Multiple losses, ex ante moral hazard, and the implications for umbrella policies

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 72, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 525-538

  Breuer, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 30344439131     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2005.00136.x     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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14. Winter, R. A., 2000, Optimal Insurance Under Moral Hazard, in: G. Dionne, ed., Handbook of Insurance (Boston, Dordrecht, and London: Kluwer Academic), pp. 155-183.