Representing ignorance

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Harden, Russell ^a,b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042606334     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0265052504211049     Document Type: Review

References (57)

1. Russell Hardin, "The Artificial Duties of Contemporary Professionals," Social Service Review 64 (1991): 528-43. Hume distinguishes "natural" from "artificial" virtues in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), bk. 3, pt. 2, sec. 1. Acting from a natural duty produces a good directly, and more or less immediately. Acting from an artificial duty, such as the duty of justice, produces good only through the mediation of a social institution or norm.
2. Russell Hardin, "The Artificial Duties of Contemporary Professionals," Social Service Review 64 (1991): 528-43. Hume distinguishes "natural" from "artificial" virtues in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), bk. 3, pt. 2, sec. 1. Acting from a natural duty produces a good directly, and more or less immediately. Acting from an artificial duty, such as the duty of justice, produces good only through the mediation of a social institution or norm.
3. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942), 3d ed. (New York: Harper, 1950), 262.
4. Russell Hardin, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Democratic Participation," Journal of Political Philosophy 10, no. 2 (2002): 212-29; reprinted in James Fishkin and Peter Laslett, eds., Philosophy, Politics, and Society, vol. 7 (London: Blackwell, 2003), 163-81. The argument here is essentially from the logic of incentives and it casts no blame on anyone. Others hold the political system, the poor educational system, or politicians responsible for the seeming incompetence of voters. See, for example, Matthew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
5. Russell Hardin, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Democratic Participation," Journal of Political Philosophy 10, no. 2 (2002): 212-29; reprinted in James Fishkin and Peter Laslett, eds., Philosophy, Politics, and Society, vol. 7 (London: Blackwell, 2003), 163-81. The argument here is essentially from the logic of incentives and it casts no blame on anyone. Others hold the political system, the poor educational system, or politicians responsible for the seeming incompetence of voters. See, for example, Matthew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
6. Russell Hardin, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Democratic Participation," Journal of Political Philosophy 10, no. 2 (2002): 212-29; reprinted in James Fishkin and Peter Laslett, eds., Philosophy, Politics, and Society, vol. 7 (London: Blackwell, 2003), 163-81. The argument here is essentially from the logic of incentives and it casts no blame on anyone. Others hold the political system, the poor educational system, or politicians responsible for the seeming incompetence of voters. See, for example, Matthew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
7. Martin P. Wattenberg argues that, additionally, there are obstacles even to casting one's vote correctly in the United States, where the act of voting can be almost as difficult as taking a college entrance examination. See Martin P. Wattenberg, Where Have All the Voters Gone? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), chap. 6.
8. See, for example, Edmund Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" (1774), in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, ed., Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), esp. 174-75; and Ed-mund Burke, "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs" (1791), in The Works of Edmund Burke (London: George Bell & Sons, 1890-1906), 3:85-87. For later views, see Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (New York: HarperCollins, 1962), esp. Oakeshott's essay, "On Being a Conservative."
9. See, for example, Edmund Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" (1774), in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, ed., Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), esp. 174-75; and Ed-mund Burke, "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs" (1791), in The Works of Edmund Burke (London: George Bell & Sons, 1890-1906), 3:85-87. For later views, see Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (New York: HarperCollins, 1962), esp. Oakeshott's essay, "On Being a Conservative."
10. See, for example, Edmund Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" (1774), in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, ed., Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), esp. 174-75; and Ed-mund Burke, "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs" (1791), in The Works of Edmund Burke (London: George Bell & Sons, 1890-1906), 3:85-87. For later views, see Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (New York: HarperCollins, 1962), esp. Oakeshott's essay, "On Being a Conservative."
11. Even in a not so modern polity-England and Wales in 1754-the electorate was about two hundred and eighty thousand out of a population of roughly eight million. See Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 82. In the United States at the time of ratification of its constitution in 1788, the electorate was about one million out of a population of a little more than three million. Thus, even these relatively small populations, by modern standards, required representative government or some other device for making decisions without involving all citizens at once.
12. I b i d.
13. Ibid., 185. See also Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 35, 43.
14. Ibid., 185. See also Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 35, 43.
15. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Russell Hardin, "Deliberation: Method, Not Theory," in Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 103-19.
16. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Russell Hardin, "Deliberation: Method, Not Theory," in Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 103-19.
17. See Hardin, "Deliberation: Method, Not Theory"; and Cass Sunstein, "Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes," Yale Law Journal 110 (2000): 71-119.
18. See Hardin, "Deliberation: Method, Not Theory"; and Cass Sunstein, "Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes," Yale Law Journal 110 (2000): 71-119.
19. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861), in John Stuart Mill, Essays on Politics and Society, vol. 19 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 444-45.
20. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861), in John Stuart Mill, Essays on Politics and Society, vol. 19 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 444-45.
21. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).
22. Hardin, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Democratic Participation." (Passages in the next two pages are taken from pages 217-19 of this essay.)
23. Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns, 2d ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
24. Ibid., 73.
25. Quoted in Frank Bruni, "Italy, a Land of Tolerance, Even to Prime Ministers," New York Times, May 28, 2003, late edition-final, sec. A, p. 4, col. 3.
26. He pushes legislation that would directly benefit him as an oligopolistic media owner. See "Italian Leader Faces Dissent over Control of the Media," New York Times, April 6, 2003, late edition-final, sec. A, p. 4, col. 1.
27. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, 218-32.
28. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1978).
29. Susan Estrich, Getting Away with Murder: How Politics Is Destroying the Criminal Justice System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
30. "25 Years for a Slice of Pizza," New York Times, March 5, 1995, sec. 1, p. 21.
31. Elisabeth R. Gerber et al., Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct Democracy (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 64.
32. Ibid., 71-74.
33. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
34. See also Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 511-12.
35. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, chap. 4.
36. Members of Berlusconi's party in the Italian Parliament introduced legislation, to exempt the top five government officials from facing trial while they hold office (Jason Horowitz, "World Briefing/Europe: Berlusconi Immunity Plan," New York Times, May 30, 2003, late edition-final, sec. A, p. 8, col. 5). Berlusconi previously pushed through legislation to reform the courts in ways that might have permitted him to avoid prosecution for bribery, complaining that "to search for, and single out, individual culprits [is] disingenuous and inherently unjust" when there is so much suspicious activity to go around (Bruni, "Italy, a Land of Tolerance").
37. Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchal Tendencies of Modern Democracy (1911), trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949).
38. John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse (1851), ed. C. Gordon Post (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), 14-15.
39. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, chap. 8.
40. Russell Hardin, "Seeing Like Hayek," The Good Society 10, no. 2 (2001): 36-39.
41. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), chap. 4.
42. Ibid., chaps. 6 and 7.
43. In this section only, citations to pages and chapters in Mill's Considerations on Representative Government will be given in parentheses. See note 11 for complete bibliographic information.
44. Mill gives a compelling consequentialist justification for liberty, without which progress is eventually stifled.
45. In this section only, citations to pages and chapters in Manin's The Principles of Representative Government will be given in parentheses. See note 6 for complete bibliographic information.
46. John Stuart Mill, "De Tocqueville on Democracy in America, II," in John Stuart Mill, Essays on Politics and Society, vol. 18 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 175.
47. Arthur Miller, On Politics and the Art of Acting (New York: Viking, 2001).
48. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, 151, 1. Rousseau specifically discusses England in the eighteenth century. He wrote, of course, before the rise of representative democracy in its fuller forms.
49. For discussion, see Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).
50. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 390, 392.
51. Ibid., 389.
52. Bruni, "Italy, a Land of Tolerance."
53. Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1908).
54. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 132-33.
55. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 vols. (1835, 1840; reprint, New York: Knopf, 1945), 1:260.
56. Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chap. 4.
57. Scott argues that a state's capacity to keep records on us or, in his term, to make us 'legible' allows the state to control us in various ways, such as by raising taxes and armies. This capacity also makes it possible to determine just who is to be represented in a modern democracy. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution requires a periodic census primarily for the purpose of allocating seats in the House of Representatives according to state populations so that representation is relatively equal.