Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces

International Affairs

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 531-551

  Yost, David S ^a  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0040927946     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00205     Document Type: Article

References (79)

1. Nikolai Sokov, Russian strategic modernization: the past and future (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 180.
2. According to Dmitri Trenin, in the event of conflict with China, 'Moscow will have to rely on its nuclear weapons - both strategic and tactical (mostly air-based)', as well as transcontinental force redeployments. Dimitri Trenin, Russia's China problem (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), pp. 41-2.
3. Alexei G. Arbatov, The transformation of Russian military doctrine: lessons learned from Kosovo and Chechnya, Marshall Center Paper no. 2 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall Center, July 2000), pp. 5-6.
4. Igor Sergeyev, 'The main factors which determine Russia's military-technical policy on the eve of the 21st century', Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 Dec. 1999, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), CEP19991208000053.
5. Russia's National Security Concept, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 14 Jan. 2000, in FBIS, FTS20000116000515.
6. Russian Federation Military Doctrine, approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict of 21 April 2000, published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 April 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000424000171, sec. I, para. 8.
7. Major General Vladimir Grigoryev, Colonel Nikolay Radayev and Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Protasov, 'An "umbrella" instead of a "shield" - do nuclear weapons have a future?' Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 Feb. 2000, in FBIS, CEP 20000503000116.
8. Sergey Rogov, 'How much do lost illusions cost? Russia must not reject nuclear deterrence', Vek, 28 July 2000, in FBIS, CEP 20000727000425.
9. Vladimir Sivolob and Mikhail Sosnovskiy, 'A reality of deterrence: algorithms for nuclear weapon use should become a component part of military doctrine', Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 22 Oct. 1999, in FBIS, CEP 19991029000006.
10. Andrey Piontkovskiy and Vitaliy Tsygichko, 'A holey nuclear umbrella', Segodnya, 31 May 2000, in FBIS, CEP 20000531000257.
11. Colonel S. V. Kreydin, 'Problems of nuclear deterrence: the nuclear potential's combat stability', Voyennaya Mysl, July-Aug. 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000816000366.
12. Major General V. I. Levshin, Colonel A. V. Nedelin and Colonel M. Ye. Sosnovskiy, 'Use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate military operations', Voyennaya Mysl, May-June 1999, in FBIS, FTS19990602001557.
13. For background, see David S. Yost, 'The history of NATO theater nuclear force policy: key findings from the Sandia conference', Journal of Strategic Studies 15, June 1992.
14. Sivolob and Sosnovskiy, 'A reality of deterrence'.
15. Arbatov, The transformation of Russian military doctrine, p. 21.
16. Sergeyev 'The main factors which determine Russia's military-technical policy'.
17. Colonel C. A. Ivasik, Colonel A. S. Pisyaukov and Colonel A. L. Khryapin, 'Nuclear weapons and Russian military security', Voyennoye Mysl, July-Aug. 1999, UKTRANS 00594.
18. Ibid.
19. Admiral Richard Mies, USN, Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic Command, testimony at the hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on US strategic nuclear force requirements, 23 May 2000, Federal News Service transcript, pp. 18-19.
20. General Vladimir Yakovlev, Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Missile Troops, interview in Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 July 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000705000396.
21. The Tu-22M3 Backfire is being upgraded (mainly via improved avionics) into the Tu-22M5 model capable of carrying the new long-range ALCMs. Nikolai Sokov, 'Developments in Russian nuclear weapons policy', presentation to US Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 Jan. 2001, p. 15. No means of distinguishing the non-nuclear Kh-101 from the nuclear-armed Kh-102 has been identified. Equipping the Backfire with a nuclear-armed long-range ALCM would render it accountable as a heavy bomber under START.
22. Vladimir Putin, President-elect of the Russian Federation, speech at the State Duma, 14 April 2000, in Kommersant, 15 April 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000417000148.
23. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation, signed at Paris, 27 May 1997, p. 7.
24. Yevgeny Primakov, Years in big politics, trans. and abbr. by J. B. K. Lough, report F70 (Camberley: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2000), pp. 4, 13.
25. Sokov, Russian strategic modernization, p. 171.
26. For that matter, Western nuclear powers evidently also perceive few doctrinal obstacles in the nominal designations of particular weapons. Britain has assigned 'strategic' and 'sub-strategic' roles to its Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. France has since 1991 placed all its nuclear-armed aircraft previously given 'prestrategic' designations under the command of the Strategic Air Forces (Forces Aériennes Stratégiques). US B-61 bomb types have been considered both 'strategic' and 'nonstrategic', depending on their mission and configuration.
27. Arbatov, The transformation of Russian military doctrine, pp. 17-18.
28. Nikolai Sokov, 'Overview: the April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council meeting on nuclear weapons' (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies NIS Nuclear Profiles Database, 29 June 1999).
29. Pavel Felgengauer, 'Limited nuclear war? Why not! Russia's new defence concept could include precision use of nuclear weapons', Segodnya, 6 May 1999, in FBIS, FTS19990506000851.
30. Igor Ivanov, Russian foreign minister, statement at NPT review conference, New York, 25 April 2000, text available at http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/revcon2000/nuk_oorevcon_gen_russia. htm.
31. William Drozdiak, 'The next step for NATO: handling Russia', Washington Post National Weekly, 11 May 1998, p. 15.
32. Press statement, PJC ambassadorial meeting, 30 Oct. 2000, available at www.nato.int.
33. W. M. Arkin, R. S. Norris and J. Handler, Taking stock: world-wide nuclear deployments 1998 (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defence Council, 1998), p. 27, cited in Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, 'Appendix: types, delivery systems and locations of TNWs', in William C. Potter, Nikolai Sokov, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, Tactical nuclear weapons: options for control (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Dec. 2000), p. 58.
34. W. M. Arkin, R. S. Norris and J. Handler, Taking stock: world-wide nuclear deployments 1998 (Washington DC: Natural Resources Defence Council, 1998), p. 27, cited in Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, 'Appendix: types, delivery systems and locations of TNWs', in William C. Potter, Nikolai Sokov, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, Tactical nuclear weapons: options for control (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Dec. 2000), p. 58.
35. Arbatov, The transformation of Russian military doctrine, pp. 4-5.
36. Nikolai Sokov, 'Developments in Russian nuclear weapons policy', presentation to US Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 Jan. 2001, p. 9.
37. Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, statement before the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, hearing on nuclear weapons and deterrence, 12 Feb. 1997, p. 4 of text furnished by the US Department of Defense.
38. Edward L. Warner III, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Threat Reduction), statement before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, hearing on nuclear deterrence, 31 March 1998, p. 4 of the text furnished by the US Department of Defense.
39. Alain Richard, minister of defence, speech at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, 10 Feb. 1998, p. 5 of text furnished by the French ministry of defence.
40. Amy F. Woolf and Kara Wilson, Russia's nuclear forces: doctrine and force structure issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 23 May 1997), p. 9.
41. For the lower number (150), see Arkin et al., Taking stock, p. 14, cited in Müller and Schaper, 'Appendix', in Potter et al., Tactical nuclear weapons, pp. 51-2. For the higher number (700), see Alan Riding 'NATO will cut atom weapons for aircraft use', New York Times, 18 Oct. 1991, p. A1. The US nuclear warheads for artillery, short-range missiles and other NSNF systems were dismantled after their withdrawal in the early 1990s.
42. For the lower number (150), see Arkin et al., Taking stock, p. 14, cited in Müller and Schaper, 'Appendix', in Potter et al., Tactical nuclear weapons, pp. 51-2. For the higher number (700), see Alan Riding 'NATO will cut atom weapons for aircraft use', New York Times, 18 Oct. 1991, p. A1. The US nuclear warheads for artillery, short-range missiles and other NSNF systems were dismantled after their withdrawal in the early 1990s.
43. For the lower number (150), see Arkin et al., Taking stock, p. 14, cited in Müller and Schaper, 'Appendix', in Potter et al., Tactical nuclear weapons, pp. 51-2. For the higher number (700), see Alan Riding 'NATO will cut atom weapons for aircraft use', New York Times, 18 Oct. 1991, p. A1. The US nuclear warheads for artillery, short-range missiles and other NSNF systems were dismantled after their withdrawal in the early 1990s.
44. Televised announcement by Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 5 Oct. 1991, US State Department translation in SIPRI yearbook 1992: world armaments and disarmament (London: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1992), p. 87.
45. Televised statement by Russian Federation President Boris N. Yeltsin, 29 Jan. 1992, FBIS translation in SIPRI yearbook 1992, p. 90.
46. Televised announcement by Gorbachev, 5 Oct. 1991.
47. Televised statement by Yeltsin, 29 Jan. 1992.
48. George Bush, 'Address to the nation on reducing United States and Soviet nuclear weapons', 27 Sept. 1991, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27: 39, 30 Sept. 1991, pp. 1349-50.
49. Author's interview with Bruno Tertrais in Paris, 12 April 2001.
50. Final communiqué, ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, 5 Dec. 2000, para. 10.
51. 'Rodionov declared that in the face of NATO enlargement, Russia "might objectively face the task of increasing the number of tactical nuclear weapons at [its] borders"': Sokov, Russian strategic modernization, p. 180. It is, of course, possible that Rodionov had in mind a geographical redistribution (hence an increase in deployments near certain borders) in NSNF covered by the 1991-2 commitments rather than any deviation from the rather vaguely worded commitments.
52. Kuroedov, quoted in Russki Telegraph, 11 June 1998, cited in Nikolai Sokov, The fate of Russian nuclear weapons: an anticlimax on August 11', 14 Aug. 2000, available at http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke2.htm.
53. Kuroedov, quoted in Russki Telegraph, 11 June 1998, cited in Nikolai Sokov, The fate of Russian nuclear weapons: an anticlimax on August 11', 14 Aug. 2000, available at http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke2.htm.
54. Nikolai Sokov, 'The tactical nuclear weapons controversy', Jane's Defence Weekly, 31 Jan. 2001.
55. Other examples of Russians talking about possibly abandoning the 1991-2 commitments share two characteristics: the context concerns developments deemed threatening to Russia, such as NATO enlargement or US security cooperation with the Baltic states; and the abandonment of the commitments is usually implicit in the call for a build-up and/or more extensive deployment of NSNF.
56. It was reported in January 2001 that Russian NSNF were recently moved to Kaliningrad (see, among other sources, Bill Gertz, 'Russia transfers nuclear arms to Baltics', Washington Times, 3 Jan. 2001, p. 1). The Russian government has disputed the accuracy of such reports. However, in March 2001 Sergey Ivanov, then Secretary of the Security Council, stated that Russia 'has not made an agreement with the international community not to deploy tactical [nuclear] weapons in the Kaliningrad region'. In an earlier statement, foreign minister Igor Ivanov said that there was no reason Russia should not deploy nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad (Agence France-Presse dispatch, 'Russian official says Moscow entitled to deploy nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad', in FBIS, 25 March 2001, EUP20010325000124).
57. Rose Gottemoeller, 'Lopsided arms control', Washington Post, 7 Dec. 2000, p. 37. In April 2001 Grigori Tomchin, a member of the Russian government's investigating commission, was quoted as having said that the Kursk, an Oscar II-class nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine (SSGN), was carrying NSNF when it sank in August 2000. Such statements have been denied by Russian authorities. See, among other sources, the brief reports in the International Herald Tribune, 5 and 6 April 2001.
58. Rose Gottemoeller, 'Lopsided arms control', Washington Post, 7 Dec. 2000, p. 37. In April 2001 Grigori Tomchin, a member of the Russian government's investigating commission, was quoted as having said that the Kursk, an Oscar II-class nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine (SSGN), was carrying NSNF when it sank in August 2000. Such statements have been denied by Russian authorities. See, among other sources, the brief reports in the International Herald Tribune, 5 and 6 April 2001.
59. Levshin et al., 'Use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate military operations'.
60. Sergey T. Brezkun, 'Pioners must be revived: Russia needs a new "European" nuclear weapon', Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 13-19 Aug. 1999, in FBIS, 18 Aug. 1999, FTS19990818001156. 'Pioner' is a Russian designation for a certain type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
61. Under START I a medium-range bomber becomes accountable as a heavy bomber when it is equipped with a long-range nuclear-armed ALCM. For START purposes, a long-range nuclear-armed ALCM has a range in excess of 600 km.
62. Nikolai Sokov, 'A new old direction in Russia's nuclear policy', Disarmament Diplomacy 50 (Sept. 2000).
63. Sokov, 'Developments in Russian nuclear weapons policy', p. 20.
64. William C. Potter, 'Reducing the threat of tactical nuclear weapons', paper presented to the international workshop on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Tokyo, 27-9 Aug. 2000, p. 5.
65. Moscow called the US NSNF in Europe 'forward based systems'.
66. US-Russian Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, Helsinki, 21 March 1997.
67. The US Senate gave its advice and consent to START II ratification in January 1996, but the US President has not yet submitted to the Senate the START II protocols and ABM Treaty agreements concluded with Russia in September 1997. Russia has made START II's entry into force conditional on US ratification of the September 1997 START II protocols and ABM Treaty agreements.
68. This article is focused on Russian attitudes and policies, rather than the intrinsic problems of defining an arms control regime for NSNF, such as the baseline or initialization problem (determining the numbers and locations of Russian NSNF) and the difficulties of verification and geographical scope. Nor does this article examine the considerable damage to US and NATO interests, including with respect to non-proliferation, that could be caused by a unilateral withdrawal of the remaining US nuclear presence in Europe. For discussions of these issues, see David S. Yost, The US and nuclear deterrence in Europe, Adelphi Paper no. 326 (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1999), pp. 25-33, 49-52, 57-61.
69. William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov, 'The nature of the problem', in William C. Potter, Nikolai Sokov, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, Tactical nuclear weapons: options for control (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Dec. 2000), p. 14.
70. Some European experts on Russia judge that Moscow at times overstates its concerns about NATO to advance domestic political purposes and to seek concessions from European and NATO nations.
71. Lewis A. Dunn and Victor Alessi, 'Arms control by other means', Survival 42: 4, Winter 2000-01, p. 136.
72. 'A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe': North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, para. 63. The formula 'European Allies involved in collective defence planning' excludes France, which has chosen not to participate in the Alliance's Nuclear Planning Group since its establishment in 1966-7.
73. In this respect the attitudes of many Russians in the country's political elite remain as a renowned British scholar characterized them during the Soviet period: 'The Russians feel themselves to be not only the most numerous but also the greatest of all European peoples. They believe, on these grounds and on ideological grounds, that the Soviet Union has the right to greater influence in all European affairs than she has now': Malcolm Mackintosh, 'Moscow's view of the balance of power', The World Today 29, March 1973, p. 111.
74. As Nikolai Sokov himself has pointed out, 'The persistence with which Russia continues to adhere to the view that tactical nuclear weapons are important for its security in spite of several years of insistence of the West that these weapons should be reduced, testifies to the relative independence of the country's policy in the area of nuclear weapons': Sokov, Russian strategic modernization, p. 200. Indeed, Sokov has commented as follows on proposals to convert the 1991-2 commitments into a formal treaty regime, with verification provisions: 'The task is not easy. Russia values tactical nuclear weapons more than the Soviet Union did in 1991 and its requirements for such a treaty are stiffer': Sokov, 'The tactical nuclear weapons controversy'.
75. As Nikolai Sokov himself has pointed out, 'The persistence with which Russia continues to adhere to the view that tactical nuclear weapons are important for its security in spite of several years of insistence of the West that these weapons should be reduced, testifies to the relative independence of the country's policy in the area of nuclear weapons': Sokov, Russian strategic modernization, p. 200. Indeed, Sokov has commented as follows on proposals to convert the 1991-2 commitments into a formal treaty regime, with verification provisions: 'The task is not easy. Russia values tactical nuclear weapons more than the Soviet Union did in 1991 and its requirements for such a treaty are stiffer': Sokov, 'The tactical nuclear weapons controversy'.
76. Kapralov statement of 14 Nov. 2000, quoted in Itar-Tass dispatch, 14 Nov. 2000, in FBIS, CEP20001114000223.
77. Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov, 'Reliance on nuclear shield: not unilateral reduction, but a search for compromise solutions with the United States will ensure Russia's national security', Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 4-10 Aug. 2000, in FBIS, CEP20000810000216.
78. In December 2000 the North Atlantic Council called for 'an early conclusion of a START III agreement' and stated that, 'Given the need to reduce the uncertainties surrounding substrategic nuclear weapons in Russia, we believe that a reaffirmation - and perhaps codification - of the 1991/92 Presidential Initiatives might be a first, but not exhaustive, step in this direction': final communiqué, ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 15 Dec. 2000, para. 63.
79. The North Atlantic Council in December 2000 approved a proposal for 'a reciprocal data exchange with Russia' in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council 'to enhance transparency and knowledge of the size of the US and Russian stockpiles' of 'sub-strategic nuclear forces'. See the 'Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament', press communiqué M-NAC-2 (2000) 121 (Brussels, 14 Dec. 2000), para. 95.