So who gains from a small tick size?

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 32-66

  Kadan, Ohad ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Decimalization; Imperfect competition; Tick size; Welfare

Indexed keywords

EID: 31444446387     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2004.09.003     Document Type: Article

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