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Volumn 1, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 797-802

The church report's analysis of vertical and conglomerate mergers: A reply to Cooper, Froeb, O'Brien, and Vita

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EID: 31844443590     PISSN: 17446414     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhi026     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (2)

References (15)
  • 2
    • 34547128338 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A companion piece sponsored by DG Enterprise and Industry considers efficiency benefits associated with non-horizontal mergers in detail. See
    • A companion piece sponsored by DG Enterprise and Industry considers efficiency benefits associated with non-horizontal mergers in detail. See Simon Bishop et al., The Efficiency-Enhancing Effects of Non-Horizontal Mergers (2005), http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/ library/lib-competition/doc/non_horizontal_mergers.pdf.
    • (2005) The Efficiency- Enhancing Effects of Non-Horizontal Mergers
    • Bishop, S.1
  • 3
    • 31844434765 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A Critique of Professor Church's Report on the Impact of Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers on Competition 4
    • James Cooper, Luke Froeb, Dan O'Brien & Michael Vita, A Critique of Professor Church's Report on the Impact of Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers on Competition 4, 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 785 (2005).
    • (2005) J. Competition L. & Econ. , vol.1 , pp. 785
    • Cooper, J.1    Froeb, L.2    O'Brien, D.3    Vita, M.4
  • 5
    • 0034385704 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market
    • Eric Avenel & Corinne Barlet, Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market, 9 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 211 (2000).
    • (2000) J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy , vol.9 , pp. 211
    • Avenel, E.1    Barlet, C.2
  • 10
    • 20144377477 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Exclusive Dealing
    • show that the introduction of non-coincident market effects can result in an incentive for foreclosure that is profitable and harms consumers. A non-coincident market means that the market power created upstream is exercised in a different downstream market than the one in which the vertically integrated firm participates. For the complete list of factual circumstances that must be present for the Bernheim-Whinston model to indicate anticompetitive harm from, and incentive to, vertically merge and foreclose
    • Douglas Bernheim & Michael Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106 J. POL. ECON. 64 (1998), show that the introduction of non-coincident market effects can result in an incentive for foreclosure that is profitable and harms consumers. A non-coincident market means that the market power created upstream is exercised in a different downstream market than the one in which the vertically integrated firm participates. For the complete list of factual circumstances that must be present for the Bernheim-Whinston model to indicate anticompetitive harm from, and incentive to, vertically merge and foreclose,
    • (1998) J. Pol. Econ. , vol.106 , pp. 64
    • Bernheim, D.1    Whinston, M.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.