Ex Post Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction When Demand Can Be Arbitrarily Larger Than Supply

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 97, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 175-190

  Zacharias, Eleftherios ^a   Williams, Steven R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS   (Cyprus)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Double auction; bargaining; market microstructure

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346611216     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2722     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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