A model of seller holdout

Economic Theory

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 231-253

  Menezes, Flavio ^a   Pitchford, Rohan ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Bargaining model; Complementarity; Delay; Holdout

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142674797     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0432-x     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Asami, Y.: A game-theoretic approach to the division of profits from economic land development. Regional Science and Urban Economics 18, 233-246 (1988)
2. Busch, L., Wen, Q.: Perfect equilibria in negotiation model. Econometrica 63(3), 545-565 (1995)
3. Cai, H.: Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information. Journal of Economic Theory 93(2), 260-276 (2000)
4. Eckart, W.: On the land assembly problem. Journal of Urban Economics 18, 364-378 (1985)
5. Farrel, J.: Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games. In: Dempster, M. (ed.) Mathematical models in economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988
6. Fernandez, R., Glazer, J.: Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents. American Economic Review 81, 240-252 (1991)
7. Fudenberg, D., Levine, D.K., Tirole, J.: Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. In: Roth, A.E. (ed.) Game-theoretic models of bargaining, pp. 73-98. Cambridge New York Sydney: Cambridge University Press 1985
8. Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Sequential bargaining with incomplete information. The Review of Economic Studies 50(2), 221-247 (1983)
9. Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D.: Takeover bids, the free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation. Bell Journal of Economics 11(1), 42-64 (1980)
10. Hall, B.H., Ziedonis, R.H.: The patent paradox revisited: An empirical study of patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry, 1979-1995. Rand Journal of Economics 32(1), 101-128 (2001)
11. Heller, M.A., Eisenberg, R.S.: Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research. Science 280, 698-701 (1998)
12. Kamien, M.I.: Patent licensing. In: Aumman, R., Hart, S. (eds.) Handbook of game theory, Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier 1992
13. Mailath, G.J., Postlewaite, A.: Asymmetric information and bargaining problems with many agents. Review of Economic Studies 57, 351-367 (1990)
14. Mazzoleni, R., Nelson, R.: Economic theories about the benefits and costs of patents. Journal of Economic Issues 32(4), 1031-1052 (1998)
15. Myerson, R.: Game theory: Analysis of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1991
16. Myerson, R.: Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans. Journal of Economic Theory 48, 264-303 (1989)
17. O'Flaherty, B.: Land assembly and urban renewal. Regional Science and Urban Economics 24, 287-300 (1994)
18. Rubinstein, A.: Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50(1), 97-109 (1982)
19. Schelling, T.: The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1960
20. Shaked, A., Sutton, J.: Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 52(6), 1351-1364 (1984)
21. Shapiro, C: Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard-setting. In: Jaffe, A., Lerner, J., Stern, S. (eds.) Innovation policy and the economy, Vol. I, ch. 4. MIT Press 2001