The deprivation argument against abortion

Bioethics

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 144-180

  Stretton, Dean ^a  

^a NONE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABORTION; CULTURAL DEPRIVATION; FETUS; FETUS DEATH; HUMAN; MORALITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; REVIEW;

EID: 1642503816     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00386.x     Document Type: Review

References (78)

1. I owe much of this paragraph to Jim Stone (personal correspondence).
2. I use 'foetus' to mean 'unborn human organism.' A being has a right to life to the extent that killing the being is, in itself, prima facie wrong (that is, prima facie wrong quite apart from any effects of the killing on, or duties owed to, beings other than the one killed). Normal human adults have a full right to life: killing them is prima facie very seriously wrong. My concern is whether the foetus has a right to life in this sense.
3. D. Marquis. 1998. Why Abortion is Immoral. Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy. Second edition. L. Pojman & F. Beckwith, eds. Belmont, CA. Wadsworth: 339-55 (all page references are to this reprint). Originally published in: Journal of Philosophy 1989; 86: 183-202. More recently: D. Marquis. 1997. An Argument that Abortion is Wrong. In Ethics in Practice. H. LaFollette, ed. Malden, MA. Blackwell: 91-102.
4. D. Marquis. 1998. Why Abortion is Immoral. Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy. Second edition. L. Pojman & F. Beckwith, eds. Belmont, CA. Wadsworth: 339-55 (all page references are to this reprint). Originally published in: Journal of Philosophy 1989; 86: 183-202. More recently: D. Marquis. 1997. An Argument that Abortion is Wrong. In Ethics in Practice. H. LaFollette, ed. Malden, MA. Blackwell: 91-102.
5. D. Marquis. 1998. Why Abortion is Immoral. Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy. Second edition. L. Pojman & F. Beckwith, eds. Belmont, CA. Wadsworth: 339-55 (all page references are to this reprint). Originally published in: Journal of Philosophy 1989; 86: 183-202. More recently: D. Marquis. 1997. An Argument that Abortion is Wrong. In Ethics in Practice. H. LaFollette, ed. Malden, MA. Blackwell: 91-102.
6. J. Stone. Why Potentiality Matters. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1987; 17: 815-830. More recently: J. Stone. Why Potentiality Still Matters. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1994; 24: 281-294.
7. J. Stone. Why Potentiality Matters. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1987; 17: 815-830. More recently: J. Stone. Why Potentiality Still Matters. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1994; 24: 281-294.
8. On a reflective equilibrium model of theory justification, we aim to find the best 'fit' between, on the one hand, our intuitions (or 'considered judgements') about particular cases, and, on the other hand, more general moral principles. The greater the range of intuitions a principle explains, the more plausible it becomes. If, however, a principle leads to results that conflict with strong or fairly strong intuitions, there is a presumption that we should reject it - unless of course the principle explains such a wide range of other intuitions as to be more plausible than the intuitions with which it conflicts. Our intuitions, then, are not decisive or infallible, but have a certain prima facie force. Marquis and Stone would accept this view, as they both reject certain moral principles on the basis that they contradict, and accept other principles on the basis that they explain, widespread moral beliefs or intuition (Marquis, An Argument that Abortion is Wrong, op. cit. note 3, pp. 100 and 95-98; Stone, Why Potentiality Matters, op. cit. note 4, p. 820). On reflective equilibrium generally, see: J. Rawls, 1971. A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press: 18-21, 46-51.
9. On a reflective equilibrium model of theory justification, we aim to find the best 'fit' between, on the one hand, our intuitions (or 'considered judgements') about particular cases, and, on the other hand, more general moral principles. The greater the range of intuitions a principle explains, the more plausible it becomes. If, however, a principle leads to results that conflict with strong or fairly strong intuitions, there is a presumption that we should reject it - unless of course the principle explains such a wide range of other intuitions as to be more plausible than the intuitions with which it conflicts. Our intuitions, then, are not decisive or infallible, but have a certain prima facie force. Marquis and Stone would accept this view, as they both reject certain moral principles on the basis that they contradict, and accept other principles on the basis that they explain, widespread moral beliefs or intuition (Marquis, An Argument that Abortion is Wrong, op. cit. note 3, pp. 100 and 95-98; Stone, Why Potentiality Matters, op. cit. note 4, p. 820). On reflective equilibrium generally, see: J. Rawls, 1971. A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press: 18-21, 46-51.
10. On a reflective equilibrium model of theory justification, we aim to find the best 'fit' between, on the one hand, our intuitions (or 'considered judgements') about particular cases, and, on the other hand, more general moral principles. The greater the range of intuitions a principle explains, the more plausible it becomes. If, however, a principle leads to results that conflict with strong or fairly strong intuitions, there is a presumption that we should reject it - unless of course the principle explains such a wide range of other intuitions as to be more plausible than the intuitions with which it conflicts. Our intuitions, then, are not decisive or infallible, but have a certain prima facie force. Marquis and Stone would accept this view, as they both reject certain moral principles on the basis that they contradict, and accept other principles on the basis that they explain, widespread moral beliefs or intuition (Marquis, An Argument that Abortion is Wrong, op. cit. note 3, pp. 100 and 95-98; Stone, Why Potentiality Matters, op. cit. note 4, p. 820). On reflective equilibrium generally, see: J. Rawls, 1971. A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press: 18-21, 46-51.
11. Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, op. cit. note 3, p. 345.
12. Ibid. p. 346. I use 'harm' and its cognates in a normative sense: necessarily, it is prima facie wrong to harm others.
13. Ibid. p. 347.
14. 'We' here refers to the beings that live out futures of value. I am most fundamentally (or essentially) a certain sort of thing if and only if the following holds: necessarily, I could not exist without being that sort of thing.
15. This view is defended in: E. Olson. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. New York. Oxford University Press.
16. See, for example: W. Hasker. 1999. The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY. Cornell University Press. Hasker holds that each of us - each mind - is 'an emergent individual, a new individual entity which comes into existence as a result of a certain functional configuration of the material constituents of the brain and nervous system' (p. 190, his emphasis). A similar view is defended in: J. McMahan. 2002. The Ethics of Killing: Problem at the Margins of Life. New York. Oxford University Press: Chapter 1.
17. See, for example: W. Hasker. 1999. The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY. Cornell University Press. Hasker holds that each of us - each mind - is 'an emergent individual, a new individual entity which comes into existence as a result of a certain functional configuration of the material constituents of the brain and nervous system' (p. 190, his emphasis). A similar view is defended in: J. McMahan. 2002. The Ethics of Killing: Problem at the Margins of Life. New York. Oxford University Press: Chapter 1.
18. Over 99.9% of abortions (in the UK, at least) occur prior to 25 weeks gestation: S. Derbyshire. Locating the Beginnings of Pain. Bioethics 1999; 13: 1-31, at 29. In current evidence there is no capacity for consciousness prior to 25 weeks: H. Morowitz & J. Trefil. 1992. The Facts of Life: Science and the Abortion Controversy. New York. Oxford University Press: 119, 158.
19. Over 99.9% of abortions (in the UK, at least) occur prior to 25 weeks gestation: S. Derbyshire. Locating the Beginnings of Pain. Bioethics 1999; 13: 1-31, at 29. In current evidence there is no capacity for consciousness prior to 25 weeks: H. Morowitz & J. Trefil. 1992. The Facts of Life: Science and the Abortion Controversy. New York. Oxford University Press: 119, 158.
20. See, for example: F. Doepke. 1996. The Kinds of Things. Chicago. Open Court: 263-264.
21. See, for example: L. Baker. 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 101-105. Baker holds, as do most supporters of the 'constituted persons' view, that the person cannot exist without being constituted by a body, but can be constituted by different bodies at different times. If, for example, my body parts were gradually replaced by bionic equivalents, I would end up being constituted by a new (bionic) body rather than my current (human) body (p. 109).
22. Baker (ibid. p. 92) holds that newborn human organisms constitute persons. If this is right, we should ignore the phrase 'or non-self-conscious infant' in this paragraph. The argument still works if we do this.
23. J. McMahan. Cloning, Killing, and Identity. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 77-86, at 81. He believes it is 'more plausible to suppose that a human organism does not begin to exist until about fourteen days after fertilisation' (p. 82), when a certain level of integrated functioning first appears and twinning is ruled out. Marquis is sympathetic to this sort of view; he grants that abortion may be permissible if it 'occur[s] so early in pregnancy that a fetus is not yet definitely an individual.' Why Abortion is Immoral, op. cit. note 3, pp. 348-349.
24. J. McMahan. Cloning, Killing, and Identity. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 77-86, at 81. He believes it is 'more plausible to suppose that a human organism does not begin to exist until about fourteen days after fertilisation' (p. 82), when a certain level of integrated functioning first appears and twinning is ruled out. Marquis is sympathetic to this sort of view; he grants that abortion may be permissible if it 'occur[s] so early in pregnancy that a fetus is not yet definitely an individual.' Why Abortion is Immoral, op. cit. note 3, pp. 348-349.
25. Cf. Stone, Why Potentiality Matters, op. cit. note 4, p. 815.
26. Marquis's argument claims: (1) The serious harm of death is a sufficient source of the right to life; (2) The foetus, because it has a future like ours, would be seriously harmed by death (and by any act depriving it of that future) ; hence (3) The foetus has a right to life. The equality objection, discussed in section I.iii. challenges (1). The thought-experiment in section I.iv. challenges (2).
27. D. Marquis. 1994. A Future like Ours and the Concept of a Person: A Reply to McInerney and Paske. Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy, op. cit. note 3, pp. 372-386, at 380. See also: G. Paske. 1994. Abortion and the Neo-Natal Right to Life: A Critique of Marquis's Futurist Argument. Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy, op. cit. note 3, pp. 361-371, at 365 (Paske raises a version of the equality objection).
28. D. Marquis. 1994. A Future like Ours and the Concept of a Person: A Reply to McInerney and Paske. Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy, op. cit. note 3, pp. 372-386, at 380. See also: G. Paske. 1994. Abortion and the Neo-Natal Right to Life: A Critique of Marquis's Futurist Argument. Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy, op. cit. note 3, pp. 361-371, at 365 (Paske raises a version of the equality objection).
29. Jim Stone (personal correspondence) brought this argument to my attention.
30. Marquis, An Argument that Abortion is Wrong, op. cit. note 3, p. 100. He attributes the suggestion about past behaviour to: F. Feldman. 1992. Confrontations with the Reaper. New York. Oxford University Press: 184. Feldman's rationale is that those who have behaved more admirably are more deserving of the goods of life, so that killing them would be more unjust.
31. Marquis, An Argument that Abortion is Wrong, op. cit. note 3, p. 100. He attributes the suggestion about past behaviour to: F. Feldman. 1992. Confrontations with the Reaper. New York. Oxford University Press: 184. Feldman's rationale is that those who have behaved more admirably are more deserving of the goods of life, so that killing them would be more unjust.
32. Feldman holds that killing is also made wrong by the extent to which the victim has experienced a life of value: the less experience, the more wrong the killing would be (ibid. pp. 183-184). Thus, if G and H would be equally harmed by death and have behaved equally admirably, but G has experienced far less life than H (e.g., through being comatose for many years), then G has substantially more of a right to life than H. This seems clearly wrong. Feldman may not grant the force of this objection, however, as he seems to hold (in my terminology) that some of us have more of a right to life than others - e.g., I have more of a right to life than a vagrant (cf. pp. 205 and 186-187).
33. Some desires about one's own future are conditional: one is indifferent between fulfilling the desire and eliminating it. A smoker, for example, may not care whether he smokes a cigarette (thus fulfilling the desire to smoke) or ceases to be addicted to cigarettes (thereby eliminating the cause of the desire and thus the desire itself). So far as conditional desires are concerned, death is not a harm. For death eliminates such desires (the dead, after all, do not desire), which is as good as living to fulfil them. Hence conditional desires do not contribute to the harm of death. The harm consists, rather - at least so far as desires are concerned - in the non-fulfilment of non-conditional desires about one's own future. See: J. McMahan. 1998. Preferences, Death, and the Ethics of Killing. In Preferences. C. Fehige & U. Wessels, eds. New York. W. de Gruyter: 471-502, at 473-475.
34. Some desires about one's own future are conditional: one is indifferent between fulfilling the desire and eliminating it. A smoker, for example, may not care whether he smokes a cigarette (thus fulfilling the desire to smoke) or ceases to be addicted to cigarettes (thereby eliminating the cause of the desire and thus the desire itself). So far as conditional desires are concerned, death is not a harm. For death eliminates such desires (the dead, after all, do not desire), which is as good as living to fulfil them. Hence conditional desires do not contribute to the harm of death. The harm consists, rather - at least so far as desires are concerned - in the non-fulfilment of non-conditional desires about one's own future. See: J. McMahan. 1998. Preferences, Death, and the Ethics of Killing. In Preferences. C. Fehige & U. Wessels, eds. New York. W. de Gruyter: 471-502, at 473-475.
35. For a discussion of other attempts to solve the equality problem for harm-based accounts of the wrongness of killing, see: J. McMahan. Killing and Equality. Utilitas 1995; 7: 1-29, at 5-10.
36. I owe this suggestion to Jim Stone (personal correspondence).
37. D. Parfit. 1986. Overpopulation and the Quality of Life. In Applied Ethics. P. Singer, ed. Oxford. Oxford University Press: 145-165, at 160.
38. Ibid. p. 161, his emphasis.
39. For development of a similar claim see: McMahan, op. cit. note 24, pp. 10-29.
40. Another reason for being tentative about my conclusion that autonomy is the only source of the right to life is that I have not addressed three issues. First, what does it mean to be an autonomous agent? We want the reversibly comatose to count, presumably on the basis that they possess - albeit unconsciously or dispositionally - various 'autonomous mental states', such as desires about their own futures (compare: D. Boonin. 2003. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 64-70); but a more detailed analysis is needed. Second, what is the precise relation between autonomy and the right to life? How exactly does a being's autonomy give it a right to life? Third, does the view that autonomy is the only source of the right to life also create problems of equality (see: McMahan, op. cit. note 24, pp. 27-29)? Exploration of these issues must await another occasion.
41. Another reason for being tentative about my conclusion that autonomy is the only source of the right to life is that I have not addressed three issues. First, what does it mean to be an autonomous agent? We want the reversibly comatose to count, presumably on the basis that they possess - albeit unconsciously or dispositionally - various 'autonomous mental states', such as desires about their own futures (compare: D. Boonin. 2003. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 64-70); but a more detailed analysis is needed. Second, what is the precise relation between autonomy and the right to life? How exactly does a being's autonomy give it a right to life? Third, does the view that autonomy is the only source of the right to life also create problems of equality (see: McMahan, op. cit. note 24, pp. 27-29)? Exploration of these issues must await another occasion.
42. The next two paragraphs are based on: D. Stretton. The Argument from Intrinsic Value: A Critique. Bioethics 2000; 14: 228-239, at 238.
43. And indeed Olson, op. cit. note 10, pp. 140-142, holds exactly this view.
44. Jim Stone suggested (A) to me. He notes that even if (A) is correct, 'there might be creatures with big brains containing a tiny personality-consciousness module that can be readily transferred. Removing and replacing one of these modules cannot plausibly be said to create a new brain, for only a little bit of matter is changed' (personal correspondence, quoted with permission). Our intuitions on the cases that I will present are equally strong, I believe, if we imagine ourselves dealing with such creatures. So my arguments work even if (A) is true.
45. Marquis could endorse this response, as he agrees 'it might not make sense to attribute rights to a being that would never in its natural history have certain psychological traits.' Why Abortion is Immoral, op. cit. note 3, p. 343, my emphasis. He does not explain the notion of a 'natural history', however, so we must here turn to Stone.
46. Stone, Why Potentiality Matters, op. cit. note 4, pp. 820-823; the following quotations are from p. 821.
47. Ibid. p. 822.
48. Ibid. p. 819, note 7.
49. Stone, Why Potentiality Still Matters, op. cit. note 4, pp. 282-283.
50. Ibid. p. 285.
51. Ibid. p. 282, note 4.
52. This is suggested by Stone's equation of 'look [ing] out for someone's interests' with 'do[ing] what benefits him.' Why Potentiality Matters, op. cit. note 4, p. 822. What is strongly against my interests, then, is what would seriously harm me.
53. Stone, Why Potentiality Still Matters, op. cit. note 4, p. 282.
54. J. Stone. Abortion as Murder? A Response. Journal of Social Philosophy 1995; 25: 129-146, at 139, note 3, his emphasis. My formulation of Stone's argument is based on a negative duty, the duty not to harm: killing the foetus is wrong because it harms her. Yet he also refers to a 'powerful duty to protect and care for human infants', suggesting abortion is wrong because it violates this positive duty. Why Potentiality Matters, op. cit. note 4, p. 821. I will deal only with a version of the argument based on negative duties, but my objections would apply equally to a version based on positive duties.
55. J. Stone. Abortion as Murder? A Response. Journal of Social Philosophy 1995; 25: 129-146, at 139, note 3, his emphasis. My formulation of Stone's argument is based on a negative duty, the duty not to harm: killing the foetus is wrong because it harms her. Yet he also refers to a 'powerful duty to protect and care for human infants', suggesting abortion is wrong because it violates this positive duty. Why Potentiality Matters, op. cit. note 4, p. 821. I will deal only with a version of the argument based on negative duties, but my objections would apply equally to a version based on positive duties.
56. Stone, Why Potentiality Matters, op. cit. note 4, p. 824.
57. Stone's argument claims: (1) The serious harm of death is a sufficient source of the right to life; (2) Because death deprives the foetus of conscious goods which it is the foetus's biological nature to make itself have, the foetus would be seriously harmed by death (and by any act that deprives it of those goods); hence (3) The foetus has a right to life. The equality objection, discussed in section I.iii. (and which applies mutatis mutandis to Stone's account), challenges (1). The following thought-experiments challenge (2).
58. Once consciousness and the goods it makes possible are irreversibly lost, there will generally be no further good in my life; so continued life is then no better than death. But life as a vegetable is plausibly a degrading state to be in, so that continued life is then worse than death.
59. This would require revising premise (2) (see note 44, above) to: (2′) Because both (a) death deprives the foetus of conscious goods which it is the foetus's biological nature to make itself have, and (b) the foetus is now in circumstances where its attainment of those goods would be explained primarily by its biological nature, therefore (c) the foetus would be seriously harmed by death (and by any act that deprives it of those goods). Note that (a) is not the same as (b). Condition (a) claims it was true at the time the foetus came into existence that its attainment of conscious goods would be explained primarily by its biological nature. Condition (b) claims it is true now (in the foetus's current circumstances) that its attainment of conscious goods will be explained primarily by its biological nature.
60. Thus one cannot appeal to (R) to rescue Stone's view. Also consider modified versions of Case One where the destruction of current mental states and creation of new ones is produced by a cerebrum transplant or by a 'cerebrum scrambler': a device which, while one is comatose, gradually rearranges the neural connections in one's cerebrum. Intuitively, our reaction to Cases One, Two and Three should still be the same: Case One, in its original or modified versions, is slightly better than Case Two, and much worse than Case Three. So whether the change in mental states is genetically caused (original Case One) or externally caused (modified Case One) makes no difference to whether (and to what extent) it is in one's interest to attain the future goods. But (R) claims it does make a difference. So (R) is incorrect.
61. Cf. M. Tooley. 1983. Abortion and Infanticide. New York. Oxford University Press: 180.
62. McMahan, op. cit. note 16, p. 85. See also: D. Parfit. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford. Oxford University Press: 205-206.
63. McMahan, op. cit. note 16, p. 85. See also: D. Parfit. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford. Oxford University Press: 205-206.
64. I am influenced here by McMahan, ibid. pp. 84-86. A similar view occurs in: P. McInerney. 1990. Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours? Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy, op. cit. note 3, pp. 357-360. Originally published in Journal of Philosophy 1990; 87: 264-268. However, McInerney may also hold - what I am assuming is false - that the foetus is not the same entity as the being who later lives out a future of value.
65. I am influenced here by McMahan, ibid. pp. 84-86. A similar view occurs in: P. McInerney. 1990. Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours? Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy, op. cit. note 3, pp. 357-360. Originally published in Journal of Philosophy 1990; 87: 264-268. However, McInerney may also hold - what I am assuming is false - that the foetus is not the same entity as the being who later lives out a future of value.
66. I am influenced here by McMahan, ibid. pp. 84-86. A similar view occurs in: P. McInerney. 1990. Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours? Reprinted in The Abortion Controversy, op. cit. note 3, pp. 357-360. Originally published in Journal of Philosophy 1990; 87: 264-268. However, McInerney may also hold - what I am assuming is false - that the foetus is not the same entity as the being who later lives out a future of value.
67. Four points about the principle I am defending: (1) It holds only where other things are equal. If other things are not equal - if, for example, it is not my nature to attain a set of future goods (or, more plausibly, if it is both not my nature to attain them and I do not desire to attain them) - then this may reduce, or even remove completely, their moral significance. (2) There may be a threshold degree of connectedness such that above the threshold the moral significance of a set of future goods or evils ceases to vary with the degree of connectedness. If so, this would also count (in cases where the connectedness is above the threshold) as other things not being equal. (3) The principle claims that if (a) identity holds between a being now and a being who will attain a set of future goods or evils (that is, the earlier and later beings are one and the same entity), and if (b) other things are equal, then (c) the being can now be harmed by being deprived of those goods, or benefited by being caused not to attain that set of evils, in accordance with the degree of psychological connectedness between the being as it is now and the being as it will be when it attains the goods or evils. This does not commit us to any particular view of cases where identity does not hold (i.e., where condition (a) is not met). (4) We could modify our principle by replacing 'psychological connectedness' in condition (c) with mere 'psychological resemblance'; a being at one time and a being at another time psychologically resemble each other to the extent that they have the same (types of) mental states (regardless of whether this sameness of mental states results from direct connections between the earlier and later beings). The resulting principle - slightly weaker than the one I am defending - would also explain why the deprivation argument fails.
68. Could one claim that, although (as these cases show) a being that is not at all psychologically connected to its future cannot be significantly harmed by being deprived of future goods, a being that is very weakly connected to its future can be seriously harmed by being deprived of future goods? I think not: a tiny change in the degree of connectedness can hardly produce a massive change in the degree of potential harm. So it is most plausible to hold that there is (at least up to a point - see point (2) of previous footnote) a general correlation between connectedness and potential harm.
69. McMahan, op. cit. note 16, p. 86.
70. Parfit, op. cit. note 49, p. 326.
71. Most abortions occur prior to the onset of the capacity for consciousness (see note 12, above). They thus occur prior to any psychological connectedness between the foetus and its future self.
72. B. Williams. 1973. The Self and the Future. Reprinted in Problems of the Self. B. Williams, ed. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 46-63, at 51-52. The following quotations are from p. 52.
73. After writing this section, I found a similar response in: S. Coleman. Thought Experiments and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 2000; 98: 53-69, at 64.
74. Note that, in contrast to the infant, reversibly comatose patients are very strongly psychologically connected to their future selves (that is, about as strongly connected as normal adults are). This is because such patients retain all the unconscious or dispositional mental states they had before becoming comatose, and these states will continue to exist when the patient wakes up and attains further goods (compare: Boonin, op. cit. note 29, pp. 64-70). So our principle does not commit us to denying - rather it helps explain why - the reversibly comatose would be seriously harmed by death.
75. Jim Stone (personal correspondence) suggested this case.
76. I owe this suggestion to Jeff McMahan (personal correspondence). So psychological connectedness consists (nearly enough) in the continued existence of psychological capacities (i.e., neural architecture, the neural structures that produce mental states) and/or mental states.
77. Bringing the disabled child into existence is no worse for him, for if you had not brought him into existence then he would never have existed. See: Parfit, op. cit. note 49, pp. 357-361.
78. My deepest thanks to Don Marquis and Jim Stone for detailed comments on previous drafts; their patience saved me from many errors (despite those that remain). Thanks also to Jeff McMahan, whose work informed and inspired many of the views expressed here; and to two Bioethics referees: Mary Anne Warren and Maurizio Mori.