A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games

Game Practice and the Environment

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 224-246

  Currarini, Sergio ^a   Marini, Marco ^b,c  

^a CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF URBINO   (Italy)

^c LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 32644480315     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781845421441.00019     Document Type: Chapter

References (9)

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2. Aumann, R. (1967), 'A survey of games without side payments', in M. Shubik (ed.), Essays in Mathematical Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 3-27.
3. Bloch, F. (1997), 'Non cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers', in C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco (eds), New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Bulow, J., J. Geanokoplos and P. Klemperer (1985), 'Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes and complements', Journal of Political Economy, 93, 488-511.
5. Chander, P. and H. Tulkens (1997), 'The core of an economy with multilateral externalities', International Journal of Game Theory, 26, 379-401.
6. Hart, S. and M. Kurz (1983), 'Endogenous formation of coalitions', Econometrica, 51, 1047-64.
7. Neumann, J. von and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8. Topkis,D.M. (1998), Supermodularity and Complementarities, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9. Yi, S.-S. (1997), 'Stable coalition structure with externalities', Games and Economic Behaviour, 20, 201-37.