East Timor's double life: Smells like Westphalian spirit

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 135-159

  Philpott, Simon ^a  

^a NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL IDENTITY; NATION STATE; POST-COLD WAR; STATE BUILDING;

ASIA; EURASIA; SOUTHEAST ASIA; TIMOR-LESTE;

EID: 31344433412     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436590500370004     Document Type: Review

References (156)

1. R Tanter, 'Intelligence agencies and Third World militarization: A case study of Indonesia, 1966- 89', unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Politics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, 1991, p 26.
2. GC Gunn, 'The five-hundred-year Timorese Funu', in R Tanter, M Selden & SR Shalom (eds), Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community, Sydney: Pluto Press Australia, 2001, pp 7-11.
3. JKRX Gusmao, 'Reconciliation, unity and national development in the framework of the transition towards independence', in D Kingsbury (ed), Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's Vote for Independence, Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 2000, p 1.
4. Fretilin is the acronym for The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor.
5. AL Smith, 'East Timor: Elections in the world's newest nation', Journal of Democracy, 15(2), 2004, p 152.
6. Ibid, p 146.
7. See also J Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', World Policy Journal, 19(2), 2002, p 79.
8. Smith, 'East Timor', p 153.
9. N Chomsky, 'East Timor, the United States, and international responsibility: "green light" for war crimes', in Tanter et al, Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers, p 143.
10. S Welles, The Time for Decision, Melbourne: George Jaboor, 1945, p 303.
11. East Timor was eventually placed on the UN's list of non-self governing territories on 14 December 1960.
12. Gunn, 'The five-hundred-year Timorese Funu', p 9.
13. EG Whitlam, 'Australia, Indonesia and Europe's empires', in J Cotton (ed), East Timor and Australia, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1999, p 142.
14. J Birmingham, 'Appeasing Jakarta: Australia's complicity in the East Timor tragedy', Quarterly Essay, 2, 2001, p 43.
15. See also P Hastings, 'Timor: Some Australian attitudes, 1941-1950', in Cotton (ed), East Timor and Australia, pp 41-53 for a more detailed account of Australian attitudes. The reluctance of successive Australian conservative governments to prioritise the future status of East Timor was at least partly based on two key assessments of Australia's regional relationships. The first of these was that its opposition to Indonesia's takeover of the western half of New Guinea had been a costly failure in diplomatic terms. Strong Australian opposition to the takeover articulated during the 1950s had not been backed by the USA or UK and ultimately Australia was powerless to stop it.
16. See H Weisbrod, 'Sir Garfield Barwick and Dutch New Guinea', Australian Quarterly, 34(2), 1967, pp 24-35.
17. Significantly the West New Guinea problem seemed, in the eyes of Australian policy makers, quickly to fade from view once Indonesia assumed control and then sovereignty over that territory. At least some in the foreign policy community in Australia assumed East Timor would go the same way. Birmingham, 'Appeasing Jakarta', pp 48-49. The second assessment was more general and recognised that Australia had to reach a broadly based settlement with respect to its status in Southeast Asia. Nixon's 1969 doctrine of transferring the burden of defence and security to Pacific-Asian states and the steady 'Europeanisation' of Britain's interests meant that, strategically and economically, Australian governments had to turn to securing their own interests in Asia.
18. There was no irredentist call for the resumption of Indonesian sovereignty. There was no legitimate claim to it in international law. There were no compelling historical accounts of close association between the peoples of East Timor and those in the Javanese heartland of modern Indonesia. There were no reasons of shared ethnic or religious identity with Indonesia, although the New Order eventually did articulate a desire to bring its East Timorese 'brothers' into the Indonesian nation. See L Suryadinata, Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996, p 53;
19. H Crouch, 'Australia and the security of Australia and Papua New Guinea', Australian Outlook, 40(3), 1986, pp 167-168;
20. H McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, Blackburn, Victoria: Fontana, 1980, p 191.
21. For brief data on the later Portuguese colonial economy, see P Hastings, 'The Timor problem', in Cotton, East Timor and Australia, pp 57-73.
22. Birmingham, 'Appeasing Jakarta', p 40.
23. N Wheeler & T Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism', International Affairs, 77(4), 2001, pp 809-810.
24. R Falk, 'The East Timor ordeal: International law and its limits', in Tanter et al, Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers, pp 152-153;
25. M Aarons & R Domm, East Timor: A Western Made Tragedy, Sydney, Left Book Club, 2000, pp 16-19;
26. Suryadinata, Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto, p 54;
27. N Viviani, 'Australians and the East Timor issue - the policy of the Whitlam government', in Cotton, East Timor and Australia, pp 82-83;
28. J Nevins, 'The making of "Ground Zero" in East Timor in 1999: An analysis of international complicity in Indonesia's crimes', Asian Survey, 42(4), 2002, p 629;
29. and Wheeler & Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism', p 806.
30. Suryadinata, Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto, p 92;
31. Crouch, 'Australia and the security of Australia and Papua New Guinea', p 168;
32. and Viviani, 'Australians and the East Timor issue', p 87.
33. Viviani, 'Australians and the East Timor issue', p 87;
34. and Wheeler & Dunne,'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism', p 809.
35. D Bourchier, 'The 1950s in New Order ideology and politics', in D Bourchier & J Legge (eds), Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s-1990s, Clayton, Victoria: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, 31, 1994, p 50.
36. C Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the independence of East Timor, Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2004, pp 14-15.
37. See D Kammen, 'The trouble with normal: The Indonesian military, paramilitaries, and the final solution in East Timor', in BRO Anderson (ed), Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2001.
38. S Nichterlein, 'Australia: Courtier or courtesan?', in Cotton, East Timor and Australia, p 152.
39. S Niner, 'A long journey of resistance: The origins and struggle of CNRT', in R Tanter et al, Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers, pp 15-16.
40. Ibid.
41. McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, pp 192-193.
42. From mid-1974 onwards, the Indonesian government increasingly interfered in East Timorese affairs, citing its concerns with the supposed communism of Fretilin. It sponsored the broadcasting of propaganda from Kupang (West Timor) warning of the dangers of Fretilin, while the Indonesian consulate destabilised from within through its open endorsement of Apodeti and finally its orchestration of the infiltration of Apodeti and UDT. In the months before the invasion Indonesia deployed covert forces into East Timorese territory to terrorise and promote distrust and conflict among the parties contending for political control in the wake of Portugal's scheduled withdrawal. Niner 'A long journey of resistance', p 18;
43. and McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, pp 199-200.
44. Niner, 'A long journey of resistance'. p 17.
45. By early 1975, and jointly recognising the dangers of growing Indonesian intervention into the process of decolonisation, Fretilin and UDT forces entered into an agreement to jointly govern East Timor. However, the agreement could not withstand the pressures generated by poorly planned and executed decolonisation plans by Portugal and Indonesian determination to split the coalition and isolate Fretilin. Gunn, 'the five-hundred-year Timorese Funu', p 10;
46. and McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p 203. By August 1975 Fretilin and UDT had engaged in a brief civil war in no small part attributable to the interventions not only of Indonesia but also of Portuguese officials charged with East Timor's decolonisation and who tended to (covertly) support Fretilin.
47. McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p 200. While it was the UDT that initiated the conflict, Fretilin forces took control of the Portuguese armoury with its 15 000 modern NATO-pattern rifles, quickly defeating the UDT and taking effective control over East Timor from September 1975.
48. See McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, pp 205-206.
49. Niner, 'A long journey of resistance', pp 18-19.
50. D Shoesmith, 'Timor-Leste: Divided leadership in a semi-presidential system', Asian Survey, 43(2), 2003, pp 239-241;
51. Niner, 'A long journey of resistance', p 19.
52. B Kiernan, 'The demography of genocide in Southeast Asia - the death tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and East Timor, 1975-80', Critical Asian Studies, 35(4), 2003, pp 590-594.
53. Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor, which was initially the armed wing of Fretilin but later was declared independent of Fretilin by Xanana Gusmao.
54. Niner, 'A long journey of resistance', pp 20-21.
55. Shoesmith, 'Timor-Leste', pp 238-240. Sarah Niner differs in her analysis of the origins of the term Mau bere, arguing it was a common name among the Mambai people.
56. See Niner, 'A long journey of resistance', pp 28, fn 30. Mauberism in its valorisation of the rural poor and its attempt to articulate a Timorese identity construct is remarkably similar to independent Indonesia's first president Sukarno's Marhaenism.
57. See JD Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1972, pp 72-74.
58. Niner, 'A long journey of resistance', p 22;
59. R Tanter, 'East Timor and the crisis of the Indonesian intelligence state', in Tanter et al, Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers, p 190.
60. Aarons & Domm, East Timor: A Western Made Tragedy, pp 64-66;
61. Wheeler & Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism' p 806;
62. and Birmingham, 'Appeasing Jakarta', p 12. However, in July 1992, the 18 donors that made up the Consultative Group on Indonesia, pledged $4.95 billion in new economic aid, higher than the level of 1991.
63. See Suryadinata, Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto, p 58. US support of the Indonesian military continued unabated.
64. See A Nairn, 'US support for the Indonesian military: Congressional testimony', in Tanter et al, Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers, p 164.
65. Wheeler & Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism', p 818.
66. Kammen, 'The demography of genocide in Southeast Asia', p 173.
67. R Foot, 'The UN system's contribution to Asia-Pacific security architecture', Pacific Review, 16(2), 2003, p 225.
68. Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', pp 76, 79;
69. and Smith, 'East Timor: Elections in the world's newest nation', pp 148-149.
70. UN Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976) affirmed East Timor's right to self-determination, instructed Indonesia to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor and to withdraw its military forces without delay. These resolutions also left Portugal with the responsibility of administrator of a non-self governing territory and with the duty of seeing that the rights of the East Timorese to self-determination were properly exercised. See Falk, 'The East Timor ordeal', pp 152-153.
71. Nevins, 'The making of "Ground Zero" in East Timor in 1999', pp 627-628;
72. and Wheeler & Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism', p 810.
73. Falk, 'The East Timor ordeal', p 155.
74. Nevins, 'The making of "Ground Zero" in East Timor in 1999', p 628.
75. Ibid, p 627;
76. and Wheeler & Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism', pp 813-815.
77. G Robinson, 'With UNAMET in East Timor - an historian's personal view', in Tanter et al, Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers, pp 56-58. Of the 446 256 people who registered to vote, the great majority were in East Timor itself (433 576) and under circumstances of great duress, given the widespread violence and intimidation of Indonesian-backed militias.
78. See http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/bs/br070899.htm.
79. See also http://www.etan.org/et99b/august/8-14/8therep.htm, accessed 13 May 2005.
80. Wheeler & Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism', pp 816, 806;
81. and Birmingham, 'Appeasing Jakarta', pp 23-24.
82. J Nevins, 'Restitution over coffee: Truth, reconciliation, and environmental violence in East Timor', Political Geography, 22(6), 2003, p 681;
83. J Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor', Development and Change, 33(5), 2002, p 983.
84. Robinson, 'With UNAMET in East Timor', p 70.
85. DY King, 'East Timor's founding elections and emerging party system', Asian Survey, 43 (5), 2003, pp 746.
86. Smith, 'Elections in the world's newest nation', p 149;
87. Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor',p 984;
88. and Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', p 78.
89. Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', p 76.
90. Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor', p 981;
91. and F Mégret & F Hoffman, 'The UN as a human rights violator? Some reflections on the United Nations' changing human rights responsibilities', Human Rights Quarterly, 25(2), 2003, p 328.
92. R Wilde, 'From Danzig to East Timor and beyond: The role of international territorial administration', American Journal of International Law, 95(3), p 600;
93. and Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor', p 981.
94. Wilde, 'From Danzig to East Timor and beyond', p 583.
95. Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor', p 989;
96. and Mégret & Hoffman, 'The UN as a human rights violator?', pp 325-327.
97. Smith, 'Elections in the world's newest nation', p 149.
98. Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor', p 981.
99. Jonathan Steele argues that upon arrival Sergio Vieira de Mello found Dili in far worse shape that the Kosovo he was leaving behind: Almost no secondary teachers, few civil service personnel, almost no doctors, and an adult population that was 46% illiterate. Jonathan Steele 'Nation-building in East Timor', p 79.
100. Ibid, p 83.
101. King, 'East Timor's founding elections and emerging party system', p 746;
102. Mégret & Hoffman, 'The UN as a human rights violator?', p 335;
103. Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', p 79;
104. and Smith, 'Elections in the world's newest nation', p 149.
105. Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor', p 981.
106. Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', p 80;
107. Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor', p 994.
108. See http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/easttimor.htm, accessed 13 May 2005.
109. Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', pp 79-80.
110. Jarat Chopra notes that in January 2000 there were 174 professional-level staff employed by UNTAET in Dili and only 17 in the 13 districts of East Timor. p 988.
111. Ibid, pp 985-988;
112. and Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', pp 82-85.
113. Chomsky, 'East Timor, the United States, and international responsibility', p 132.
114. See 'The Special Panels for Serious Crimes - justice for East Timor', La'o Hamutuk Bulletin, 5 (3-4), October 2004, p 2.
115. Nevins, 'Restitution over coffee', pp 683-684.
116. See 'UN panel calls for Timor tribunal', The Australian, 29 June 2005, at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/ 0,5744,15769422%255E1702,00.html, accessed 29 June 2005.
117. See also Human Rights Watch, 'East Timor: UN Security Council must ensure justice', 29 June 2005, at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/28/ eastti11231.htm, accessed 29 June 2005.
118. Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', p 81;
119. and 'The Special Panels for Serious Crimes', p 2.
120. See War Crimes Studies Centre, at http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/ ~warcrime/East_Timor.htm, accessed 29 June 2005.
121. 'The Special Panels for Serious Crimes', p 3.
122. Details of indictees can be viewed at http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/ ~warcrime/Serious%20Crimes%20Unit%20Files/suspects/SuspectsByName.html, and of prosecutions at http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/ Serious%20Crimes%20Unit%20Files/cases/AllCases.html.
123. See Human Rights Watch, 'East Timor'.
124. C Stahn, 'Accommodating individual criminal responsibility and national reconciliation: The UN truth commission for East Timor', American Journal of International Law, 95(4), 2001, p 953;
125. Nevins, 'Restitution over coffee', pp 680-686;
126. 'Reviewing the East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)', La'o Hamutuk Bulletin, 4(5), November 2003, pp 1-7.
127. Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor', pp 993-994;
128. Smith, 'Elections in the world's newest nation', p 151;
129. and Steele, 'Nation-building in East Timor', p 80.
130. The small business people I spoke to were in hospitality and claimed that Fretilin was little concerned with the interests of particularly foreign-owned business, that the legal environment including title over land remains uncertain and that taxation is excessive.
131. Smith, 'Elections in the world's newest nation', p 152;
132. and Shoesmith, 'Timor-Leste', p 242.
133. Shoesmith, 'Timor-Leste', p 235.
134. Smith, 'Elections in the world's newest nation', pp 154-155. The election proceeded openly and fairly, despite general discontent among the opposition parties that Fretilin was aggressive and at times intimidating in its campaigning. Turnout was 91.3%. The Constituent Assembly comprised 88 seats, of which 13 were district and 75 national. Sixteen parties contested the election, of which 12 and one independent won representation. The key parties are Fretilin (55 seats); ASDT (six seats); PD (seven seats); Social Democratic Party (PSD) (six seats). Despite its name, the PSD is more a party of the right than the left and is built around the popular former Governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalão.
135. Shoesmith, 'Timor-Leste', p 242;
136. and Smith, 'Elections in the world's newest nation', p 152.
137. Shoesmith, 'Timor-Leste', p 235.
138. Ibid, pp 243-245.
139. Chopra, 'Building state failure in East Timor', p 982.
140. M Dodd 'Questions raised as guns pour in', The Australian, 7 July 2005, at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/ 0,5744,15847937%5E2702,00.html, accessed 7 July 2005.
141. Shoesmith, 'Timor-Leste', pp 246-247;
142. and King, 'East Timor's founding elections and emerging party system', pp 752-753.
143. Smith, 'Elections in the world's newest nation', p 157.
144. Dodd 'Questions raised as guns pour in'. in'. See also Dodd 'Timor PM link to arms contract', The Australian, 7 July 2005, at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/ 0,5744,15848039%255E601,00.html, accessed 7 July 2005.
145. King, 'East Timor's founding elections and emerging party system', p 755. This point was also made to me in a number of conversations and interviews in January 2005.
146. AAP, 'Governments close to Timor gas deal', The Age, 30 June 2005, at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/06/30/ 1119724758272.html?oneclick=true, accessed 30 June 2005;
147. and AAP, 'East Timor to get $13 billion from gas', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 July 2005, at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2005/07/07/ 1120329528486.html, accessed 7 July 2005.
148. N Wilson, 'Gusmao to veto gas deal', The Australian, 22 July 2005, at http://www.etan.org/et2005/july/17/22gusmao.htm, accessed 25 July 2005.
149. F Brennan, 'Maritime boundary claims down to shelf life', The Australian, 3 September 2004, at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/ printpage/0,5942,10651164,00.html, accessed 3 September 2004.
150. P Holding, 'The new battle over East Timor', The Age, 21 April 2005, at http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-new-battle-over-East-Timor/ 2005/04/20/1113854256512.html, accessed 21 April 2005.
151. N Klein, 'Negotiation, not adjudication, is East Timor's best bet', Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 2005, at http://www.smh.com.au/news/ Opinion/Negotiation-not-adjudication-is-East-Timors-best-bet/2005/05/24/ 1116700709567.html, accessed 25 May 2005.
152. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Australia-East Timor maritime boundaries: Finding an equitable solution', no date, on file with author;
153. and M Byrne, 'East Timor/Australia talks', NewMatilda.com, 16 March 2005, at http://www.newmatilda.com/home/ articledetail.asp?ArticleID=528&CategoryID, accessed 16 March 2005.
154. Holding, 'The new battle over East Timor'.
155. J Ramos Horta, 'The shape of a fair deal for East Timor', The Age, 30 May 2005, at http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/ The-shape-of-a-fair-deal-for-East-Timor/2005/05/29/1117305497563.html, accessed 30 May 2005.
156. Birmingham, 'Appeasing Jakarta', p 5.