Time-inconsistence preferences in Adam Smith and David Hume

History of Political Economy

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 241-268

  Palacios Huerta, Ignacio ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942526821     PISSN: 00182702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/00182702-35-2-241     Document Type: Article

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