The US nuclear posture review and the NATO allies

International Affairs

Volumn 80, Issue 4, 2004, Pages

  Yost, David S ^a  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 3142733746     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00412.x     Document Type: Review

References (73)

1. This article is based on interviews with allied observers as well as press coverage. The US State Department's Office of Media Reaction published two useful reports about international press coverage of the NPR.: 'US nuclear policy: "sleight of hand" doesn't escape foreign notice' on 18 January 2002, and 'US nuclear policy: is Washington "rethinking the unthinkable"?' on 15 March 2002.
2. For background, see David S. Yost, The US and nuclear deterrence in Europe, Adelphi Paper no. 326 (London: Oxford University Press/International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1999).
3. Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts), submitted to Congress on 31 Dec. 2001, p. 44, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr. htm. The authenticity of these excerpts has not been confirmed by the US government, but they have probably been more widely cited than the official public expositions of the NPR's content by officials of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
4. Final communiqué, ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, 12 June 2003, para. 14.
5. 'Report on options for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), verification, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament', press communiqué M-NAC-2 (2000) 121, Brussels, 14 Dec. 2000, para. 77.
6. Bruno Tertrais, 'Polémique déplacée autour de la Nuclear Posture Review', TTU Europe, no. 400, 14 March 2002, p. 6.
7. Kurt Guthe, The Nuclear Posture Review: how is the 'new triad' new? (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002), pp. 13, 21-2, 26.
8. Ibid., p. 20.
9. C4ISR stands for command, control, communications, computers intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
10. At a news conference in Crawford, Texas, on 13 November 2001, President Bush said, 'I have informed President Putin that the United States will reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, a level fully consistent with American security.' Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/print/2001113- 3.html.
11. John A. Gordon, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, 'Prepared statement for the hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review', Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 Feb. 2002, pp. 7-8.
12. Some arms control treaties have stipulated a year's notice for withdrawal (e.g. the 1967 Outer Space Treaty) or six months' notice (e.g. the ABM Treaty, SALT I and II, the INF Treaty, and START I and II). Some treaties have, however, also included a three-months'-notice withdrawal clause - for instance, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
13. The Assembly of the Western European Union on 4 June 2002 approved a resolution (no. 709) welcoming the Moscow Treaty, but 'regretting that the agreement does not include clear commitments regarding the deactivated warheads'. The resolution is available at www.assemblee ueo.org/en/documents/ sessions_ordinaires/txt/2002/709rec.html. According to a European critic of the Moscow Treaty, 'It is a strange argument to appeal to the precedent of previous nuclear arms control treaties, and to say that, because the SALT and START and INF treaties did not call for the destruction of warheads, this one should not call for the destruction of warheads. It's like saying that, because our cars have never had airbags, we should never have airbags in future cars.' Author's interview with a German observer in Berlin, 19 July 2002. The counter-argument is that there is no established way to conduct verified control or destruction of warheads, so this view is like demanding airbags be ore the technology was developed. The Russians in any event have never appeared willing to pursue such measures in a concrete fashion. The US government has not yet determined the magnitude of the non-deployed stockpile that it will retain. 'However, the analysis that helped determine the size of the operationally deployed force and the decision to pursue non-nuclear capabilities in the New Triad suggests that our responsive capability will not need to be as large as the "hedge" force maintained by the previous Administration.' Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 'Prepared statement for the hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review', Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 Feb. 2002, p. 9.
14. The Assembly of the Western European Union on 4 June 2002 approved a resolution (no. 709) welcoming the Moscow Treaty, but 'regretting that the agreement does not include clear commitments regarding the deactivated warheads'. The resolution is available at www.assemblee ueo.org/en/documents/ sessions_ordinaires/txt/2002/709rec.html. According to a European critic of the Moscow Treaty, 'It is a strange argument to appeal to the precedent of previous nuclear arms control treaties, and to say that, because the SALT and START and INF treaties did not call for the destruction of warheads, this one should not call for the destruction of warheads. It's like saying that, because our cars have never had airbags, we should never have airbags in future cars.' Author's interview with a German observer in Berlin, 19 July 2002. The counter-argument is that there is no established way to conduct verified control or destruction of warheads, so this view is like demanding airbags be ore the technology was developed. The Russians in any event have never appeared willing to pursue such measures in a concrete fashion. The US government has not yet determined the magnitude of the non-deployed stockpile that it will retain. 'However, the analysis that helped determine the size of the operationally deployed force and the decision to pursue non-nuclear capabilities in the New Triad suggests that our responsive capability will not need to be as large as the "hedge" force maintained by the previous Administration.' Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 'Prepared statement for the hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review', Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 Feb. 2002, p. 9.
15. 'We can reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads to this level because, in the NPR, we excluded from our calculation of nuclear requirements for immediate contingencies the previous, long-standing requirements centered on the Soviet Union and, more recently, Russia. This is a dramatic departure from the Cold War approach to nuclear force sizing, which focused first and foremost on sustaining our side of the balance of terror and mutual assured destruction (MAD).... MAD is a strategic relationship appropriate to enemies, to deep-seated hostility, and distrust. Russia is not our enemy, and we look forward to a new strategic framework for our relations.' Feith, 'Prepared statement for the hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review', 14 Feb. 2002, p. 6, Some allied experts have noted that they do not endorse the tendency of US officials to deplore 'mutual assured destruction' strategic postures as an element in US-Russian relations. Among these experts, some point out that it would be difficult to move beyond the continuing situation of US-Russian mutual vulnerability, and they hold that this situation is a source of political and strategic stability. Moreover, they note, US official rejections of mutual vulnerability as a strategic policy do not seem to be reciprocated by the Russians, who have historically not welcomed their own vulnerability and who intend to continue to hold the United States at risk of nuclear attack.
16. In the words of a critic, 'The Moscow Treaty is a rather short-term legal obligation - what we call in German eine logische Sekunde - it's not real, but for logical reasons it has to be there. The obligation only applies to meet the deadline. After the deadline, it's gone... . We need a legally binding treaty with an obligation lasting longer than one second... . By reducing uncertainties about Russia, it would enhance our security.' Author's interview with a German observer in Berlin, 18 July 2002.
17. Christoph Bluth, 'Warming words but chill is still in the air', Times Higher Education Supplement, 31 May 2002, p. 10.
18. Vladimir Putin, then President-elect of the Russian Federation, speech at the State Duma, 14 April 2000, in Kommersant, 15 April 2000, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CEP20000417000148.
19. The Moscow Treaty also reflected other circumstances. Owing to economic constraints, Russian strategic nuclear capabilities would probably decline radically without any formal arms control measures, and Russia might not be able to maintain the treaty-specified ceiling of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads in 2012.
20. Secretary of State Colin Powell, 'Prepared statement on the US-Russia Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions', Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 July 2002, available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/11735pf.htm.
21. According to written responses by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, '[I]t is imperative to preserve the capability of nuclear-capable bombers to deliver conventional weapons and vice-versa. The 76 B-52H bombers and 21 B-2 bombers that will make up the bomber portion of the NPR force structure must be able to carry out both nuclear and conventional missions.' Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction. The Moscow Treaty, Hearings, 107th Congress, 2nd session (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 123. US officers had expressed concern in 2000 that START It's counting and attribution rules could hamper US efforts to maintain and improve conventional bomber capabilities. See the testimony of Admiral Richard Mies, USN, then Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic Command, and General Michael Ryan, USAF, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, at the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on US Strategic Nuclear Force Requirements, 23 May 2000, Federal News Service transcript, pp. 7, 16.
22. According to written responses by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, '[I]t is imperative to preserve the capability of nuclear-capable bombers to deliver conventional weapons and vice-versa. The 76 B-52H bombers and 21 B-2 bombers that will make up the bomber portion of the NPR force structure must be able to carry out both nuclear and conventional missions.' Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction. The Moscow Treaty, Hearings, 107th Congress, 2nd session (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 123. US officers had expressed concern in 2000 that START It's counting and attribution rules could hamper US efforts to maintain and improve conventional bomber capabilities. See the testimony of Admiral Richard Mies, USN, then Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic Command, and General Michael Ryan, USAF, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, at the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on US Strategic Nuclear Force Requirements, 23 May 2000, Federal News Service transcript, pp. 7, 16.
23. '[T]he United States and Russia stand on completely different footings with regard to their ability to manufacture new nuclear weapons. Russia has a large infrastructure. They have a warm production base ... They are, in fact, producing new warheads on an ongoing basis in large numbers... . [I]t is no big deal for the Russians to destroy a warhead because they can replace it immediately with a new production item. We, on the other hand, have not produced a new warhead in a decade and can't and will not have the ability to produce one for almost another decade.' Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, testimony at the Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review, Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 Feb. 2002, pp. 10 and 27 of transcript by Federal Document Clearing House.
24. Feith, 'Prepared statement for the hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review', 14 Feb. 2002, pp. 6, 9.
25. For a recent survey of the wide variations in allied public estimates of the number of Russian NSNF, see Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thomton, Russia's tactical nuclear weapons, part i: background and policy issues, FOI-R-1057-SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, November 2003), pp. 14-17. This report is available at www.foi.se and www.cissm.umd.edu/thornton.htm.
26. Some governments (e.g. the French) might decline to participate in an NSNF negotiation on the grounds that they have no such weapons. Since September 1991, all the nuclear-capable means in France's air force (including the ASMP missiles on Mirage 2000Ns previously described as equipped with 'pre-strategic' weapons) have been under the command of the Forces Aériennes Stratégiques. Since the early 19905 the terms 'pre-strategic' and 'final warning' have disappeared from official discourse; and the French have accordingly considered all their nuclear weapons strategic. The British government's focus on the political role of its nuclear arms suggests that it also sees all its nuclear weapons as strategic, especially since the withdrawal in 1998 of the United Kingdom's freefall bomb, the WE177. While the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile could be employed in a 'sub-strategic' role, London does not regard it as a 'non-strategic' weapon.
27. Information paper from the United States concerning Article VI of the NPT, provided to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Confererence, Geneva, Switzerland, 1 May 2003, available at http://www.us-mission.ch/press2003/0501NPTinfopaper.htm. This statement implies, perhaps inadvertently, that an arms control or disarmament regime for NSNF might focus on dual-use delivery systems; but a greater challenge would reside in verifying data relating to the nuclear warheads.
28. For background, see David S. Yost, 'Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces', International Affairs 77: 3, July 2001, pp. 531-51.
29. Secretary of State Colin Powell, testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 9 July 2002, Federal Document Clearing House transcript available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
30. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, testimony as delivered for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the Moscow Treaty, 17 July 2002, available at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/S20020717-secdefl.html.
31. Feith, 'Prepared statement for the hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review', 14 Feb. 2002, p. 5. Feith's testimony and other official sources have received little attention. The main conclusions of the NPR have been so poorly communicated by the US government that journalistic accounts have fostered a widespread and incorrect impression throughout the alliance that it calls for increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Few people seem to have heard that one of the NPR's central themes is improving non-nuclear capabilities.
32. According to General William F. Kernan, US Army, then Commander-in-Chief, Joint Forces Command, 'Non-kinetic technologies are weapons that hinder the enemy, but don't go boom, such as ones that destroy computer files, disrupt communications or wipe out bank accounts.' Kernan quoted in R. W. Rogers, 'Kernan tasked with transforming military', Newport News Virginia, Daily Press, 5 August 2001, available at www.jfcom.mil/NewsLink/StoryArchive/2001/n0080501. htm. In other words, the term 'non-kinetic' has been adopted to signify capabilities other than 'kinetic' strike systems that cause physical damage or destruction through violent impact or blast or thermal effects.
33. Feith, 'Prepared statement for the hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review', 14 Feb. 2002, p. 7.
34. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, Sept. 2002), p. 15.
35. The NPR did not call for new nuclear warhead designs or nuclear testing, but identified shortfalls in US capabilities - e.g. concerning hardened and deeply buried targets. Non-nuclear means, if feasible, will probably have priority in addressing such shortfalls; but there are recognized limits to such means.
36. North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 62.
37. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, joint press conference with British Secretary of State for Defence Geoffrey Hoon, 5 June 2002, available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/106052000_10605sd.html.
38. In the words of Limon Brooks, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, 'nobody in this administration has any interest in lowering the nuclear threshold... . [I]f military missions can be accomplished by conventional means, then of course that's what you want.' 'The Bush administration's views on the future of nuclear weapons: an interview with NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks', Arms Control Today, Jan.-Feb. 2004, p. 5.
39. See 'NATO-Russia relations: a new quality', declaration by heads of state and government of NATO member states and the Russian Federation, Rome, 28 May 2002.
40. The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation, 24 May 2002, is available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-2.html.
41. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, remarks on 8 March 2001, quoted in Lee Ewing, 'Why "national" has been dropped from "national missile defense",' Aerospace Daily, 12 March 2001.
42. Lord Robertson, quoted ibid.
43. Helmut Kohl, policy statement to the Bundestag on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 18 April 1985, in Statements and Speeches, vol. 8, no. 10 (New York: German Information Center, 1985), p. 3.
44. Terrorists are unlikely to conduct attacks with long-range missiles, which would be difficult to obtain and operate without state sponsorship or collusion. For states, however, missiles offer a certain prestige as well as a prompt strike capability that is difficult to counter.
45. Prague summit declaration, issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 Nov. 2002, para. 4g.
46. Nick Witney, 'Shifting international perspectives on missile defence', RUSI Journal 148, Dec. 2003, p. 39.
47. The goal is to improve the 'readiness posture from the current ability to test within 24 to 36 months to an ability to test within approximately 18 months'. The improved readiness posture may be achieved by September 2005. Testimony of Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, House Armed Services Committee, 18 March 2004.
48. Allied observers have pointed out that 'the early entry into force' of the CTBT is the first of the 13 'practical steps' approved at the 2000 NPT review conference to implement Article VI of the NPT. See Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), p. 14.
49. Spencer Abraham, 'Facing a new nuclear reality', Washington Post, 21 July 2003.
50. Statement of Linton Brooks, Acting Under Secretary of Energy and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, 8 April 2003, p. 7.
51. Testimony of Ambassador Linton Brooks before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, House Armed Services Committee, 18 March 2004.
52. Author's interview with a German observer in Brussels, 24 June 2003.
53. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, Article IV.
54. Statement of Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr, USN, Commander, United States Strategic Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Command Posture, 8 April 2003, p. 17.
55. For a recent discussion of the Common Aerospace Vehicle and related projects, see John Tirpak, 'In search of spaceplanes', Air Force Magazine, Dec. 2003, available at www.afa.org/magazine/dec2003/1203 spaceplane.html.
56. For background, see 'The non-weaponization of outer space', a Dec. 2003 report by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, available at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/outers-en.asp.
57. See also David S. Yost, 'Debating security strategies', NATO Review, Winter 2003, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/ art4.html.
58. National Security Strategy, p. 15.
59. Loi no. 2003-73 du 27 janvier 2003 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2003 à 2008, section 2.3.1., 'Les fonctions stratégiques', available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr; emphasis added.
60. Pierre Hassner, 'Definitions, doctrines and divergences', The National Interest, no. 69, Fall 2002, p. 32.
61. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 30 Sept. 2001), p. 11.
62. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, testimony as delivered for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the Moscow Treaty, 17 July 2002, available at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020717-secdefl.html.
63. According to one of the slides released by the Department of Defense in January 2002, the QDR goal to 'assure allies and friends' will be met by the US nuclear forces envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review because a 'second-to-none nuclear capability assures allies and [the] public'. See the slide entitled 'QDR: defense policy goals'. These slides, entitled 'Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review', are publicly available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ Jan2002/g020109-D-6570C.html. In written responses for the record, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also referred to 'an assurance-related requirement for US nuclear forces that they be judged second to none'. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction: The Moscow Treaty, Hearings, 107th Congress, 2nd session, p. 117.
64. According to one of the slides released by the Department of Defense in January 2002, the QDR goal to 'assure allies and friends' will be met by the US nuclear forces envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review because a 'second-to-none nuclear capability assures allies and [the] public'. See the slide entitled 'QDR: defense policy goals'. These slides, entitled 'Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review', are publicly available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ Jan2002/g020109-D-6570C.html. In written responses for the record, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also referred to 'an assurance-related requirement for US nuclear forces that they be judged second to none'. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction: The Moscow Treaty, Hearings, 107th Congress, 2nd session, p. 117.
65. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 12.
66. Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the military', Foreign Affairs 81, May-June 2002, p. 27.
67. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 42.
68. Michael Rühle, 'Wege von Krieg und Frieden: Auch das neue Raketenabwehrprojekt ist ein Kind der strategischen Kultur Amerikas', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 March 2001.
69. Thérèse Delpech, 'Le deuxième âge nucléaire?', Le Figaro, 8 June 2001, p. 15.
70. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, testimony at the Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 21 June 2001.
71. NATO's Nuclear Planning Group had prepared the ground politically and conceptually for this decision in its deliberations since 1989, as can be inferred from its communiqués, which underscored the importance of retaining air-delivered weapons.
72. North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 64. This paragraph concerns NATO's sub-strategic nuclear forces. The 'Allies concerned' formula at the beginning of the paragraph indicates that it does not involve France, which does not consider any of its nuclear forces to be 'sub-strategic'.
73. For a thoughtful analysis, see Michael Rühle, 'America and Europe in the second nuclear age', AICGS Advisor, 19 Feb. 2004, available from the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at www.aicgs.org/c/ruhlec. shtml.