The case for jury waiver

Criminal Law Review

Volumn 1997, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 155-171

  Doran, Sean ^a   Jackson, John ^a  

^a QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY BELFAST   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 3042943068     PISSN: 0011135X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (117)

1. See P. Derbyshire, "The Lamp That Shows That Freedom Lives: Is it Worth the Candle?" [1991] Crim.L.R. 740 at 743-744.
2. See A. Ashworth, The Criminal Process (1994), p.247 (and see generally pp.246-252).
3. The governing legislation is the Criminal Law Act 1977. The mechanics of election of mode of trial will not be discussed in the present article.
4. The considerations to be taken into account by the court in making the decision are set out in the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.19. In addition to the respective views of prosecution and defence, these include the nature of the case, the seriousness of the circumstances and the adequacy of the punishment which could be inflicted by the court of summary trial. Guidance on the magistrates' decision is provided in Mode of Trial Guidelines, issued with the indorsement of the Lord Chief Justice: see Blackstone's Criminal Practice (6th ed., 1996), pp.997-999. See also S. White, "The Antecedents of the Mode of Trial Guidelines" [1996] Crim.L.R. 471.
5. The considerations to be taken into account by the court in making the decision are set out in the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.19. In addition to the respective views of prosecution and defence, these include the nature of the case, the seriousness of the circumstances and the adequacy of the punishment which could be inflicted by the court of summary trial. Guidance on the magistrates' decision is provided in Mode of Trial Guidelines, issued with the indorsement of the Lord Chief Justice: see Blackstone's Criminal Practice (6th ed., 1996), pp.997-999. See also S. White, "The Antecedents of the Mode of Trial Guidelines" [1996] Crim.L.R. 471.
6. The considerations to be taken into account by the court in making the decision are set out in the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.19. In addition to the respective views of prosecution and defence, these include the nature of the case, the seriousness of the circumstances and the adequacy of the punishment which could be inflicted by the court of summary trial. Guidance on the magistrates' decision is provided in Mode of Trial Guidelines, issued with the indorsement of the Lord Chief Justice: see Blackstone's Criminal Practice (6th ed., 1996), pp.997-999. See also S. White, "The Antecedents of the Mode of Trial Guidelines" [1996] Crim.L.R. 471.
7. D. Riley and J. Vennard, Triable Either-Way Cases: Crown Court or Magistrates' Court? (Home Office Research Study, 1988), p.11 . For commentary on the relationship between prosecutors' representations and magistrates' committal decisions, see Ashworth, op. cit., n.2 above, pp.234-236.
8. D. Riley and J. Vennard, Triable Either-Way Cases: Crown Court or Magistrates' Court? (Home Office Research Study, 1988), p.11 . For commentary on the relationship between prosecutors' representations and magistrates' committal decisions, see Ashworth, op. cit., n.2 above, pp.234-236.
9. For notable contributions to the debate in recent years, see Darbyshire, op. cit., n.1 above and the collection of essays in M. Findlay and P. Duff (eds), The Jury Under Attack (1988).
10. For notable contributions to the debate in recent years, see Darbyshire, op. cit., n.1 above and the collection of essays in M. Findlay and P. Duff (eds), The Jury Under Attack (1988).
11. A. Ashworth, "Crime, Community and Creeping Consequentialism" [1996] Crim.L.R. 220.
12. Patton v. United States, 281 US. 276 (1930). The basic right to jury trial is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. A brief historical account of waiver in the U.S. is contained in H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American Jury (1966), pp.22-24. All states have come to accept the practice, albeit with different procedural rules attached.
13. The criminal court system which operates across the provinces in Canada is a varied and rather complex one: for discussion, see The Law Reform Commission of Canada, Toward a Unified Criminal Court (Working Paper 59, 1989). The following is a very basic outline of the relevant provisions governing the operation of waiver. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s.11(f), provides a right to jury trial for offences carrying a maximum of at least five years' imprisonment. The Canadian Criminal code, s.471, states that, except where otherwise provided, indictable offences shall be tried by a court composed of judge and jury. For most indictable offences, the Code provides that the accused may elect trial by judge and jury, trial by a superior court judge alone or trial by a lower court judge (s.536). The most serious offences, such as murder, are listed in s.469 and can only be tried by a superior court of criminal jurisdiction, with s.473 making provision for waiver of jury trial with the Attorney-General's consent (prior to 1985, waiver was not permitted in respect of such offences except in Alberta, but the Code was amended to allow waiver generally in such cases: Criminal Law Amendment Act 1985, c.19, s.64). For discussion of the provisions, see Turpin (1989) 48 C.C.C. (3d) 8 (Supreme Court of Canada); Bryant (1984) 16 C.C.C. (3d) 408 (Ontario Court of Appeal); Cardinal (1996) 105 C.C.C. (3d) 163 (Alberta Court of Queen's Bench).
14. The right to trial by jury is one of the minimum standards of criminal procedure set out in s.25 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (s. 25(e)). Provisions were introduced in 1979 enabling trial by judge alone in the case of persons committed to the High Court for trial (other than where the maximum term of imprisonment is life or 14 years or more): see the Crimes Act 1961, ss.361B and 361C (as amended).
15. South Australia was the first Australian state to permit waiver in trials on indictment, by amendment in 1984 of the Juries Act 1927, s.7. Waiver is also now permitted in the Australian Capital Territory (Supreme Court Act 1933, s.68B), New South Wales (Criminal Procedure Act 1986, s.32) and Western Australia (Criminal Code, s.651A). See Halsbury's Laws of Australia (LEXIS Service), Vol. 9, Title 130. The Commonwealth Constitution, s.80, states: "The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury . . ." In Brown (1986) 160 C.L.R. 171, the High Court of Australia held (by a three to two majority) that the clear words of s.80 precluded a person from electing trial by judge alone for an offence against the law of the Commonwealth, despite the existence within a State (in this case South Australia) of a statutory provision permitting waiver in trials on indictment. The judgments in Brown are replete with illuminating historical and comparative discussion of the status of jury trial as a privilege or a right within the constitutional framework of Australia, the USA and beyond.
16. Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Cm. 2263, 1993), Chap. 4, paras. 41-42.
17. ibid. Chap. 8, paras. 12-14.
18. ibid. Chap. 8, para. 18.
19. ibid. Chap. 6, paras. 4-19.
20. For comment on the immediate reaction to this proposal, see G. Maher, "Reforming the Criminal Process: A Scottish Perspective" in M. McConville and L. Bridges (eds), Criminal Justice in Crisis (1994).
21. The Commission's comment that "[m]agistrates' courts conduct over 93% of all criminal cases and should be trusted to try cases fairly" (Chap. 6, para. 18 of the Report) was described elsewhere by one of the authors as a "classic non sequitur": see J. Jackson, "Trial by Jury and Alternative Modes of Trial" in McConville and Bridges (eds), op. cit., n.16 above. See also Ashworth, op. cit., n.2 above, pp.244-245.
22. The Commission's comment that "[m]agistrates' courts conduct over 93% of all criminal cases and should be trusted to try cases fairly" (Chap. 6, para. 18 of the Report) was described elsewhere by one of the authors as a "classic non sequitur": see J. Jackson, "Trial by Jury and Alternative Modes of Trial" in McConville and Bridges (eds), op. cit., n.16 above. See also Ashworth, op. cit., n.2 above, pp.244-245.
23. See discussion by Ashworth, op. cit., n.2 above, p. 231.
24. For a discussion of the concept of "jury equity", see P. Devlin, "The Conscience of the Jury," (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 388. For a more sceptical view, see Darbyshire, op. cit., n.1 above, pp.747-751. For the argument that the jury's right to determine the law and the facts should be enshrined in statute, see M. D. A. Freeman, "Why Not a Jury Nullification Statute Here Too?" (1981) 131 R.L.J. 304.
25. For a discussion of the concept of "jury equity", see P. Devlin, "The Conscience of the Jury," (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 388. For a more sceptical view, see Darbyshire, op. cit., n.1 above, pp.747-751. For the argument that the jury's right to determine the law and the facts should be enshrined in statute, see M. D. A. Freeman, "Why Not a Jury Nullification Statute Here Too?" (1981) 131 R.L.J. 304.
26. For a discussion of the concept of "jury equity", see P. Devlin, "The Conscience of the Jury," (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 388. For a more sceptical view, see Darbyshire, op. cit., n.1 above, pp.747-751. For the argument that the jury's right to determine the law and the facts should be enshrined in statute, see M. D. A. Freeman, "Why Not a Jury Nullification Statute Here Too?" (1981) 131 R.L.J. 304.
27. See nn.25 and 26 below and accompanying text.
28. Kalven and Zeisel, op. cit., n.8 above, pp.58-59.
29. J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Jury Trials, (1979), Chap. 5.
30. See, for example, M. Freeman, "The Social Construction of Truth: Some Thoughts on Jury Trials and Current Research into Juries" (1978) 1 Preston Polytechnic Law Review 3.
31. M. Zander and P. Henderson, The Crown Court Study (RCCJ Research Study No. 19, 1993), pp.170-171.
32. L. Donegan, "Trial and error?", The Guardian, May 10, 1995.
33. At the time of writing, the Court of Appeal had not issued its reasons for allowing the appeal: see The Times, April 26, 1996.
34. [1981] 2 All E.R. 1060.
35. See B. Block, C. Corbett and J. Peay, Ordered and directed acquittals in the Crown Court (RCCJ Research Study No. 15). For a summary of the research, see "Ordered and Directed Acquittals in the Crown Court: A Time of Change?" [1993] Crim.L.R. 95.
36. See B. Block, C. Corbett and J. Peay, Ordered and directed acquittals in the Crown Court (RCCJ Research Study No. 15). For a summary of the research, see "Ordered and Directed Acquittals in the Crown Court: A Time of Change?" [1993] Crim.L.R. 95.
37. For discussion of this issue following the halting of the prosecution of Geoff Knights for assault last year, see R. Greenslade, "Press and Prejudice", The Guardian, October 9, 1995.
38. For discussion of this theme, see S. Doran (forthcoming article in The Times).
39. See R. Ford, "Lab tests cast doubt on IRA convictions", The Times, May 15, 1996.
40. See F. Bawden, "Who checks forensics?", The Times, May 28, 1996.
41. J. Jackson and S. Doran, Judge Without Jury: Diplock Trials in the Adversary System (1995).
42. ibid. Chap. 2 (dealing with the introduction, history and operation of the system).
43. ibid. Chap. 4 (methodology).
44. ibid. p.231.
45. For an interesting recent example from Canada of this line of argument having a direct influence on the defence decision to waive jury trial, see Cardinal (1996) 105 C.C.C. (3d) 163 (Alberta Court of Appeal), a murder case involving a serious causation issue which the defence thought more suitable for a judge to deal with than a jury.
46. Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, pp.229-230.
47. [1977] 2 Q.B. 224.
48. Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, p.229.
49. For discussion, see J. R. Spencer, Jackson's Machinery of Justice (1989), pp.394-396.
50. The range of offences in respect of which the accused could opt for trial by jury has been reduced since the recommendation of the James Committee in 1975 that a number of offences be transferred to the sole jurisdiction of magistrates: The Distribution of Criminal Business Between the Crown Court and Magistrates' Courts: Report of the Interdepartmental Committee (Cmnd. 6323, 1975). See the Criminal Law Act 1977, s.15, and the Criminal Justice Act 1988, ss.37-39.
51. See nn.15 and 16 above and accompanying text.
52. See Report of the Fraud Trials Committee (1986), paras. 1.6 and 8.52-8.74.
53. For a useful critique, see R. Harding, "Jury Performance in Complex Cases" in Findlay and Duff (eds), op. cit., n.6 above, pp.75-79.
54. For discussion, see C. Walker and K. Starmer (eds), Justice in Error (1993), p. 148. The Royal Commission recommended the use of stipendiary magistrates on a wider scale: see Chap. 8, para. 103. Note that in Northern Ireland, the courts of summary jurisdiction are presided over by legally qualified resident magistrates ("R.M.s"): see B. Dickson, The Legal System of Northern Ireland (3rd ed., 1993), pp.23-24.
55. For discussion, see C. Walker and K. Starmer (eds), Justice in Error (1993), p. 148. The Royal Commission recommended the use of stipendiary magistrates on a wider scale: see Chap. 8, para. 103. Note that in Northern Ireland, the courts of summary jurisdiction are presided over by legally qualified resident magistrates ("R.M.s"): see B. Dickson, The Legal System of Northern Ireland (3rd ed., 1993), pp.23-24.
56. For further details, see G. Maher, op. cit., n. 16 above, p.63.
57. For a review of the Diplock controversy, see Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, pp.29-52. See also S. Greer and A. White, Abolishing the Diplock Courts: The Case for Restoring Jury Trial to Scheduled Offences in Northern Ireland (1986).
58. For a review of the Diplock controversy, see Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, pp.29-52. See also S. Greer and A. White, Abolishing the Diplock Courts: The Case for Restoring Jury Trial to Scheduled Offences in Northern Ireland (1986).
59. For a critique of the system of allocation and proposals for reform, see Jackson and Doran, "Diplock and the Presumption Against Jury Trial: a critique" [1992] Crim.L.R. 755. Prior to the enactment of the latest version of the emergency legislation (Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996), the major difficulty was that cases of robbery and aggravated burglary in which a firearm was alleged to have been used could not be diverted to jury trial by the Attorney-General, unlike most of the other offences listed in Schedule 1 to the Act as being triable by judge alone.
60. One could also point to other common law jurisdictions such as Israel, Singapore and now Malaysia, in which trial by judge alone is the norm for serious criminal cases.
61. See generally S. Doran, J. Jackson and M. L. Seigel, "Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials" (1995) 23 American Journal of Criminal Law 1 at 8-11.
62. U.S. Constitution, Sixth Amendment; see Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
63. R. Munday, "Jury trial, continental style" (1993) 13 Legal Studies 204 at 223.
64. See generally J. Jackson, "Judicial Responsibility in Criminal Proceedings" (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 59.
65. See nn.27 and 28 above and accompanying text.
66. For an incisive critique of this power, see D. Wolchover, "Should Judges Sum Up on the Facts?" [1989] Crim.L.R. 781. For an American perspective, see S. Saltzburg,"The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge" (1978) 63 Virginia Law Review 1.
67. For an incisive critique of this power, see D. Wolchover, "Should Judges Sum Up on the Facts?" [1989] Crim.L.R. 781. For an American perspective, see S. Saltzburg,"The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge" (1978) 63 Virginia Law Review 1.
68. See S. Doran, "Alternative Defences: the 'invisible burden' on the trial judge" [1991] Crim.L.R. 878.
69. Crimes Act 1961, s.361B.
70. See n.9 above.
71. Crimes Act 1961, s.361B. But note the view expressed by Hammond J. in Perks [1993] N.Z.L.R. 572 (involving a charge of sexual violation, which carries a maximum term of 14 years' imprisonment and therefore falls outside the remit of the waiver provision): "It may be that the right of an accused to select the mode of trial ought to be wider in relation to this (and perhaps other) offences. And there is much to be said for the notion that an accused should have the fundamental right to be tried in that forum which fits her sense of where justice to her will be done" (at 575).
72. For an expression of this view, see the landmark decision in Brown v. R. (1986) 160 C.L.R. 171, in which the High Court of Australia ruled that the effect of a constitutional provision stating that the trial on indictment of an offence against a law of the Commonwealth "shall" be by jury (s.80) was to prevent waiver by the accused in respect of such an offence; Deane J. opined: "That constitutional guarantee [of trial by jury] is . . . for the benefit of the community as a whole as well as for the benefit of the individual accused" (at 201).
73. See the Criminal Code, ss.473 and 568. Interestingly, in a number of recent decisions, Canadian courts have insisted that the Crown should have a reason of substance to justify a refusal of consent: see, for example, Cardinal (1996) 105 C.C.C. (3d) 163; Bird (1996) 107 C.C.C. (3d) 186 (Alberta Court of Queen's Bench).
74. See the Criminal Code, ss.473 and 568. Interestingly, in a number of recent decisions, Canadian courts have insisted that the Crown should have a reason of substance to justify a refusal of consent: see, for example, Cardinal (1996) 105 C.C.C. (3d) 163; Bird (1996) 107 C.C.C. (3d) 186 (Alberta Court of Queen's Bench).
75. See C. H. Whitbread and C. Slobogin, Criminal Procedure (3rd ed., 1983), p.670. In Singer v. United Staus, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Fed.R. Crim. P. 23a, permitting prosecution vetoes of jury waivers. In Patton, U.S. 276 (1930), the landmark decision sanctioning the practice of waiver from which R. 23a was derived, the Supreme Court noted: "[T]he maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had . . ." (at 312).
76. Crimes Act 1961, ss.361B and 361C. But see Narain [1988] 1 N.Z.L.R. 580: court will generally assume that the defence is the best judge of the interests of justice as far as the accused is concerned.
77. For a description of the system of allocation of cases to different levels of trial in Scotland, see the Royal Commission's Report, Chap. 6, para. 12. See also Maher, op. cit., n.16 above.
78. The James Committee, op. cit., n.42 above, Chap. 1, paras. 60-61.
79. Chap. 6, para. 12.
80. See n.5 above and accompanying text.
81. For discussion of this issue, see Ashworth, op. cit., n.2 above, pp.236-242 (but note the observation at p.255 that there is an internal Crown Prosecution Service memorandum instructing prosecutors not to alter charges after mode of trial has been determined by defence election or magistrates' decision).
82. There is certainly no doubt that trial by judge alone would meet the standard of a fair trial prescribed in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
83. The Code for Crown Prosecutors (1994) in fact stipulates that prosecutors operate on the basis of the Mode of Trial Guidelines (see n.4 above) and should recommend Crown Court trial when the guidelines require them to do so: para. 8.1.
84. See G. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials (1995), p.168.
85. See nn.44 and 45 above and accompanying text.
86. See M. McConville, "Putting Juries on Trial", The Times, January 30, 1996;
87. P. Binning, "Are Juries Essential?", The Times, September 24, 1996.
88. Offences Against the State Act 1939, ss.46-47.
89. The provisions which govern the matter are contained in the Magistrates' Courts Act 1981, ss.18-21.
90. Crimes Act 1961, s.361B.
91. See Binning, op. cit., n.74 above. Note that in Western Australia, the election must be made before the identity of the judge is known: Criminal Code, s.651A. Interestingly, in a recent Canadian case, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench disapproved of the Crown's decision to withhold consent to waiver, on the ground that the Crown had been motivated in whole or in part by a consideration of the identity of the assigned judge: Bird (1996) 107 C.C.C. (ed) 186.
92. See Binning, op. cit., n.74 above. Note that in Western Australia, the election must be made before the identity of the judge is known: Criminal Code, s.651A. Interestingly, in a recent Canadian case, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench disapproved of the Crown's decision to withhold consent to waiver, on the ground that the Crown had been motivated in whole or in part by a consideration of the identity of the assigned judge: Bird (1996) 107 C.C.C. (ed) 186.
93. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Procedure - Part I: Miscellaneous Amendments (Report 9, 1978).
94. The relevant provision is now Criminal Code, s.561 (the change was initially effected by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1985, s.110). For discussion, see Ruston (1991) 63 C.C.C. (3d) 419.
95. See R. v. Birmingham Justices, ex p. Hodgson [1985] Q.B. 1131.
96. Note that the provision permitting waiver in South Australia requires that the judge be "satisfied that the accused, before making the election, sought and received legal advice in relation to the election from a legal practitioner" (Juries Act 1927, s.7). An analogy might also be drawn with the provision in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 governing inferences from the accused's failure to testify at trial; the court has to satisfy itself that the accused has been made aware of the potential consequences of not testifying (s.35): see Cowan, Gayle and Ricciardi [1995] 4 All E.R. 939.
97. Crimes Act 1961, ss.361B(4) and 361C(5). In the context of a consideration of alternative approaches to the trial of serious fraud, Levi has suggested that waiver might be permitted if all accused agreed, enabling "severed components of one 'case' to undergo different modes of trial if the defendants wished it": M. Levi, The Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Serious Fraud (RCCJ Research Study No. 14, 1993), p. 193.
98. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, s.11(5). For observations on the judge's role in giving judgment, see Thompson [1977] N.I. 74 at 83. In New Zealand, it has been held that the judge's decision is intended to be a verdict and need not be supported by elaborate reasons: Connell [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 233; Walters [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 533 (Court of Appeal).
99. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, s.11(5). For observations on the judge's role in giving judgment, see Thompson [1977] N.I. 74 at 83. In New Zealand, it has been held that the judge's decision is intended to be a verdict and need not be supported by elaborate reasons: Connell [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 233; Walters [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 533 (Court of Appeal).
100. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, s.11(5). For observations on the judge's role in giving judgment, see Thompson [1977] N.I. 74 at 83. In New Zealand, it has been held that the judge's decision is intended to be a verdict and need not be supported by elaborate reasons: Connell [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 233; Walters [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 533 (Court of Appeal).
101. This is not necessarily a desirable practice: for discussion, see Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, pp.272-274.
102. See Doran, Jackson and Seigel, op. cit., n.51 above, p.45.
103. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, s.11(6).
104. This theme is considered in detail in Doran, Jackson and Seigel, op. cit., n.51 above.
105. See Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, p.244.
106. For a detailed scrutiny of the desirability of enforcing rules of evidence in the non-jury criminal context, see A. L. Levin and H. K. Cohen, "The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases" (1971) 119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 905. For a comparison of the effect of prejudicial information on judges and juries, see S. Landsman and R. F. Rakos, "A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation" (1994) 12 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 113.
107. For a detailed scrutiny of the desirability of enforcing rules of evidence in the non-jury criminal context, see A. L. Levin and H. K. Cohen, "The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases" (1971) 119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 905. For a comparison of the effect of prejudicial information on judges and juries, see S. Landsman and R. F. Rakos, "A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation" (1994) 12 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 113.
108. For development of this idea, see Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, pp.274-276; Doran, Jackson and Seigel, op. cit., n.51 above, pp.54-57.
109. For development of this idea, see Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, pp.274-276; Doran, Jackson and Seigel, op. cit., n.51 above, pp.54-57.
110. For a critique of the excessive dependence on the guilty plea and of the "plea bargaining" to which this gives rise, see A. W. Alschuler, "Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Rights to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System" (1983) 50 University of Chicago Law Review 931.
111. See Ashworth, op. cit., n.2 above, pp.257-258.
112. See now the provisions in Part III of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
113. The practice of conducting such hearings derives from Newton (1982) 77 Cr.App.R. 13. For explanation and discussion of Newton hearings, see Blackstone's Criminal Practice (1996), paras. D16.2-D16.13.
114. The practice of conducting such hearings derives from Newton (1982) 77 Cr.App.R. 13. For explanation and discussion of Newton hearings, see Blackstone's Criminal Practice (1996), paras. D16.2-D16.13.
115. For a useful discussion of the guilty plea rate, see Ashworth, op. cit., n.2 above, pp.258-260.
116. See L. M. Mather, Plea Bargaining or Trial? (1979), p.2 and pp.149-150. For further discussion of this theme, see Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, pp.300-301.
117. See L. M. Mather, Plea Bargaining or Trial? (1979), p.2 and pp.149-150. For further discussion of this theme, see Jackson and Doran, op. cit., n.33 above, pp.300-301.