East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism

International Affairs

Volumn 77, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 805-827

  Wheeler, Nicholas J ^a   Dunne, Tim ^a  

^a ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039890677     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00220     Document Type: Review

References (108)

1. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian war, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin Classics, 1954), p. 361.
2. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving strangers: humanitarian intervention in international society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3. Kofi Annan, 'Two concepts of sovereignty', The Economist, 18 Sept. 1999, pp. 81-2 at p. 82.
4. By piecing together estimates from the Indonesian government, the local administration and Catholic Church census data, James Cotton estimates the number of fatalities between 1975 and 1979 to be in the region of 120,000-200,000 out of a population of 700,000. See James Cotton, '"Peacekeeping" in East Timor: an Australian policy departure', Australian Journal of International Affairs 53: 3, 1999, pp. 237-46 at p. 237.
5. James Cotton, 'Against the grain: the East Timor intervention', Survival 43: 1, 2001, pp. 127-42 at p. 130.
6. Bob Lowry, quoted in Patrick Bishop and Barbie Dutter, 'Howard defends Australia's actions in face of bloodbath', Daily Telegraph, 22 Sept. 1999.
7. The case study is broadly focused on the time period from December 1999 to September 2000. While consideration is given to the UNAMET and INTERFET operations, we do not consider the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) mandated to oversee East Timor's reconstruction.
8. TNI stands for Tentara Nasional Indonesia (i.e. national troops of Indonesia). The army is sometimes referred to as ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia: Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). It changed its name to TNI after a reshuffle in 1999. We use the terms TNI/ABRI interchangeably in the article.
9. These conditions are set out in East Timor in transition 1998-2000: an Australian policy challenge (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), p. 133.
10. The words are Prime Minister Howard's. See Ted Bardacke, Gwen Robinson and Sander Thoenes, 'Jakarta cancels Australian pact', Financial Times, 17 Sept. 1999.
11. The idea of 'good international citizenship' was first propounded by Gareth Evans in Making Australian foreign policy, Australian Fabian Society Pamphlet 50, 1989. For an application to the first British Labour government's foreign policy, see Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'Good international citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy', International Affairs 74: 4, 1998.
12. The idea of 'good international citizenship' was first propounded by Gareth Evans in Making Australian foreign policy, Australian Fabian Society Pamphlet 50, 1989. For an application to the first British Labour government's foreign policy, see Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'Good international citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy', International Affairs 74: 4, 1998.
13. Richard Leaver, 'Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia', Pacific Review 14: 1, 2001, pp. 1-14 at pp. 2-3. Interestingly, New Zealand adopted a very similar stance. Having examined 'hundreds' of ministry of foreign affairs papers, Phil Goff argues that the human rights of the East Timorese were consistently 'subordinated to the desire to maintain good relations with Indonesia'. He quotes from a memorandum written by the secretary of foreign affairs to the prime minister on 10 Dec. 1975: 'New Zealand has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with Indonesia even if this might on occasion require some measure of compromise on matters of principle.' See Phil Goff, 'East Timor: lessons and implications', New Zealand International Review 24: 4, July/Aug. 1999, pp. 2-5 at p. 2.
14. Richard Leaver, 'Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia', Pacific Review 14: 1, 2001, pp. 1-14 at pp. 2-3. Interestingly, New Zealand adopted a very similar stance. Having examined 'hundreds' of ministry of foreign affairs papers, Phil Goff argues that the human rights of the East Timorese were consistently 'subordinated to the desire to maintain good relations with Indonesia'. He quotes from a memorandum written by the secretary of foreign affairs to the prime minister on 10 Dec. 1975: 'New Zealand has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with Indonesia even if this might on occasion require some measure of compromise on matters of principle.' See Phil Goff, 'East Timor: lessons and implications', New Zealand International Review 24: 4, July/Aug. 1999, pp. 2-5 at p. 2.
15. The Australian ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott, quickly alerted his colleagues in the Department of Minerals and Energy to business opportunities that arose in the aftermath of the Indonesian invasion. In the ambassador's words: 'We are all aware of the Australian defense interest in the Portuguese Timor situation but I wonder whether the Department has ascertained the interest of the Minister of the Department of Minerals and Energy in the Timor situation … The present gap in the agreed sea border … could be more readily negotiated with Indonesia … than with Portugal or an independent Portuguese Timor [sic]. I know I am recommending a pragmatic rather than a principled stand but that is what national interest and foreign policy is all about.' Quoted in Mathew Jardine, East Timor, p. 45. Citation is from an Australian Defense Department paper, in J. R. Walsh and George Munster, Documents on Australian defence and foreign policy, 1968-1975.
16. Jardine, East Timor: genocide in paradise (Tucson, AZ: Odonian Press, 1975, p. 38. Jardine's source here is the Los Angeles Times, 12 July 1975.
17. Jardine, East Timor: genocide in paradise (Tucson, AZ: Odonian Press, 1975, p. 38. Jardine's source here is the Los Angeles Times, 12 July 1975.
18. Jardine, East Timor, pp. 37-38. Jardine's source here is Dollars and Sense (Somerville, MA).
19. Jardine, East Timor, pp. 37-38. Jardine's source here is Dollars and Sense (Somerville, MA).
20. Security Council Resolution 389, on 22 April 1976, called for Indonesia 'to withdraw without further delay all its forces from the Territory'. The UN General Assembly voted for the immediate withdrawal of Indonesia five days after the invasion (12 Dec. 1975): the vote was 72:10, with 43 abstentions (including the United States, Canada and many West European states). Quoted in Jardine, East Timor, p. 36.
21. Quoted in Jardine, East Timor, p. 37.
22. William Maley, 'The UN and East Timor', Pacifica Review 12: 1, 2000, pp. 63-76 at p. 65.
23. Gareth Evans claims that Australia 'continued to recognise East Timor as a non-self governing territory entitled to self-determination'. See his defence of Labor's Timor policy, 'Steps beyond ending the bloodshed'. The Australian, 27 Sept. 1999.
24. Leaver, 'Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia', p. 3.
25. Ibid.
26. Melissa Roberts, 'Why Sydney is screaming: Australia's sense of loss in East Timor goes back decades', Newsweek, 20 Sept. 1999, p. 26.
27. Andrew Linklater, 'What is a good international citizen?', in Paul Keal, ed., Ethics and foreign policy (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1992). See also Peter Lawler, 'Constituting the "good state"', in Paul James, ed., Critical politics (Melbourne: Arena Publications, 1994).
28. Andrew Linklater, 'What is a good international citizen?', in Paul Keal, ed., Ethics and foreign policy (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1992). See also Peter Lawler, 'Constituting the "good state"', in Paul James, ed., Critical politics (Melbourne: Arena Publications, 1994).
29. Looking back on the issue in the aftermath of the crisis, Evans offered up the argument that good relations with Indonesia were a 'means' to realizing multiple 'ends', including 'helping the people of East Timor'. While other goals were achieved (particularly economic and security interests), this one was not 'fully realised'. See Evans, 'Steps beyond ending the bloodshed'.
30. The key part of Habibie's statement was: 'I am ready to consider as the President, to give East Timor a special status … under one condition that East Timor is recognized as an integrated part of the Republic of Indonesia' (Reuters, 10 June 1998).
31. East Timor in transition, pp. 29-30.
32. Richard Leaver, 'The meaning, origins and implications of "the Howard doctrine"', Pacific Review 14: 1, 2001, pp. 15-34 at p. 28. After East Timor went up in flames, former Primer Minister Keating blamed Howard for the disaster. Had he not sent the letter, Keating rather implausibly suggested, 'The East Timor disaster would not have started to unfold'. See Mike Steketee, 'Keating's last stand', The Weekend Australian, 9-10 Oct. 1999. Interestingly, Keating's foreign minister took a different line, believing that Howard was right to send the letter. See Evans, 'Steps beyond ending the bloodshed'.
33. Richard Leaver, 'The meaning, origins and implications of "the Howard doctrine"', Pacific Review 14: 1, 2001, pp. 15-34 at p. 28. After East Timor went up in flames, former Primer Minister Keating blamed Howard for the disaster. Had he not sent the letter, Keating rather implausibly suggested, 'The East Timor disaster would not have started to unfold'. See Mike Steketee, 'Keating's last stand', The Weekend Australian, 9-10 Oct. 1999. Interestingly, Keating's foreign minister took a different line, believing that Howard was right to send the letter. See Evans, 'Steps beyond ending the bloodshed'.
34. Richard Leaver, 'The meaning, origins and implications of "the Howard doctrine"', Pacific Review 14: 1, 2001, pp. 15-34 at p. 28. After East Timor went up in flames, former Primer Minister Keating blamed Howard for the disaster. Had he not sent the letter, Keating rather implausibly suggested, 'The East Timor disaster would not have started to unfold'. See Mike Steketee, 'Keating's last stand', The Weekend Australian, 9-10 Oct. 1999. Interestingly, Keating's foreign minister took a different line, believing that Howard was right to send the letter. See Evans, 'Steps beyond ending the bloodshed'.
35. Maley claims that Habibie's change of policy was not discussed with foreign minister Ali Alatas: William Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor crisis: some critical comments', Australian Journal of International Affairs 54: 2, 2000, pp. 151-61 at p. 156.
36. Desmond Ball, 'Silent witness: Australian intelligence and East Timor', Pacific Review 14: 1, 2001, pp. 35-62 at p. 45.
37. Alexander Downer, cited in Ball, 'Silent witness', p. 45. Downer would, of course, have wanted to play down these reports, particularly in public.
38. Ball, 'Silent witness', p. 47.
39. Ibid., pp. 51-2.
40. Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor crisis', p. 157. Maley also quotes from a 'leaked cable' from the Prime Minister's office to the effect that a peacekeeping force 'would remove any incentive for the East Timorese and the Indonesians to sort out their differences' (p. 157).
41. Alexander Downer, 'East Timor - looking back on 1999', Australian Journal of International Affairs 54: 1, 2000, pp. 5-10 at p. 6.
42. Maley, 'The UN and East Timor', p. 70.
43. Alan Dupont and Anthony Bergin, 'UN force critical to peace in Timor', Australian Financial Review, 29 March 1999. In the article, they argued that 'What is needed now is the early deployment of a multinational force under UN auspices'. Quoted in Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor crisis', p. 154.
44. Alan Dupont and Anthony Bergin, 'UN force critical to peace in Timor', Australian Financial Review, 29 March 1999. In the article, they argued that 'What is needed now is the early deployment of a multinational force under UN auspices'. Quoted in Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor crisis', p. 154.
45. Dame Margaret Anstee, quoted in Maley, 'The UN and East Timor', p. 71. It is worth noting in this regard that the Secretary-General himself appeared not to have learned this lesson. In a rare lapse of judgement, he argued on to September 1999 that 'If any of us had an inkling that it was going to be this chaotic, I don't think anyone would have gone forward. We are not fools.' Quoted in Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor Crisis', p. 154.
46. Dame Margaret Anstee, quoted in Maley, 'The UN and East Timor', p. 71. It is worth noting in this regard that the Secretary-General himself appeared not to have learned this lesson. In a rare lapse of judgement, he argued on to September 1999 that 'If any of us had an inkling that it was going to be this chaotic, I don't think anyone would have gone forward. We are not fools.' Quoted in Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor Crisis', p. 154.
47. Downer, 'East Timor - looking back on 1999', pp. 6-7.
48. This figure is given by Ball on the basis of intelligence estimates: 'Silent witness', p. 36.
49. Ball, 'Silent witness', p. 47.
50. Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, 'Marching into tragedy', The Australian, 8 Sept. 1999.
51. Jeffrey Bartholet, 'The "Clinton Doctrine" is tested by murderous pro-Indonesian militias', Newsweek, 20 Sept. 1999, pp. 22-6 at p. 23.
52. Shawn Donnan, 'Evidence grows over Jakarta hand in violence', Financial Times, 25 Nov. 1999. See also Ball, 'Silent witness', pp. 47-50.
53. Shawn Donnan, 'Evidence grows over Jakarta hand in violence', Financial Times, 25 Nov. 1999. See also Ball, 'Silent witness', pp. 47-50.
54. Report of the Security Council mission to Jakarta and Dili, S/1999/976, 14 Sept. 1999, www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs, visited on 6 July 2001, p. 5.
55. Xanana Gusmao's speech as reported by Portuguese Renascenca radio on 4 Sept. 1999, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia-Pacific, FE/3632 B/3, 6 Sept. 1999.
56. William Shawcross, Deliver us from evil: warlords and peacekeepers in a world of endless conflict (London: Bloomsbury 2001), p. 137.
57. Report of the Security Council Mission, p. 5; and Shawcross, Deliver us from evil, p. 359.
58. Report of the Security Council Mission, p. 5; and Shawcross, Deliver us from evil, p. 359.
59. Shawcross, Deliver us from evil, p. 357; Dan Murphy and John McBeth, 'Scorched earth', Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 Sept. 1999.
60. Shawcross, Deliver us from evil, p. 357; Dan Murphy and John McBeth, 'Scorched earth', Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 Sept. 1999.
61. Quoted in Leaver, 'Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia', p. 10.
62. Barbie Dutter, 'Australia ready to send in soldiers', Daily Telegraph, 7 Sept. 1999.
63. Report of the Security Council mission, p. 2.
64. Statement by the President on East Timor, 9 Sept. 1999, p. 3 (emphasis added), www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/timor, visited on 6 July 2001.
65. Noam Chomsky claims that the United States and the UK continued military support in the months before the ballot, despite evidence of widespread TNI-backed atrocities. The United States, he adds, even conducted 'joint military exercises just prior to the referendum'. Noam Chomsky, A new generation draws the line: Kosovo, East Timor and the standards of the West (London: Verso, 2000), p. 22.
66. Andrew Marshall and John Armstrong, 'East Timor crisis: US moves nearer to intervention', Independent, 11 Sept. 1999.
67. Mark Suzman and Sander Thoenes, 'US halts military links in move on E. Timor violence', Financial Times, 10 Sept. 1999.
68. Alexander Nicoll and Sander Thoenes, 'Indonesia defies UK to operate Hawk jets in E. Timor', Financial Times, 10 Sept. 1999.
69. Statement by the President On East Timor, 9 Sept. 1999, pp. 3, 7. The day before, a Financial Times editorial had made the same point: 'Jakarta should remember that the IMF's major western shareholders have difficulty justifying loans to countries condoning mass murder.' See leader, 'Intervening in East Timor', Financial Times, 8 Sept. 1999.
70. Statement by the President On East Timor, 9 Sept. 1999, pp. 3, 7. The day before, a Financial Times editorial had made the same point: 'Jakarta should remember that the IMF's major western shareholders have difficulty justifying loans to countries condoning mass murder.' See leader, 'Intervening in East Timor', Financial Times, 8 Sept. 1999.
71. See 'IMF suspends discussions on economic programme', Radio Australia, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/3638 B/8, 11 Sept 1999; Gwen Robinson, 'Asia-Pacific: Jakarta warns IMF and Bank over E. Timor', Financial Times, 10 Sept. 1999; Philip Thornton, 'World Bank freezes all new loans to Indonesia', Independent, 14 Sept. 1999.
72. See 'IMF suspends discussions on economic programme', Radio Australia, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/3638 B/8, 11 Sept 1999; Gwen Robinson, 'Asia-Pacific: Jakarta warns IMF and Bank over E. Timor', Financial Times, 10 Sept. 1999; Philip Thornton, 'World Bank freezes all new loans to Indonesia', Independent, 14 Sept. 1999.
73. See 'IMF suspends discussions on economic programme', Radio Australia, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/3638 B/8, 11 Sept 1999; Gwen Robinson, 'Asia-Pacific: Jakarta warns IMF and Bank over E. Timor', Financial Times, 10 Sept. 1999; Philip Thornton, 'World Bank freezes all new loans to Indonesia', Independent, 14 Sept. 1999.
74. Robinson, 'Asia-Pacific: Jakarta warns IMF and Bank over E. Timor'; Stephen Fidler and Gwen Robinson, 'IMF and World Bank played role in climbdown: East Timor lobbying effort exposes divisions over wisdom of sanctions', Financial Times, 13 Sept. 1999.
75. Robinson, 'Asia-Pacific: Jakarta warns IMF and Bank over E. Timor'; Stephen Fidler and Gwen Robinson, 'IMF and World Bank played role in climbdown: East Timor lobbying effort exposes divisions over wisdom of sanctions', Financial Times, 13 Sept. 1999.
76. According to Stephen Fidler and Gwen Robinson, this pressure 'was instrumental in persuading Indonesia to accept an international peacekeeping force'. See Fidler and Robinson, 'IMF and World Bank played role in climbdown'.
77. See Nisid Hajan, 'The hard part', Time, 27 Sept. 1999, p. 49.
78. Interview with Ambassador Hasmy, permanent representative of Malaysia to the United Nations, New York, 27 April 2001.
79. Interview with Ambassador Hasmy, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations, New York, 27 April 2001.
80. Report of the Security Council, p. 4; Shawcross, Deliver us from evil, p. 360.
81. Report of the Security Council, p. 4; Shawcross, Deliver us from evil, p. 360.
82. Report of the Security Council, p. 4.
83. Philip Sherwell, 'Cook halts Hawk sale to Indonesia', Daily Telegraph, 12 Sept. 1999.
84. Penny Wensley, 'East Timor and the United Nations', speech by Ambassador Wensley to the Australian Institute for International Affairs, the United Nations Association of Australia and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Glover Cottages, Sydney, 23 Feb. 2000, p. 10.
85. Ibid.
86. Quoted in Shawcross, Deliver us from evil, p. 359.
87. For a full transcript of the speeches, see 4043rd meeting of the Security Council held on Saturday 11 Sept. 1999, S/PV.4043, www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs, visited on 7 July 2001.
88. Wensley, 'East Timor and the United Nations', p. 10.
89. Ibid., p. 9.
90. Anthony Smith, 'East Timor: opting for independence', New Zealand International Review, Nov./Dec.
91. 'APEC ministers says Indonesia should solve Timor crisis or accept foreign help', Kyodo news service, Tokyo, in English, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia-Pacific, FE/3637 S1/1, 9 Sept. 1999.
92. The Indonesian military spokesperson Brigadier General Sudrajat stated that 'The armed forces reject Australia as part of any peacekeeping troops … the majority of the force [should] come from ASEAN.' However, hours after this military statement, the Indonesian foreign minister reiterated the position that Habibie reportedly expressed to Annan on 12 September, namely, that 'We are putting no conditionalities so it is all up to the United Nations to prepare the composition.' See Stephen Fidler, Michael Littlejohns, Gwen Robinson and Sander Thoenes, 'Military rejects Australian troops: conflicting signals as Indonesian Foreign Minister denies conditions placed on peacekeeping mission', Financial Times, 14 Sept. 1999; Shawcross, Deliver us from evil, p. 360.
93. The Indonesian military spokesperson Brigadier General Sudrajat stated that 'The armed forces reject Australia as part of any peacekeeping troops … the majority of the force [should] come from ASEAN.' However, hours after this military statement, the Indonesian foreign minister reiterated the position that Habibie reportedly expressed to Annan on 12 September, namely, that 'We are putting no conditionalities so it is all up to the United Nations to prepare the composition.' See Stephen Fidler, Michael Littlejohns, Gwen Robinson and Sander Thoenes, 'Military rejects Australian troops: conflicting signals as Indonesian Foreign Minister denies conditions placed on peacekeeping mission', Financial Times, 14 Sept. 1999; Shawcross, Deliver us from evil, p. 360.
94. David Usborne, 'UN strategy - UN seeks peace force volunteers', Independent, 13 Sept. 1999.
95. Stephen Fidler and Gwen Robinson, 'Asean steps in over East Timor force', Financial Times, 14 Sept. 1999.
96. Wensley, 'East Timor and the United Nations', p. 11. Ambassador Hasmy reflected in April 2001 that he was concerned during the drafting of the resolution that too little weight was being given to Indonesia's cooperation with the process. He claims that, as a result, elements in the draft resolution were watered down. Interview with Ambassador Hasmy, New York, April 2001.
97. Resolution 1264 adopted by the Security Council at its 4045th meeting on 15 Sept. 1999, www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs, visited on 9 July 2001.
98. Wensley, 'East Timor and the United Nations', p. 11.
99. Cotton, 'Against the Grain', p. 11.
100. Many threats were issued by the militiamen. Eurico Guterres, leader of the pro-Indonesian Aitarak, said that the East Timorese 'are thirsty for the blood of white people'. Opinion-formers in Jakarta agreed, albeit in more polite language. Habibie's adviser Fortuna Anwar noted that The militias have made clear their strong animosity toward the Australians; now the hostility will be multiplied 100 times.' Prime Minister Howard openly admitted the risk to his troops. As the mission was under way, he told the Australian public: 'There will be danger. There could be casualties. And the Australian public should understand that.' Excerpts quoted from Ron Moreau and Jeffrey Bartholet, 'Marching into a trap?', Newsweek, 27 Sept. 1999, pp. 42-5 at pp. 42, 44.
101. Kofi A. Annan, Preventing war and disaster: A growing global challenge, annual report on the work of the organization (New York, UN, 1999), p. 12.
102. Downer, 'East Timor - looking back on 1999', p. 5.
103. The words of John McCarthy, Canberra's ambassador to Indonesia, quoted in Leaver, 'The meanings, origins and implications of "the Howard Doctrine"', p. 15.
104. One of the leaders of the independence movement, Jose Ramos Horta, referred to Howard as the 'only Prime Minister in Australia in 23 years who has had the courage to respond to the appeals, to the cries, of the people of East Timor'. He went on to say: 'They will remember the likes of Paul Keating, who year after year were an accomplice of the Suharto regime.' Dennis Shanahan, 'PM accuses Keating', The Australian, 6 Oct. 1999.
105. The idea of conceiving state sovereignty in terms of responsibility was first advanced by Francis Deng, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General for internally displaced persons. Deng encapsulated this approach in the phrase 'sovereignty as responsibility'. See Francis M. Deng, Protecting the dispossessed: a challenge for the international community (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993) and Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as responsibility (Washington DC: Brookings, 1995).
106. The idea of conceiving state sovereignty in terms of responsibility was first advanced by Francis Deng, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General for internally displaced persons. Deng encapsulated this approach in the phrase 'sovereignty as responsibility'. See Francis M. Deng, Protecting the dispossessed: a challenge for the international community (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993) and Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as responsibility (Washington DC: Brookings, 1995).
107. Richard Woolcott, 'Hefty price to pay for meddling', The Australian, 17 Sept. 1999. Greg Sheridan added that the intervention had 'enormous implications for our national security': Sheridan, 'This burden is here to stay', The Australian, 17 Sept. 1999.
108. Richard Woolcott, 'Hefty price to pay for meddling', The Australian, 17 Sept. 1999. Greg Sheridan added that the intervention had 'enormous implications for our national security': Sheridan, 'This burden is here to stay', The Australian, 17 Sept. 1999.