Possibilistic information flow control in the presence of encrypted communication

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3193, Issue , 2004, Pages 209-224

  Hutter, Dieter ^a   Schairer, Axel ^a  

^a GERMAN RESEARCH CENTER FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DFKI   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTERS;

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS; DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS; ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION; EQUIVALENCE RELATIONS; INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL; INFORMATION FLOWS; NON INTERFERENCE; POSSIBILISTIC INFORMATIONS; REDUCTION TECHNIQUES;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 31844443143     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-30108-0_13     Document Type: Article

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