Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods

European Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 905-925

  Clark, Simon ^a   Kanbur, Ravi ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

Heterogeneity of tastes; Local public goods; Matching; Sorting

Indexed keywords

PARTNERSHIP APPROACH; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 3042593409     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.10.002     Document Type: Article

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