Comparing economic incentives in peer-to-peer networks

Computer Networks

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 133-146

  Antoniadis, Panayotis ^a   Courcoubetis, Costas ^a   Mason, Robin ^b  

^a ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Economics; Incentives; Incomplete information; Mechanism design; P2p networks; Public goods

Indexed keywords

CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION); COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NUMERICAL ANALYSIS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

INCENTIVES; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; MECHANICAL DESIGN; P2P NETWORKS; PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS (P2P); PUBLIC GOODS;

TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

EID: 3242666914     PISSN: 13891286     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2004.03.021     Document Type: Article

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