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Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 151-155

Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously

(1) Sanver, M Remzi a

a ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY (Turkey)

Author keywords

Respecting majority; Scoring rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036167653 PISSN: 01654896 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00087-7 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (9)

References (5)

1
- 0003563997
- Mémoire sur les Elections au Scrutin
- Histoire de l'Academie Royale des Sciences, Paris
- (1781)
- De Borda, J.C.¹

2
- 0003744755
- North-Holland, Amsterdam
- (1983) The Strategy of Social Choice
- Moulin, H.¹

3
- 0004165607
- Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- (1988) Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making
- Moulin, H.¹

4
- 0008357202
- Türkiye I̊çin Yeni Bir Seçim Sistemi Tasarlmlna Doǧru, (Toward the Design of a New Electoral Method for Turkey), TÜSI̊AD, I̊stanbul
- (1995)
- Sertel, M.R.¹ Kalaycioǧlu, E.²

5
- 0033437807
- The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
- (1999) Social Choice and Welfare , vol.16 , pp. 615-627
- Sertel, M.R.¹ Yilmaz, B.²

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.