Process algebra and non-interference

Journal of Computer Security

Volumn 9, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 75-103

  Ryan, P Y A ^a   Schneider, S A ^b  

^a SRI Cambridge   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bisimulation; Confidentiality; Information flow; Information security; Non determinism; Non interference; Power bisimulation; Process algebra; Testing equivalence; Unwinding rules

Indexed keywords

BOOLEAN ALGEBRA; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; DATA FLOW ANALYSIS; EQUIVALENCE CLASSES;

INFORMATION FLOW; POWER BISIMULATION; PROCESS ALGEBRA;

SECURITY OF DATA;

EID: 0035067847     PISSN: 0926227X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2001-91-204     Document Type: Article

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