Cultural foundations of military diffusion

Review of International Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 69-91

  Goldman, Emily O ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644603516     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210506006930     Document Type: Review

References (166)

1. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (eds.), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
2. Margret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998);
3. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction', in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1-38;
4. Theo Farrell, Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army', European Journal of International Relations, 7 (March 2001), pp. 63-102;
5. Amy Gurowitz, 'Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State', World Politics, 51 (1999), pp. 413-45.
6. Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures and the End of the Cold War', International Organization, 48 (Spring 1994), pp. 185-214;
7. Farrell, Transnational Norms';
8. Deborah Avant, 'From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War', International Organization, 54 (Winter 2000), pp. 41-72.
9. Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', International Studies Quarterly, 43 (1999), pp. 83-114.
10. Radical reform can be implemented by 'political incumbents'. Peter the Great and Gorbachev come to mind.
11. Morris Janowitz, ' Some Observations on the Comparative Analysis of Middle Eastern Military Institutions', in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.), War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).
12. Scholars of comparative politics have already compared rates and patterns of change in these two countries. See Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964);
13. Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978).
14. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 61-3.
15. Martha Finnemore, 'Norms, Culture and World Culture: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism', International Organization, 50 (Spring 1996), p. 336.
16. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, p. 75.
17. Other cases of cultural resistance, and then cultural acceptance, of Western military innovations include Maury Feld, 'Middle Class Society and the Rise of Military Professionalism: The Dutch Army, 1589-1609', Armed Forces and Society (1975);
18. Richard Hellie, Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1971);
19. Adam Hirsh, The Collision of Military Cultures in 17th Century New England', Journal of American History, 74 (1988), pp. 1187-212;
20. Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare (University of Oklahoma Press, 1998);
21. and Andrew Vayda, 'Maoris and Muskets in New Zealand', Political Science Quarterly, 85 (1970), pp. 560-84.
22. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 127.
23. Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979);
24. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
25. New institutionalists also have a concept of competitive isomorphism. Because it is so similar to neorealism, I concentrate on their concept of normative isomorphism.
26. For an overview, see Richard W. Scott, Institutions and Organizations (London: Sage, 1995).
27. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', American Sociological Review, 48 (April 1983).
28. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 79-113,
29. Chris Demchak, 'Creating the Enemy: Global Diffusion of the IT-Based Military Model', in Goldman and Eliason (eds.), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, pp. 307-47.
30. John W. Meyer and Michael T. Hannan (eds.), National Development and the World System: Education, Economic, and Political Change, 1950-1970 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979);
31. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991);
32. Richard W. Scott, John W. Meyer et al., Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism (London: Sage, 1994);
33. John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, 'World Society and the Nation State', American Journal of Sociology, 193 (1997), pp. 144-81.
34. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights.
35. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders;
36. Risse and Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms';
37. Gurowitz, 'Mobilizing International Norms'.
38. Farrell, Transnational Norms and Military Development'.
39. Avant, 'From Mercenary to Citizen Armies'.
40. Thomas Risse and Stephen C. Roppe, 'International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change: Conclusions', in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights, pp. 262-4.
41. Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas Do Not Float Freely'. Matthew Evangelista makes a similar argument in his book, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
42. Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 1: The Rise of the Network Society (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 9-13.
43. Torsten Hägerstrand, Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
44. Translated by Allan Pred (originally published in 1953);
45. James M. Blaut, Two Views of Diffusion', in Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 67:3 (September 1977), p. 343.
46. Blaut, Two Views of Diffusion', p. 346;
47. David Brian Robertson, 'Political Conflict and Lesson-Drawing', Journal of Public Policy, 11 (January-March, 1991), p. 68.
48. Checkel, 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity'.
49. Theo Farrell, 'Culture and Military Power', Review of International Studies, 24 (1998), pp. 407-16;
50. Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941-1951 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994);
51. Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995);
52. Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996);
53. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
54. Checkel, 'Norms, Institutions and National Identity', p. 87.
55. Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas Do Not Float Freely', p. 209.
56. Castells, The Information Age, p. 10;
57. Jack A. Goldstone, 'Political Crisis and Cultural Orthodoxy: Attitudes toward Risk and Innovation in the Divergence of East and West in the 17th Century', draft manuscript.
58. Goldstone, 'Political Crisis and Cultural Orthodoxy', p. 389.
59. Goldstone, 'Political Crisis and Cultural Orthodoxy', Ibid., p. 378.
60. This argument resonates with the claim by Risse and Ropp, 'International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change', pp. 262-3,
61. that the internalisation of external norms works well in 'open' domestic societies, meaning 'societies that for a variety of historical reasons have developed cultures and institutions that are responsive to and can accommodate some meaningful degree of internal debate and external influence'. Similarly, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 30, associates the absence of a cultural and ideological orthodoxy with the 'freedom to inquire, to dispute, to experiment, a belief in the possibilities of improvement, a concern for the practical rather than the abstract, a rationalism which defied mandarin codes, religious dogma, and traditional folklore'.
62. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, pp. 66-7.
63. Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 8.
64. Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807, Ibid, p. 121.
65. See Stanford J. Shaw, The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-I Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III', The Journal of Modern History, 37:3 (September 1965), pp. 291-306;
66. Shaw, Between Old and New, especially pp. 86-166 for a discussion of Selim's reforms.
67. Shaw, 'Origins of Ottoman Military Reform', p. 302.
68. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968; reprinted 1969), pp. 78-9.
69. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (McGill University Press, 1964), p. 111.
70. For an overview, see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, ibid., pp. 137-222.
71. David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 61;
72. M. E. Yapp, The Modernization of Middle Eastern Armies in the Nineteenth Century: A Comparative View', in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 348;
73. Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 264-6.
74. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 265-6.
75. For an overview of reform in the navy, see Shaw, Between Old and New, pp. 150-66.
76. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, p. 266.
77. Avigdor Levy, 'Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century', Middle Eastern Studies, 18 (July 1982), pp. 229-30.
78. Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 405 notes that simply introducing new corps to make use of new weapons was not enough. The older corps had to be destroyed. The idea of creating new corps to make use of new techniques dated back to the creation of the Janissary corps in the fifteenth century to make use of rifles, cannons, and gunpowder.
79. Ralston, Importing the European Army, p. 75.
80. Levy, 'Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization', pp. 231-9;
81. Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 45-9.0
82. Levy, 'Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization', p. 236.
83. Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 59.
84. Levy, 'Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization', p. 238.
85. Shaw, Between Old and New, pp. 181-3.
86. Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 60-1;
87. Shaw, Between Old and New, pp. 189-90.
88. Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 82.
89. Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, p. 272.
90. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, p. 67;
91. Ralston, Importing the European Army, p. 52.
92. Ralston, Importing the European Army, p. 58.
93. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, p. 76.
94. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, Ibid., pp. 74, 79, 86.
95. For an extended discussion of the ideas of Kemal and the Young Ottomans, see Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (New York; Syracuse University Press, 2000).
96. Levy, 'Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization', p. 240.
97. Avigdor Levy, The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826-39', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2 (1971), p. 23.
98. Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
99. Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600 (Phoenix, 1995).
100. Walter F. Weiker, The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform', Administrative Science Quarterly, 13:3 (December 1968), pp. 458-9.
101. Inalcik, Ottoman Empire: Classical Age, p. 34.
102. These areas included Istanbul, Crete, part of Albania, Kurdistan, most of eastern Asia Minor, Bosnia, Syria, and Iraq. Efforts were made to conscript from these areas, and they did supply volunteers. But the major burden was born by the Muslims of Asia Minor. Yapp, 'Modernization of Middle Eastern Armies', p. 351.
103. See Halil Inalcik, The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East', in Parry and Yapp, War, Technology and Society in the Middle East. The importance of Islam varied throughout history and so did the rhetoric that Christian Europe was the infidel.
104. Imber, Ottoman Empire;
105. Martin Sicker, The Islamic World in Decline: From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire (Praeger, 2001).
106. Yapp, 'Modernization of Middle Eastern Armies', p. 338.
107. Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 58.
108. Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, pp. 412-19.
109. Westernists attributed Ottoman decline to the mental barrier created by Islam, subservience to the Şeriat, and the superstitious clerics who interpreted it.
110. Islamists attributed Ottoman decline to religious laxity. They believed that Western science and techniques could be borrowed without adopting the cultural, social and religious ways of Christian Europe. Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, pp. 342, 359, 361.
111. Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, Ibid., pp. 412-19. Turkists attributed Ottoman decline to a failure to adapt and interpret Islam in light of new conditions. Religion had become incongruent with modern society and had lost its living significance. The problem was the Şeriat an amalgam of religious, legal and ethical values that had come to be seen as identical to religion and viewed as immutable law. This was a function of how Islam had developed, and not inherent in Islam itself. In reality, sacred texts gave few injunctions. Most emerged from social practices, which should in turn guide the interpretation of the Şeriat. The problem was that contemporary Muslim society had become incompatible with the Şeriat as interpreted by the Ulema.
112. Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, Ibid., 483-500.
113. Uriel Heyd, Language Reform in Modern Turkey (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1954).
114. Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 3.
115. D. Eleanor Westney, The Military', in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman (eds.), Japan in Transition From Tokugawa to Meiji (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 169.
116. Ernst L. Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1965), pp. 140-3.
117. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, pp. 72-3.
118. Ralston, Importing the European Army, pp. 153-5.
119. Westney, The Military', p. 176.
120. Roger F. Hackett, The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo', in Marius Jansen (ed.), Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 333.
121. Hyman Kublin, The Modern Army of "Early" Japan', The Far Eastern Quarterly, 9 (1949), p. 39.
122. Presseisen, Before Aggression, pp. 55-6.
123. Presseisen, Before Aggression, Ibid., p. 63.
124. Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966), pp. 116-17.
125. H. Suganami, 'Japan's Entry into International Society', in Peter Kornicki (ed.), Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 1868-1912, vol. 1 (Routledge, 1998), p. 14.
126. H. Suganami, 'Japan's Entry into International Society', Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 1868-1912, Ibid.
127. Ralston, Importing the European Army, p. 149.
128. Ralston, Importing the European Army, Ibid.
129. Thomas M. Huber, The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 49;
130. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, p. 74.
131. W. G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 234.
132. Ralston, Importing the European Army, p. 151.
133. Huber, Revolution Origins, p. 211.
134. Jintarō Fujii, Outline of Japanese History in the Meiji Era, translated and adapted by Hattie K. Colt and Kenneth E. Colton (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1969), pp. 2-3.
135. See Noel Perrin, Giving Up the Gun: Japan's Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879 (Boston, MA: David R. Godine, 1979) for a concise analysis of why and how the Japanese abandoned the gun, which had been introduced into Japan by the Europeans in 1543.
136. Fujii, Outline of Japanese History, pp. 39-40.
137. Robert N. Bellah, Imagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and its Modern Interpretation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003) argues that although Japan rejected Western firearms until the end of the Tokugawa period, they did not reject other Western technological advances. He argues further that the official policy of isolation dates to the Expulsion Edict of 1825. Previous decrees only restricted contact with the Spanish and Portuguese because of their connection with unwanted missionaries. Isolation from foreign trade was due to Dutch control of East Asian waters, not to any actions by the Japanese.
138. Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and Japan's Technological Transformation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 88.
139. W. G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1990), p. 56.
140. Fujii, Outline of Japanese History, pp. 43-4.
141. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 8, 12-13.
142. Presseisen, Before Aggression, pp. 46-7.
143. See Presseisen, Before Aggression, Ibid., pp. 106-37 for a detailed discussion of Meckel's contributions to the Japanese Army.
144. Huber, Revolutionary Origins, pp. 32-3, 211-20.
145. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, p. 79.
146. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, Ibid, p. 27.
147. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, Ibid., pp. 30-1;
148. Herschel Webb, The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 262-3.
149. Webb, Japanese Imperial Institution, p. 235 provides an excellent discussion of the dynamics of the jōt, or repel the barbarians, faction. The debate with the Shogun was not over whether to repel the barbarians, which was taken for granted, but how to do so.
150. Huber, Revolutionary Origins, pp. 61-2.
151. Huber, Revolutionary Origins, Ibid., p. 62.
152. Masaaki Kōsaka, Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era, translated and adapted by David Abosch (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1969), pp. 36-48.
153. Huber, Revolutionary Origins, pp. 46-51.
154. Huber, Revolutionary Origins, Ibid., pp. 200-1.
155. Huber, Revolutionary Origins, Ibid., p. 49.
156. Beasley, Rise of Modern Japan, pp. 22-5.
157. Beasley, Rise of Modern Japan, Ibid., p. 25;
158. Kosaka, Japanese Thought, pp. 20-7.
159. Donald H. Shively, 'Nishimura Shigeki: A Confucian View of Modernization', in Marius Jansen (ed.), Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 196.
160. Suganami, 'Japan's Entry', p. 9.
161. D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 1.
162. Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change', International Organization, 55 (Summer 2001), pp. 553-88.
163. Gurowitz, 'Mobilizing International Norms', Westney, Imitation and Innovation, p. 19,
164. similarly argues in her study of Meiji Japan that there was a strong desire to make Japan a modern, internationally respected nation. What better way to achieve this than by emulating Western models? See also Emily O. Goldman, 'The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan', in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 41-67.
165. Several studies examine military change and reform only within Western European societies (Avant, 'From Mercenary to Citizen Armies'; Farrell, 'Transnational Norms and Military Development'), reducing the extent of culture clash and leading to the privileging of domestic political arguments. Farrell does look at culture clash but the culture he focuses on is military culture. There was no clash of social culture between the British and Irish cases.
166. Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, 'Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization', Review of International Studies, 19 (1993), pp. 321-47.