The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment

Economics Letters

Volumn 90, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 149-155

  Julien, Benoit ^a   Kennes, John ^a   King, Ian ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Auctions; Hosios rule; Matching; Mortensen rule

Indexed keywords

EID: 31344448540     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.019     Document Type: Article

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