Education and the condicio socialis: Double contingency in interaction

Educational Theory

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 19-35

  Vanderstraeten, Raf ^a  

^a BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 2942674396     PISSN: 00132004     EISSN: 17415446     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5446.2003.00019.x     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. George H. Mead, Selected Writings, ed. Andrew J. Reck [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 131.
2. See also the reconstmction of Mead'spositionin Jim Garrison, "Towarda Pragmatic Social Constructivism," in Constructivism and Education, eds. Marie Larochelle, Nadine Benarz, and Jim Garrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19981, 4-60;
3. and Gert J. J. Biesta, "Mead, Intersubjectivity, and Education: The Early Writings," Studies in Philosophy and Education 17, no. 2 (1998): 73-99.
4. George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 13. Together with emergent sociological conceptions (for example, those of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber], Mead's approach has contributed to an understanding of education in terms of socialization and acculturation instead of in terms of the "unfolding" of the human mind.
5. I use "after" here in the sense of "in the time following" as well as "in the spirit of" or "in the footsteps of" George H. Mead.
6. The publications of Luhmann contribute to the current, renewed interest in the writings of Parsons. This interest partly counteracts the earlier negative criticisms of Parsons' work, especially after the "critical" era of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Luhmann's analysis (along with that of Jiirgen Habermas) of Parsons' work focuses less on h s conservative bias than on the structure of his theory. The writings of Hans Joas also contributed to this reevaluation. See especially Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996),19-56;
7. and Hans Joas, The Genesis of Values (Cambridge: Polity, 2000). Joas explicitly combines American pragmatism with Parsonian functionalism.
8. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951);
9. and Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951).
10. Perhaps it is not redundant to point here to the fact that Toward a General Theory of Action sought to introduce the development of general theory in the social sciences (sociology, psychology, and cultural anthropology). The book was a joint product of several outstanding researchers: Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, Edward C. Tolman, Gordon W. Allport, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, Robert R. Sears, Richard C. Sheldon, and Samuel A. Stouffer.
11. Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, Gordon W. Allport, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, Robert R. Sears, Richard C. Sheldon, Samuel A. Stouffer, and Edward C. Tolman, "Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory of Action: A General Statement," in Toward a General Theory of Action, eds. Parsons and Shils, 14-15. As it is used, the term "ego" is different from that current in psychology or psychoanalysis. The authors indicate that their use of the term coincides with anthropological usage in the description of kinship systems. At present, this term has become an established expression.
12. Ibid., 15.
13. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, "Categories of the Orientation and Organization of Action," in Toward a General Theory of Action, eds. Parsons and Shils, 105.
14. Parsons et al., "Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory of Action: A General Statement," 16.
15. Parsons, The Social System, 94. Seen in this context, the following formulation is misleadingly simple: "Not only, as for isolated behaving units, animal or human, is a goal outcome contingent on successful cognition and manipulation of environmental objects by the actors, but since the most important objects involved in interaction act too, it is also contingent on their action or intervention in the course of events." Talcott Parsons, "Social Interaction," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol. 7, ed. David L. Sills [New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 19681,436. In this formulation, the characteristic circularity of double contingency - alter determines ego and ego determines alter - is [almost) absent.
16. Talcott Parsons, "Social Interaction," 436. In this article Parsons offers a lucid overview of the complicated history of the concept and theory of social interaction. Special mention is made of American pragmatism in general and of Meads writings in particular.
17. Ibid., 437.
18. See also Parsons, The Social System, 24-45.
19. Parsons and Shils, "Categories of the Orientation and Organization of Action," 105.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 106.
22. Parsons, "Socialhteraction," 437. Habermashas argued that GeorgeH. Mead didnot clearly distinguish between the cogrutive and moral dimensions of generalized social norms and that, as a consequence, he neglected to come to grips with normative validity in the sense of the obligatory character of social norms. Like Parsons [and Durkheim), Habermas emphasizes the collective regulation of the participants' choices in social interaction. See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2 [Boston: Beacon Press, 19871, 3540.
23. See, for example, the discussion in Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 204-234.
24. Parsons' account of the problem of double contingency is problematic in another regard, too. Parsons had in mind subjects of action, who confront one another with their needs, and who depend on one another for the satisfaction of these needs. But one would have to ask who these subjects of action designated as ego and alter really are if what constitutes their "personality" is only a result of the development of particular "action systems" -namely, social systems - and is not given in advance to these systems. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for Educational Theory, who pointed to this lack of clarity in Parsons' account of the interrelationship of individual choice and social constraint.
25. Talcott Parsons, Societies (EnglewoodCliffsN, ew Jersey:P renticeHall, 1966), 14. Parsons often did not clearly distinguish between values and norms. In general, he used the concept of societal values to refer to conceptions of desirable types of social systems and ultimate commitments. Norms are then specific to particular social functions and types of social situations. They include value components specified to appropriate levels in the structure of a social system, such as the school system of modem society.
26. See also Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971), passim.
27. See Dennis Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modem Sociology," American Sociological Review 26, no. 2 (1961): 183-193;
28. and Talcott Parsons, "Comment on 'The Oversocialized Conception of Man' by Dennis Wrong," Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Review 10, no. 2 (1962): 322-334.
29. With regard to education and socialization, see also Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, Family, Socialization and the Iteraction Process (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956);
30. Talcott Parsons, "The School Class as a Social System: Some of its Functions in American Society," Harvard Educational Review 29 (1959): 297318;
31. and the discussion in Raf Vanderstraeten, "The School Class as an Interaction Order," British Iournal of Sociology of Education 22, no. 2 (2001): 267-277.
32. Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 116. Parsons' focus on conformity and consensus as the solution for the problem of double contingency also ignores the fact that conflicts often develop in particularly stable, even ultra-stable, types of interactions.
33. Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 19971, 139.
34. Piet Strydom has underlined the central place of the theorem of double contingency in the work of Habermas: "I would venture to submit that Habermas's theory of coinniunicative action is a response ... to the problem posed by double contingency." Piet Strydom, "The Problem of Triple Contingency in Habermas," Sociological Theory 19, no. 2 (2001): 170. In a footnote to this article, he mentions Habermas's positive reaction (in a personal communication] to his interpretation.
35. See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2,221,226,254.
36. Other authors have pointed to the limitations of Habermas's approach with regard to educational questions. See, for example, Nicholas C. Burbules, Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and Practice (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993);
37. and Robert D. Heslep, "Habermas on Communication in Teaching," Educational Theory 51, no. 2 (2001): 191-207.
38. Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme [Social Systems] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984). This 675- page book was conceived as "the introductory chapter" of a theory of society. In Luhmann's following books, this general theory of social systems has been specified and applied to particular kinds of social systems -notably, to society understood as a comprehensive social system and to some of its functional systems [economy, science, law, art, religion, andpolitics). In all these "chapters" of his theory of society, Luhmann developed the argument that social systems are realities sui generis. This book will be cited as SS in the text for all subsequent references.
39. See Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung 3 [Sociological Enlightenment, Part 3) (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991 ), 14.
40. For a discussion of some implications of this conceptualization of social interactions for education and educational interaction, see Raf Vanderstraeten, "Luhmann on Socialization and Education," Educational Theory 50, no. 1 (2000): 1-23;
41. and Raf Vanderstraeten, "The Autonomy of Communication and the Structure of Education," Educational Studies 27, no. 4 (2001): 381391.
42. These remarks are explicitly directed against Mead. Luhmannargues that Mead's symbolicinteractionism builds a contingently acting alter into ego and sees, quite correctly, the process of mediation as the use of symbols. But Luhmann also states that this symbolic interactionism treats the problem only on one side of the interaction, assuming that all is the same on the other. According to Luhmann, it confines itself to only half of the double contingency: ego's actions, reflections, expectations, and anticipations. All things considered, it seems to me that Luhmann's critique should have focused on phenomenological forms of interactionism (Alfred Schutz, Harold Garfinkel, and others) rather than on Mead and symbolic interactionism. The core idea of dialogical interaction, which Mead developed, exactly implies that contingency is experienced on both sides. See Tannelie Blom, Complexiteit en Contingentie [Complexity and Contingency], (Kampen: Kok Agora, 19971, 115. It should be noted in this context that Luhmann, especially in his later work, often proceeded tactically. The list of references that he included in his publications frequently hid as much as they revealed about the main sources of influence on his thinking and writing.
43. See also Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung 5 [ Sociological Enlightenment, Part 5] (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), 52-57.
44. Ranulph Glanville, "Inside Every White Box There Are Two Black Boxes Trying to Get Out," Behavioral Science 27, no. 1 (1982): 1-11.
45. See also in this context Dirk Baecker, "Why Systems?" Theory, Culture, and Society 18, no. 1 (2001): 59-74;
46. and Raf Vanderstraeten, "Observing Systems: A Cybernetic Perspective on System/Environment Relations," Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31, no. 3 (2001 ): 297-31 1.
47. For the subtleties that are possible in interaction, see Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York Doubleday, 1959);
48. and André Kieserling, Kommundzation unter Anwesenden [Communication Among People Who Are Present] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999).
49. Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Auflärung 6 [Sociological Enlightenment, Part 6] (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995), 142-154;
50. and Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschafc der Gesellschafc [The Society of Society] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 106-107.
51. See also Cris Mayo, "The Binds that Tie: Civility and Social Difference," Educational Theory 52, no. 2 (2002): 169-186.
52. From this point on in his work, Luhmann also develops a constructivist perspective on knowledge. Niklas Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft [The Scientific System of Society] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 19911,508-531,698-701.
53. See also Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung 3 [Sociological Enlightenment, Part 3], 160.
54. For dmussions of this view, see Wolfgang Ludwig Schneider, Die Beobachtung von Kornrnunikation [The Observation of Communication] (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994);
55. and Blom, Complexiteit en Contingentie [Complexity and Contingency], 109-122.
56. Stated somewhat differently, the formulation of the theorem of double contingency presupposes that the problem of pure double contingency is solved. It presupposes a societal order within which social theory has been able to establish itself as a scientific subdiscipline (and to conceptualize the problem of double contingency). But these evolutionary achievements do not entirely eliminate this problem; it reappears in a structured form.
57. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft [The Society of Society], 36-43. See also Baecker, "Why Systems!"
58. See also Raf Vanderstraeten and Gert J. J. Biesta, "How is Education Possible! Preliminary Investigations for a Theory of Education," Educational PhiIosophy and Theory 32, no. 1 (2001): 7-21.
59. See John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "The Structure of Educational Organizations," in Environments and Organizations, eds. Marshall W. Meyer et al. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978), 78-1093
60. and Robert Dreeben, "Structural Effects in Education: A History of an Idea," in Handbook of the Sociology of Education, ed. Maureen T. Hallinan (New York: Kluwer-Plenum, ZOOO), 107-135.
61. Talcott Parsons, Social Structure and Personality (Glencoe: Free Press, 19651, 140.
62. Moreover, it should be seen that, currently, the entire population of Western countries is involved in education in two ways: ( 1) every individual is raisedand educatedin schools, and (2) every individual can assume in his contact with other individuals that they were raised and educated in schools. Everyone is thus in the position to choose social contacts on the basis of acquired premises, which she or he can assume to exist within herself or himself and within others. Therefore, the social function of education cannot be understood simply as the production of traits or characteristics of individuals; its more crucial social function is to make premises for otherwise unlikely social contact possible. Thus, education creates an important basis for the expectations and actions of others. This function of education is frequently overlooked in subjectivist conceptions of education. See Talcott Parsons, "Some Considerations on the Comparative Sociology," in The Social Sciences and the Comparative Study of Educational Systems, ed. Joseph Fischer (Scranton: International Textbook Company, 1970),212.
63. Parsons, Social Structure and Personality, 142.
64. See also Robert Dreeben, On What Is Learned in School (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1968), 63-90.
65. See, for example, Klaus-Jiirgen Tillmann, Soziahutionstheorien (Theories of SociaIization] (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 19971, 11 1-132;
66. and Vanderstraeten, "Luhmann on Socialization and Education." 41. Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Orgunizations (Thousands Oaks, California: Sage, 1995);
67. and Vanderstraeten, "Autonomy of Communication."
68. Norbert Elias, Die höfische Gesellschaft [The Noble Society:] [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997);
69. Peter Burke, The Art of Conversation (New York: Come11 University Press, 1993), 8Y-122;
70. and Stephen L. Carter, Civility: Manner, Morals, and the Etiquette of Democracy (New York Basic Books, 19Y8).
71. John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Cambridge: University Press, [ 16931 19021, 126-127.
72. Pierre de Villiers, Réflexions surles dé;fauts d'autruy (Reflections on the Shortcomings of Others] {Paris: Collombat, 1697), 210.
73. For a discussion of these kinds of reflections on interaction and conversation, see also Kieserling, Kommunikation unter Anwesenden [Communication Among People Who Are Present], 391-484.
74. See also Niklas Luhmann and Karl Ebcrhard Schorr, Reflexionsprobleme im Erziehungssystem (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 19881, 118-124.
75. An English translation of this hook is now available, Problems of Reflection in the System of Education, trans. Rebecca Neuwirth [Miinster: Waxmann, 2000).
76. However, its translator was certainly not very familiar with contemporary scientific jargon. Scveral concepts have been translated in a disputable, if not utterly wrong, way. See my review of this translation in Soziale Systeme 8, no. 2 (2002): 369372. I advise that this translation be consultedonly with the original text.
77. Bas Levering, "Disappointment in Teacher-Student Relationships," Journal of Curriculum Studies 32, no. 1 (ZOOO), 65-74.
78. Max van Manen, "On the Epistemology of Reflective Practice," Teachers and Teaching 1, no. 1 (19951, 35;
79. see also Nicholas C. Burbules and Bertram C. Bruce, "Theory and Research on Teaching as Dialogue," in Handbook of Research on Teaching, 4th ed., ed. Virginia Richardson (Washington, D.C.: AERA, 2001), 1 102-1 121.
80. See, for example, David Hargreaves, Creative Professionalism (London: Demos, 1998).
81. In this context, I would like to refer once more to the work of Mead, especially to The Philosophy of the Present, ed. Arthur E. Murphy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980).
82. In the new scholarship on Mead, this posthumous publication has not yet received much attention, but a close reading of this collection of essays on time might be very helpful in developing or reclaiming a fully social understanding of education. In the writings of John Dewey, one finds a similar, although less fully articulated, concern with the role of time in action and interaction. In this regard, see the discussions in Jim Garrison, "Deweyan Pragmatism and the Epistemology of Contemporary Social Constructivism," American Educational Research Journal 32, no. 4 (1995): 716-740;
83. Jim Garrison, "An Introduction to Dewey's Theory of Functional 'Trans-action': An Alternative Paradigm for Activity Theory," Mind, Culture, and Activity 8, no. 4 (2001): 275-296;
84. and Raf Vanderstraeten, "Dewey's Transactional Constructivism," Journal of Philosophy of Education 36, no. 2 (2002): 233-246.