What determines EU decision making? Needs, power or both?

Economic Policy

Volumn , Issue 39, 2004, Pages 221-266

  Kauppi, Heikki ^a   Widgrén, Mika ^b,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

^c Elinkeinoelaman Tutkimuslaitos   (Finland)

^d Center for Economic and Policy Research   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; EUROPEAN UNION; POLITICAL POWER; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

EURASIA; EUROPE;

EID: 3242744344     PISSN: 02664658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0327.2004.00123.x     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. Anderson, K. and R. Tyers (1995). 'Implications of the EC expansion for European agricultural policies, trade and welfare', in R. Baldwin (ed.), Expanding the Membership of the European Union, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
2. Baldwin, R. (1994). Towards an Integrated Europe, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
3. Baldwin, R. and M. Widgrén (2003a). 'Decision-making and the Constitutional Treaty: Will the IGC discard Giscard?', Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief 37.
4. Baldwin, R. and M. Widgrén (2003b). 'The Draft Constitutional Treaty's voting rule dilemma', Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief 44.
5. Baldwin, R. and C. Wyplosz (2004). The Economics of European Integration, McGraw-Hill.
6. Baldwin, R., E. Berglöf, F. Giavazzi and M. Widgrén (2000). 'The EU reforms for tomorrow's Europe', Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 2623.
7. Baldwin, R., E. Berglöf, F. Giavazzi and M. Widgrén (2001). Nice Try: Should the Treaty of Nice Be Ratified? Monitoring European Integration 11, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
8. Baldwin, R., J. Francois and R. Portes (1997). 'The costs and benefits of eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and central Europe', Economic Policy, 24, 125-76.
9. Brenton, P. and D. Gros (1993). 'The budgetary implications of EC enlargement', Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document No 78.
10. Bueno de Mesquita, B. and F.N. Stokman (eds.) (1994) European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons, Yale University Press, New Haven.
11. Courchene, T., Goodhart, C., Majocchi, A. et al. (1993). 'Stable money-sound finances: Community public finance in the perspective of EMU', European Economy, special issue, No. 53.
12. Crombez, C. (1996). 'Legislative procedures in the European Community', British Journal of Political Science, 26, 199-228.
13. Crombez, C. (1997). 'The co-decision procedure in the European Union', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22, 97-119.
14. Felsenthal, D. and M. Machover (1998). The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
15. Felsenthal, D. and M. Machover (2001). 'Myths and meaning of voting power', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13, 81-87.
16. Garrett, G. and G. Tsebelis (1999a). 'Why resist the temptation to apply power indices to the EU?', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11, 291-308.
17. Garrett, G. and G. Tsebelis (1999b). 'More reasons to resist the temptation to apply power indices to the EU', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11, 331-38.
18. Garrett, G. and G. Tsebelis (2001). 'Even more reasons to resist the temptation to apply power indices to the EU', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13, 99-105.
19. Holler, M. and M. Widgrén (1999). 'Why power indices for assessing EU decision-making?', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11, 321-30.
20. Jackson, M. and J. Swinnen (1994). 'A survey and evaluation of current situation and prospects of agriculture in the central and eastern European countries, with emphasis on six states with European agreements', Final Report to the European Commission. European Commission, DG 6, Brussels.
21. Kandogan, Y. (2000). 'Political economy of eastern enlargement of the EU: Budgetary costs and then reform of voting rules', European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 685-706.
22. Kieschnick, R. and B.D. McCullough (2003). 'Regression analysis of variates observed on (0, 1): Percentages, proportions and fractions', Statistical Modelling, 3, 193-213.
23. Kirman, A. and M. Widgrén (1995). 'European economic decision-making policy: Progress or paralysis?', Economic Policy, 21, 421-60.
24. Laruelle, A. and M. Widgrén (1998). 'Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?', Public Choice, 94(3-4), 317-39.
25. Leech, D. (2002). 'Designing the voting system for the EU Council of Ministers', Public Choice, 113(3-4), 437-64.
26. Moser, P. (1996). 'The European Parliament as a conditional agenda setter: What are the conditions? A critique of Garrett and Tsebelis', American Political Science Review, 90, 834-38.
27. Moser, P. (1997). 'A theory of the conditional influence of the European Parliament in the cooperation procedure', Public Choice, 91, 333-50.
28. Napel, S. and M. Widgrén (2004). 'Power measurement as sensitivity analysis: A unified approach', forthcoming in the Journal of Theoretical Politics.
29. Pajala, A. and M. Widgrén (2004). 'A priori versus empirical voting power in the EU Council of Ministers', European Union Politics, 5(1), 73-97.
30. Papke, L.E. and J.M. Wooldridge (1996). 'Econometric methods for fractional response variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates', Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11, 619-32.
31. Shapley, L.S. (1953). 'A value for n-person games', in H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (Annals of Mathematics Studies 28), Princeton University Press, Princeton.
32. Shapley, L.S. and M. Shubik (1954). 'A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system', American Political Science Review, 48, 487-792.
33. Steunenberg, B. (1994). 'Decision-making under different institutional arrangements: Legislation by the European Community', Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, 150, 642-69.
34. Steunenberg, B., D. Schmidtchen and C. Koboldt (1999). 'Strategic power in the European Union: Evaluating the distribution of power in policy games', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11, 339-66.
35. Straffin, P.D. (1977). 'Homogeneity, independence, and power indices', Public Choice, 30, 107-18.
36. Straffin, P.D. (1988). 'The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities', in A.E. Roth (ed.), The Shapley Value, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
37. Straffin, P.D. (1994). 'Power and stability in politics', in R.J. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory, Elsevier Science.
38. Tangermann, S. (1997). 'Reforming the CAP: A prerequisite for eastern enlargement', in H. Siebert (ed.), Quo Vadis Europe?, 151-79, Kiel Institute of World Economics.
39. Thompson, R., F. Stockman, C. Achen and T. König (eds.) (2004). The EU Decides, Book Manuscript prepared for the ECPR Conference, Marburg, September 2003.
40. Tsebelis, G. (1994). 'The European Parliament as conditional agenda setter', American Political Science Review, 88, 128-42.
41. Tsebelis, G. (1996). 'More on the European Parliament as conditional agenda setter: Response to Moser', American Political Science Review, 90, 839-44.
42. Widgrén, M. (1994). 'Voting power in the EU and the consequences of two different enlargements', European Economic Review, 38, 1153-70.