStRL (2001), p. 260 et seq; this rationale appears most clearly in ECJ, Case 543/79 Birke [1981] ECR 2669, para. 28; CFI, Case T-479/93 and T-559/93 Bemardi [1994] ECR II-1115, para. 38 et seq; Case T-514/93 Cobrecaf [1995] ECR II-621, para. 59.
107. I. Seidl-Hohenveldern and G. Loibl, Das Recht der internationalen Organisationen einschließlich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften (7th edn, Cologne: Heymann, 2000), para. 1702;
108. H. Köck and P. Fischer, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen (3rd edn, Wien: Linde, 1997), p. 564;
109. E. Klein, "Die Internationalen und Supranationalen Organisationen", in W. Graf Vitzthum (ed.), Völkerrecht (2nd edn, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), p. 267 et seq
110. . 71 In detail, see Lavranos, as note 5 above, pp. 167, 180, 234;
111. A. Verdross and B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (3rd edn, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1984), para. 869.
112. Kelsen, as note 59 above; Mueller and Christensen, as note 59 above.
113. J. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 288.
114. Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. V. Peru) (Merits), Inter-Am. Ct HR, 14 March 2001, Ser. C, No.
115. operative para. 4. Moreover, in an interpretative decision to this judgment the IACrtHR explicitly states that the decision in the judgment on the merits has "generic effects", Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. V. Peru) (Interpretation of Judgment on the Merits) Inter-Am. Ct HR, 3 September 2001, Ser. C, No. 83, operative para. 2.
116. For details, see V. Orulu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards under the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 7 Annual Survey Int'l & Comp L. (2001), p. 21.
117. Most recently, see ECrtHR, App. No. 71503/01 Assanidze v. Georgia, (2004), para. 202.
118. G. Ress, Wirkung und Beachtung der Urteile und Entscheidungen der Straßburger Konventionsorgane, EuGRZ (1996), pp. 350-351.
119. German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), BVerfG (Kammer) NJW 1986, 1425 (1426 et seq.); BVerwG (German Federal Adminsitrative Court), BVerwGE 104, 265, 272; 105, 187; Conseil d'Etat, 11 February 2004, Chevrol, no. 257628, AJDA 2004, 441; for a comparative analysis, see
120. Okresek, Die Umsetzung der ECMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung, EuGRZ (2003), p. 168;
121. Ress, "The Effects of Judgments and Decisions in Domestic Law", in Macdonald, Matscher and Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), p. 801.
122. Tellingly, Torres v. State, Case No. PCD-04-442 (Okl.Cr. 13 May 2004) (Order granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing, after the ICJ in Case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico/ US) (Judgment, 31 March 2004) had found that the appellant's rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations had been violated.
123. SC Res. 827, 25 May 1993, on ICTY, ILM 32 (1993) 1203; SC Res. 955, 8 November 1994, on ICTR, ILM 33 (1994) 1598.
124. SC Res. 1244, 10 June 1999, on Kosovo, ILM 38 (1999) 1451; SC Res. 1272, 25 October 1999, on East Timor, ILM 39 (2000), 240. It has been argued that the use of Article 41 of the UN Charter to establish transitional administrations provides the UN with the characteristics of a supranational organization, see M. Herdegen, Die Befugnisse des UN-Sicherheitsrates (Heidelberg: Müller, 1998), pp. 33-34.
125. J. Frowein and N. Krisch, in Simma in collaboration with Mosler, Randelzhofer, Tomuschat and Wolfrum (eds), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) Vol. 1, introduction to Ch. VII, para. 45.
126. H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (3rd edn, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), § 1543, citing as an exception an incident in which Cameroon applied the UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia (SC Res. 232 (1966), 253 (1968), and 277 (1970)) to a ship carrying Rhodesian tobacco before the resolutions were transposed into national laws. For views rejecting direct effect see V. Gowlland-Debbas, Collective responses to illegal acts in international law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990), pp. 558-559, 569-572 (on the various mechanisms by which states incorporate such SC resolutions into their domestic systems);
127. P. Kuyper, The Implementation of International Sanctions (The Hague: Asser Institute, 1978), p. 75, dealing specifically with UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Recently, however, it has been suggested by Markus Wagner that Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003 on the termination of the embargo against Iraq might be partially directly effective,
128. M. Wagner, Die wirtschaftlichen Maßnahmen des Sicherheitsrates nach dem 11. September 2001 im völkerrechtlichen Kontext - Von Wirtschaftssanktionen zur Wirtschaftsgesetzgebung, 63 ZaöRV (2003), pp. 879, 913-914
129. . 84 Ibid., Schermers and Blokker; ibid., Kuyper.
130. BGH NJW 1996, 602, at 602; for other countries see Lavranos, as note 5 above, p. 94 et seq.
131. For in-depth discussion see Eeckhout, as note 23 above, pp. 436-440.
132. Ibid., pp. 439-440.
133. ECJ, Case 26/62 van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1.
134. U. Brand, A. Brunnengräber, L. Schrader, C. Stock and P. Wahl, Global Governance. Alternativen zur neolilberalen Globalisierung? (Munster: Westf. Dampfboot, 2000), see especially p. 104;
135. L. Wallach and M. Sforza, Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, 1999), pp. 3, and 217 et seq.
136. See Portugal v. Council, as note 11 above; cf. already, Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council [1994] ECR I-4973.
137. U. Everling, Will Europe slip on bananas? The bananas judgment of the Court of Justice and national courts, 33 CMLRev (1996), p. 401;
138. S. Griller, Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union, 3 J.I.E.L. (2000), pp. 441, and 450 et seq; von Bogdandy, as note 32 above, p. 357.
139. ECJ, Case C-377/98 Netherlands v. Parliament and Council (Biotechnology) [2001] ECR I-7079, para. 55.
140. ECJ, joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Dior [2000] ECR I-11037, para. 41 et seq.
141. Reinisch, as note 13 above, p. 51; C. Schmid, Immer wieder Bananen, NJW (1998), pp. 190, 196.
142. On the constitutional nature of the ECJ, G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Verfassungsgericht, EuR (1992), p. 225.
143. On this subject, see A. Slaughter Judicial Globalization, 40 Virginia J. Int'l L. (2000), p. 1103.
144. See ECJ Rechnungshof v: Österreichischer Rundfunk, as note 24 above, para. 68 et seq; ECJ, Case C-117/01 K.B. v. NHS Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health, judgment of 7 January 2004, para. 33 et seq.
145. ECrtHR, Hornsby v. Greece, App. No. 18357/91, judgment of 19 March 1997, para. 45; ECrtHR, App. No. 36677/97, Dangeville v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, para. 61.
146. Compare III.B. above.
147. The most important example is the case-law on the basic freedoms in view of the stagnant realization of the common market in the 1970s, compare ECJ, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837;
148. also the classical study of J.H.H. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe", in Weiler (ed), The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 10, and 39 et seq.
149. COM (2000), p. 320; it is questionable, but not to be discussed here, whether this proposal conforms to the DSB decision.
150. In detail Schoißwohl, as note 25 above, pp. 722 et seq.
151. The ECJ to this point has neither recognized nor rejected the existence of a claim for acts without assessment of legal error, ECJ, joined Cases 9 and 11/71 Compagnie d'approvisionnement [1972] ECR 391, para. 46; CFI, Case T-99/98 Hameico, judgment of 2 July 2003, para. 60.
152. H. Bronckhorst, "The Valid Legislative Act as a Cause of Liability of the Communities", in Heukels and McDonnell (eds), The Action for Damages in Community Law (London: Kluwer, 1997), p. 153;
153. S. Haak, Die ausservertragliche Haftung der EG für rechtmässiges Verhalten, EuR (1999), pp. 395, 398; M. Ruffert, as note 4 above, para. 18; von Bogdandy, as note 4 above, para. 94 et seq.
154. 104 CFI, Case T-184/95 Dorsch Consult [1998] ECR II/667, para. 59 et seq.
155. Haak, as note 103 above, p. 398.
156. See in detail, von Bogdandy, as note 4 above, para. 95. In this direction also C. Pitschas, EuZW (2003), p. 763.
157. ECJ, Case 267/82 Developpement SA and Clemessy [1986] ECR 1907, para. 33; Case 81/86 De Boer Buizen [1987] ECR 3677, para. 17; see Dorsch Consult, as note 104 above, paras 59, 76.
158. See opinion of Lenz AG in joined Cases 279, 280, 285 and 286/84 Rau [1987] ECR 1069, 1084 and 1114 et seq.
159. Direct effect could further aggravate the political debate over the costs of being a member generally. One must only think about the potential for public outrage, when, on account of direct effect of WTO law, the political pressure for the allowance of hormone-treated meat would be increased. See also Ehlermann, as note 27 above, p. 415: "The initial impression is deceptive: the (unilateral) recognition of direct effect by no means leads to a 'win-win' situation. It is obvious and has long been recognized that the (unilateral) recognition of direct effect raises the threshold for consent to future agreements."
160. For a discussion on the support of the European Parliament for the setting up of a parliamentarian assembly in the WTO, see P. Bender, The European Parliament and the WTO: Positions and Initiatives,
161. European Foreign Affairs Rev. (2002), pp. 193, and 206 et seq.