Rules and actions: Determinants of peer group and staff actions in group-based microcredit programs in the United States

Economic Development Quarterly

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 75-96

  Hung, Chi Kan Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS BOSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Enforcement; Microcredit; Monitoring; Peer group; Program rules; Screening

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; MONITORING;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 31544442187     PISSN: 08912424     EISSN: 15523543     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0891242405279361     Document Type: Article

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