America as a European power: The end of empire by integration?

International Affairs

Volumn 80, Issue 4, 2004, Pages

  Peterson, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 3142692761     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00407.x     Document Type: Review

References (77)

1. Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man (London and New York: Hamish Hamilton, 1992); Robert Kagan, Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order (New York: Knopf, 2003). There is in any case a clear enough connection between Fukuyama, Kagan and others who have developed simple theses about rapid change in international politics and distilled them down to their very essences in memorable, media-friendly soundbites.
2. Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man (London and New York: Hamish Hamilton, 1992); Robert Kagan, Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order (New York: Knopf, 2003). There is in any case a clear enough connection between Fukuyama, Kagan and others who have developed simple theses about rapid change in international politics and distilled them down to their very essences in memorable, media-friendly soundbites.
3. See Richard Holbrooke, 'America, a European power', Foreign Affairs 74: 2, March-April 1995, pp. 38-51.
4. Geir Lundestad, 'Empire' by integration: the United States and European integration, 1945-97 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
5. G. John Ikenberry, After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
6. Council on Foreign Relations, Renewing the Atlantic partnership, report of an independent task force sponsored by the CFR (New York: CFR, 2004.), p. 10. Given that one of the co-authors of this report is Henry Kissinger, this claim might seem a controversial one.
7. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965).
8. John Peterson and Mark Pollack, eds, Europe, America, Bush (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); G. Lindstrom and B. Schmitt, eds, One year on: lessons from Iraq, Chaillot Papers no. 68 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004).
9. John Peterson and Mark Pollack, eds, Europe, America, Bush (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); G. Lindstrom and B. Schmitt, eds, One year on: lessons from Iraq, Chaillot Papers no. 68 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004).
10. Kagan, Of paradise and power, p. 3.
11. US State Department, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, 2002), p. 25.
12. See Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (New York: St Martin's, 1993); Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, 1976); Dean Acheson, Present at the creation (New York: Norton, 1969); Nelson D. Lankford, The last American aristocrat: the biography of Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, 1898-1977, vol. 1 (New York: Little, Brown, 1996).
13. See Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (New York: St Martin's, 1993); Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, 1976); Dean Acheson, Present at the creation (New York: Norton, 1969); Nelson D. Lankford, The last American aristocrat: the biography of Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, 1898-1977, vol. 1 (New York: Little, Brown, 1996).
14. See Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (New York: St Martin's, 1993); Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, 1976); Dean Acheson, Present at the creation (New York: Norton, 1969); Nelson D. Lankford, The last American aristocrat: the biography of Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, 1898-1977, vol. 1 (New York: Little, Brown, 1996).
15. See Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (New York: St Martin's, 1993); Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, 1976); Dean Acheson, Present at the creation (New York: Norton, 1969); Nelson D. Lankford, The last American aristocrat: the biography of Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, 1898-1977, vol. 1 (New York: Little, Brown, 1996).
16. The European Economic Community (EEC) created by the 1957 Treaty of Rome became the European Community (or, officially, 'Communities', EC) following the 1986 Single European Act. The EC was transformed into the 'First Pillar' of the tri-pillared European Union by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which created the 'Second Pillar' for the CFSP and the 'Third Pillar' for justice and home affairs policies.
17. John Peterson, Europe and America: partners and rivals in international relations (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming 2005).
18. Andrew J. Bacevich, American empire: the realities and consequences of US diplomacy (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002); Benjamin R. Barber, Fear's empire: war, terrorism, and democracy (London and New York: Norton, 2003); Michael Mann, Incoherent empire (New York and London: Verso, 2003); Emmanuel Todd, After the empire: the breakdown of the American order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: the price of America's empire (New York and London: Penguin, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, The sorrows of empire: militarism, secrecy and the end of the republic (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).
19. Andrew J. Bacevich, American empire: the realities and consequences of US diplomacy (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002); Benjamin R. Barber, Fear's empire: war, terrorism, and democracy (London and New York: Norton, 2003); Michael Mann, Incoherent empire (New York and London: Verso, 2003); Emmanuel Todd, After the empire: the breakdown of the American order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: the price of America's empire (New York and London: Penguin, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, The sorrows of empire: militarism, secrecy and the end of the republic (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).
20. Andrew J. Bacevich, American empire: the realities and consequences of US diplomacy (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002); Benjamin R. Barber, Fear's empire: war, terrorism, and democracy (London and New York: Norton, 2003); Michael Mann, Incoherent empire (New York and London: Verso, 2003); Emmanuel Todd, After the empire: the breakdown of the American order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: the price of America's empire (New York and London: Penguin, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, The sorrows of empire: militarism, secrecy and the end of the republic (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).
21. Andrew J. Bacevich, American empire: the realities and consequences of US diplomacy (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002); Benjamin R. Barber, Fear's empire: war, terrorism, and democracy (London and New York: Norton, 2003); Michael Mann, Incoherent empire (New York and London: Verso, 2003); Emmanuel Todd, After the empire: the breakdown of the American order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: the price of America's empire (New York and London: Penguin, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, The sorrows of empire: militarism, secrecy and the end of the republic (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).
22. Andrew J. Bacevich, American empire: the realities and consequences of US diplomacy (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002); Benjamin R. Barber, Fear's empire: war, terrorism, and democracy (London and New York: Norton, 2003); Michael Mann, Incoherent empire (New York and London: Verso, 2003); Emmanuel Todd, After the empire: the breakdown of the American order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: the price of America's empire (New York and London: Penguin, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, The sorrows of empire: militarism, secrecy and the end of the republic (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).
23. Andrew J. Bacevich, American empire: the realities and consequences of US diplomacy (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002); Benjamin R. Barber, Fear's empire: war, terrorism, and democracy (London and New York: Norton, 2003); Michael Mann, Incoherent empire (New York and London: Verso, 2003); Emmanuel Todd, After the empire: the breakdown of the American order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: the price of America's empire (New York and London: Penguin, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, The sorrows of empire: militarism, secrecy and the end of the republic (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).
24. G. John Ikenberry, 'Illusions of empire: defining the new American order', Foreign Affairs 83: 2, March-April 2004, p. 154.
25. 'Antecedent' in the sense of one circumstance that precedes another and from which the latter logically follows.
26. The two leading works on the New Transatlantic Agenda are Eric Philippart and Pascaline Winand, eds, Ever closer partnership: policy-making in US-EU relations (Brussels: Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes/Peter Lang, 2001) and Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, eds, Transatlantic governance in the global economy (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
27. The two leading works on the New Transatlantic Agenda are Eric Philippart and Pascaline Winand, eds, Ever closer partnership: policy-making in US-EU relations (Brussels: Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes/Peter Lang, 2001) and Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, eds, Transatlantic governance in the global economy (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
28. John Peterson, 'Europe, America, Iraq: worst ever and ever-worsening?', The European Union: annual review 2004/5, Journal of Common Market Studies 42: 6, pp. 13-30.
29. James Caporaso, 'The European Union and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory or post-modern?', Journal of Common Market Studies 34: 1, March 1996, pp. 29-52; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union', Foreign Affairs 80: 3, May/June 2001, pp. 114-22.
30. James Caporaso, 'The European Union and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory or post-modern?', Journal of Common Market Studies 34: 1, March 1996, pp. 29-52; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union', Foreign Affairs 80: 3, May/June 2001, pp. 114-22.
31. In mid-2004 the EU appeared close to agreement on a new constitutional treaty, which was likely to include a range of institutional reforms in foreign policy, above all a new 'Union minister of foreign affairs'.
32. Christopher Hill, 'Rationalizing or regrouping? EU foreign policy since 11 September 2001', Journal of Common Market Studies 42: 1, March 2004, p. 161.
33. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The choice: global domination or global leadership (New York and London: Basic Books, 2004).
34. Robert Cooper, The breaking of nations: order and chaos in the 21st century (London: Atlantic, 2003), pp. 106-7. The author is a senior EU foreign policy official who is widely credited with authoring much of the EU's European Security Strategy (see below).
35. Redistricting means redrawing constituency boundaries, usually with the objective of producing safe seats that only one party has any practical chance of winning. In these circumstances, primary elections, when candidates campaign for the votes of party members and often try to appeal to those on the 'flanks' of their parties, become a more important determinant of election results than general elections, in which moderate candidates often have advantages in competing for 'swing voters'. On the electoral effects of redistricting, see Gary C. Jacobson, 'Terror, terrain and turnout: explaining the 2002 midterm elections', Political Science Quarterly 118: 1, Spring 2003, pp. 1-22.
36. Condoleezza Rice, 'Promoting the national interest', Foreign Affairs 79: 1, Jan.-Feb. 2000, pp. 45-62. The closest Rice comes to acknowledging the EU's existence is to confirm that 'the United States has an interest in shaping the European defence identity' (p. 54).
37. Condoleezza Rice, 'Promoting the national interest', Foreign Affairs 79: 1, Jan.-Feb. 2000, pp. 45-62. The closest Rice comes to acknowledging the EU's existence is to confirm that 'the United States has an interest in shaping the European defence identity' (p. 54).
38. US State Department, The National Security Strategy.
39. American officials even claimed to have done the maths and worked out that, had the matter been put to a vote under the EU's formal rules, a qualified majority would have supported an attack on Iraq. This point was made repeatedly in interviews conducted by the author in Brussels and Washington in November and December 2003.
40. The leading account of Europe's decline is, of course, Kagan's. For a contrary (and iconoclastic) view, see Charles A. Kupchan, The end of the American era: US foreign policy and the geopolitics of the twenty-first century (New York: Knopf, 2003).
41. See Peterson, 'Europe, America, Iraq'; Monica Den Boer and Jörg Monar, '11 September and the challenge of global terrorism to the EU as a security actor', The European Union: annual review 2001/2, Journal of Common Market Studies 39: 6, 2002, pp. 11-28.
42. See Peterson, 'Europe, America, Iraq'; Monica Den Boer and Jörg Monar, '11 September and the challenge of global terrorism to the EU as a security actor', The European Union: annual review 2001/2, Journal of Common Market Studies 39: 6, 2002, pp. 11-28.
43. See US Mission to the EU, 'US, EU sign legal assistance, extradition treaties', 25 June 2003, available at http://www.useu.be/TransAtlantic/US- EU%20Summits/June2503WashingtonSummit/June2503USEUSummitExtradition.html; accessed 2 May 2004.
44. Fran Burwell, 'Rethinking the transatlantic agenda', unpublished paper, Atlantic Council, Washington.
45. See European Commission, 'Wider Europe - neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our eastern and southern neighbours', communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003.
46. In October 2003, a European mission consisting of the British, French and German foreign ministers (and lacking any EU representation per se) secured an agreement (albeit a fragile one) with Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment programme and allow unrestricted inspection of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In February 2004, the UK and France - joined soon afterwards by Germany and others - announced the formation of new joint 'battlegroups', which would combine national military capabilities in a hard sense for specific types of missions (such as amphibious landings or operations in jungles or deserts) and be capable of almost immediate deployment.
47. Grant reports an unnamed 'senior figure in the Bush administration' telling a seminar of US and European officials and analysts (held in April 2003 in the middle of the Iraq war) that 'Europe is no longer a geopolitical construct, it is disaggregating, for enlargement has diluted Europe.' Charles Grant, Transatlantic rift? How to bring the two sides together (London: Centre for European Reform, 2003), p. 13. Asked if the Bush administration was trying to split the EU, the chair of the House subcommittee on European affairs, Doug Bereuter, replied that 'the EU has done a good job of doing that itself (quoted in European Voice, 16 June-2 July 2003, p. 1).
48. Grant reports an unnamed 'senior figure in the Bush administration' telling a seminar of US and European officials and analysts (held in April 2003 in the middle of the Iraq war) that 'Europe is no longer a geopolitical construct, it is disaggregating, for enlargement has diluted Europe.' Charles Grant, Transatlantic rift? How to bring the two sides together (London: Centre for European Reform, 2003), p. 13. Asked if the Bush administration was trying to split the EU, the chair of the House subcommittee on European affairs, Doug Bereuter, replied that 'the EU has done a good job of doing that itself (quoted in European Voice, 16 June-2 July 2003, p. 1).
49. To illustrate the point, consider the choice of words of one US diplomat: 'We have faith that a united Europe will by and large promote policies that are good not only for the EU, but also for the US and the rest of the planet.' See 'US views of Europe and the EU', address by EU minister counsellor for political affairs Kyle Scott to the Free University of Brussels European Studies Institute, Brussels, 20 April 2004, available at http://www.useu.be/ TransAtlantic/Apr2004ScottSpeechUSandEU.html; accessed 2 May 2004.
50. US State Department, The National Security Strategy, p. 6.
51. Michael J. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist', International Affairs 79: 3, May 2003, pp. 503-22 at p. 507. Mazarr's argument is perhaps less iconoclastic than it first appears. See e.g. Keir A. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber, 'The Bush National Security Strategy', US foreign policy agenda: electronic journal of the US Department of State 7: 4, Dec. 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pJ7-4lieber.htm; accessed 7 May 2004; Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush doctrine', Political Science Quarterly 118: 3, Fall 2003, pp. 365-88. Revealing in this context are several closely argued (and almost entirely contrary) analyses by former Clinton administration officials, including Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America unbound (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2003); John Newhouse, Imperial America: the Bush assault on world order (New York: Knopf, 2003).
52. Michael J. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist', International Affairs 79: 3, May 2003, pp. 503-22 at p. 507. Mazarr's argument is perhaps less iconoclastic than it first appears. See e.g. Keir A. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber, 'The Bush National Security Strategy', US foreign policy agenda: electronic journal of the US Department of State 7: 4, Dec. 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pJ7-4lieber.htm; accessed 7 May 2004; Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush doctrine', Political Science Quarterly 118: 3, Fall 2003, pp. 365-88. Revealing in this context are several closely argued (and almost entirely contrary) analyses by former Clinton administration officials, including Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America unbound (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2003); John Newhouse, Imperial America: the Bush assault on world order (New York: Knopf, 2003).
53. Michael J. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist', International Affairs 79: 3, May 2003, pp. 503-22 at p. 507. Mazarr's argument is perhaps less iconoclastic than it first appears. See e.g. Keir A. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber, 'The Bush National Security Strategy', US foreign policy agenda: electronic journal of the US Department of State 7: 4, Dec. 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pJ7-4lieber.htm; accessed 7 May 2004; Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush doctrine', Political Science Quarterly 118: 3, Fall 2003, pp. 365-88. Revealing in this context are several closely argued (and almost entirely contrary) analyses by former Clinton administration officials, including Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America unbound (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2003); John Newhouse, Imperial America: the Bush assault on world order (New York: Knopf, 2003).
54. Michael J. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist', International Affairs 79: 3, May 2003, pp. 503-22 at p. 507. Mazarr's argument is perhaps less iconoclastic than it first appears. See e.g. Keir A. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber, 'The Bush National Security Strategy', US foreign policy agenda: electronic journal of the US Department of State 7: 4, Dec. 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pJ7-4lieber.htm; accessed 7 May 2004; Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush doctrine', Political Science Quarterly 118: 3, Fall 2003, pp. 365-88. Revealing in this context are several closely argued (and almost entirely contrary) analyses by former Clinton administration officials, including Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America unbound (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2003); John Newhouse, Imperial America: the Bush assault on world order (New York: Knopf, 2003).
55. Michael J. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist', International Affairs 79: 3, May 2003, pp. 503-22 at p. 507. Mazarr's argument is perhaps less iconoclastic than it first appears. See e.g. Keir A. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber, 'The Bush National Security Strategy', US foreign policy agenda: electronic journal of the US Department of State 7: 4, Dec. 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pJ7-4lieber.htm; accessed 7 May 2004; Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush doctrine', Political Science Quarterly 118: 3, Fall 2003, pp. 365-88. Revealing in this context are several closely argued (and almost entirely contrary) analyses by former Clinton administration officials, including Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America unbound (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2003); John Newhouse, Imperial America: the Bush assault on world order (New York: Knopf, 2003).
56. Robert J. Lieber, 'The folly of containment', Commentary, April 2003, pp. 15-21.
57. European Union, A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy (Paris: EU Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003), pp.11, 17 and 18.
58. One effect of this allergic reaction is further to muddy the already murky waters surrounding the meanings of 'pre-emption' and 'prevention'. Pre-emption is widely viewed as the use of proactive force by one state when it is a near-certainty that it faces an imminent attack. In contrast, prevention usually means 'fighting a winnable war now in order to avoid the risk of war later under less favourable circumstances'. De Wijk argues that 'although called pre-emption, the concept mentioned in the [US] National Security Strategy is prevention'. See Rob de Wijk (untitled) in Lindstrom and Schmitt, eds, One year on, p. 50.
59. In 1837 the British moved to cut off US support for a revolt in eastern Canada by launching a raid into New York and burning an American ship. Five years later, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster reached an agreement with the British prohibiting future strikes except in cases of 'necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation'. See Bruce Ackerman, 'But what's the legal basis for pre-emption?', Washington Post, 20 Aug. 2002, p. B2, also available at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/Public_Affairs/282/yls_article.htm, accessed 7 May 2004; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, 'On the necessity of pre-emption', European Journal of International Law 14: 2, April 2003, pp. 209-26; William H. Taft IV and Todd F. Buchwald, 'International law and the war in Iraq', American Journal of International Law 97: 3, July 2003, pp. 557-62.
60. In 1837 the British moved to cut off US support for a revolt in eastern Canada by launching a raid into New York and burning an American ship. Five years later, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster reached an agreement with the British prohibiting future strikes except in cases of 'necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation'. See Bruce Ackerman, 'But what's the legal basis for pre-emption?', Washington Post, 20 Aug. 2002, p. B2, also available at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/Public_Affairs/282/yls_article.htm, accessed 7 May 2004; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, 'On the necessity of pre-emption', European Journal of International Law 14: 2, April 2003, pp. 209-26; William H. Taft IV and Todd F. Buchwald, 'International law and the war in Iraq', American Journal of International Law 97: 3, July 2003, pp. 557-62.
61. In 1837 the British moved to cut off US support for a revolt in eastern Canada by launching a raid into New York and burning an American ship. Five years later, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster reached an agreement with the British prohibiting future strikes except in cases of 'necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation'. See Bruce Ackerman, 'But what's the legal basis for pre-emption?', Washington Post, 20 Aug. 2002, p. B2, also available at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/Public_Affairs/282/yls_article.htm, accessed 7 May 2004; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, 'On the necessity of pre-emption', European Journal of International Law 14: 2, April 2003, pp. 209-26; William H. Taft IV and Todd F. Buchwald, 'International law and the war in Iraq', American Journal of International Law 97: 3, July 2003, pp. 557-62.
62. William Drozdiak (untitled) in Lindstrom and Schmitt, eds, One year on, p. 154.
63. Interview, US National Security Council, 1 Dec. 2003.
64. The emphasis here is on visibility in terms of stated policy, not actual delivery. For a scathing attack on US AIDS policy, see Molly Ivans and Lou Dubose, Bushwhacked: life in George W. Bush's America (New York: Random House, 2003).
65. United Nations, Arab human development report (UN Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2003).
66. See Daalder and Lindsay, America unbound
67. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist', p. 507.
68. Even the normally sober Washington Post reacted to the comment of the European Commission President, Romano Prodi, that force is not always the answer to terrorism by insisting that 'should such sentiments prevail, the next US administration - whether led by President Bush or Senator John F. Kerry - may have no alternative to unilateralism' (16 March 2004, p. A20).
69. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist', p. 504.
70. See New York Times, 11 March 2004, p. A1. Here I also draw on the presentation of William Schneider, chair of the US Defense Policy Board, to the German-British Forum conference held in London on 28 Oct. 2003.
71. See Peterson and Pollack, eds, Europe, America, Bush
72. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist'; Robert Kagan, 'America's crisis of legitimacy', Foreign Affairs 83: 2, March-April 2004, pp. 65-87. As postwar Iraq threatened to descend into chaos, The Economist (8 May 2004, p. 52) reported that 'mainstream [US] conservatives who thought the government had no business invading Iraq in the name of idealism [felt] emboldened.'
73. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist'; Robert Kagan, 'America's crisis of legitimacy', Foreign Affairs 83: 2, March-April 2004, pp. 65-87. As postwar Iraq threatened to descend into chaos, The Economist (8 May 2004, p. 52) reported that 'mainstream [US] conservatives who thought the government had no business invading Iraq in the name of idealism [felt] emboldened.'
74. Mazarr, 'George W. Bush, idealist'; Robert Kagan, 'America's crisis of legitimacy', Foreign Affairs 83: 2, March-April 2004, pp. 65-87. As postwar Iraq threatened to descend into chaos, The Economist (8 May 2004, p. 52) reported that 'mainstream [US] conservatives who thought the government had no business invading Iraq in the name of idealism [felt] emboldened.'
75. Kagan, 'America's crisis of legitimacy'. See also Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at war: America, Europe and the split over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
76. Kagan, 'America's crisis of legitimacy'. See also Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at war: America, Europe and the split over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
77. Lawrence Summers, 'Europe and America in the 21st century', lecture delivered at London School of Economics, 13 Nov. 2003 (available at http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2003/lse.html; accessed 7 May 2004).