On the social efficiency of conflict

Economics Letters

Volumn 90, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 96-101

  Sánchez Pagés, Santiago ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Conflict; Exclusion contest; Open access resource

Indexed keywords

EID: 30344444014     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.011     Document Type: Article

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