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Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-17

Restabilizing matching markets at senior level

(1) Cantala, David a

a UNIVERSITY OF GUANAJUATO (Mexico)

Author keywords

Deferred acceptance algorithm; Senior level markets; Stable matchings

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142710837 PISSN: 08998256 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.005 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (14)

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