Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 171-200

  Slikker, Marco ^a   Norde, Henk ^b  

^a EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Incomplete stable structure; Link formation; Symmetric convex game; Undirected graph

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142763789     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.001     Document Type: Article

References (6)

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2. Feinberg Y. An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable Games Econ. Behav. 24 1998 2-9
3. Myerson R. Graphs and cooperation in games Math. Oper. Res. 2 1977 225-229
4. Shapley L. A value for n-person games In: Tucker A. Kuhn H. (Eds.). Contributions to the Theory of Games II 1953 307-317 Princeton Univ. Press Princeton
5. Van den Nouweland A. 1993. Games and graphs in economic situations. PhD thesis. Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
6. Wilson R. Watkins J. Graphs: An Introductory Approach 1990 Wiley New York