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2
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34547128338
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A companion piece sponsored by DG Enterprise and Industry considers efficiency benefits associated with non-horizontal mergers in detail. See
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A companion piece sponsored by DG Enterprise and Industry considers efficiency benefits associated with non-horizontal mergers in detail. See Simon Bishop et al., The Efficiency-Enhancing Effects of Non-Horizontal Mergers (2005), http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/ library/lib-competition/doc/non_horizontal_mergers.pdf.
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The Efficiency- Enhancing Effects of Non-Horizontal Mergers
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Bishop, S.1
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3
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31844434765
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A Critique of Professor Church's Report on the Impact of Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers on Competition 4
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James Cooper, Luke Froeb, Dan O'Brien & Michael Vita, A Critique of Professor Church's Report on the Impact of Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers on Competition 4, 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 785 (2005).
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Cooper, J.1
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Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market
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Eric Avenel & Corinne Barlet, Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market, 9 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 211 (2000).
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Avenel, E.1
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31844434765
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A Critique of Professor Church's Report on the Impact of Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers on Competition 4
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Cooper, Froeb, O'Brien & Vita, supra note 3, at 790.
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Cooper, J.1
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20144377477
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Exclusive Dealing
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show that the introduction of non-coincident market effects can result in an incentive for foreclosure that is profitable and harms consumers. A non-coincident market means that the market power created upstream is exercised in a different downstream market than the one in which the vertically integrated firm participates. For the complete list of factual circumstances that must be present for the Bernheim-Whinston model to indicate anticompetitive harm from, and incentive to, vertically merge and foreclose
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Douglas Bernheim & Michael Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106 J. POL. ECON. 64 (1998), show that the introduction of non-coincident market effects can result in an incentive for foreclosure that is profitable and harms consumers. A non-coincident market means that the market power created upstream is exercised in a different downstream market than the one in which the vertically integrated firm participates. For the complete list of factual circumstances that must be present for the Bernheim-Whinston model to indicate anticompetitive harm from, and incentive to, vertically merge and foreclose,
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J. Pol. Econ.
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Bernheim, D.1
Whinston, M.2
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