The effect of changing reimbursement policies on quality of in-patient care, from fee-for-service to prospective payment

International Journal for Quality in Health Care

Volumn 17, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 421-426

  Tsai, Yi Wen ^a,c   Chuang, Yi Chou ^b   Huang, Weng Foung ^c   See, Lai Chu ^b   Yang, Chung Lin ^a   Chen, Pei Fen ^a  

^a NATIONAL HEALTH RESEARCH INSTITUTES   (Taiwan)

^b CHANG GUNG UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^c NATIONAL YANG MING UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Case payment; Drug prescription; Moral hazard; National health insurance; Taiwan

Indexed keywords

UNCLASSIFIED DRUG;

ARTICLE; CLINICAL OBSERVATION; CONTROLLED STUDY; DATA ANALYSIS; EXPERIMENTATION; FEMALE; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HEMORRHOIDECTOMY; HOSPITAL PATIENT; HOSPITALIZATION; HUMAN; LENGTH OF STAY; LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS; MAJOR CLINICAL STUDY; MALE; MEDICAL CARE; MEDICAL FEE; MEDICAL SERVICE; NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE; PATIENT CARE; PRESCRIPTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT; REIMBURSEMENT; STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE; TAIWAN;

ADULT; ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS; FEMALE; HEMORRHOIDS; HUMANS; LENGTH OF STAY; LINEAR MODELS; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMS; PRESCRIPTIONS, DRUG; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM; QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE; TAIWAN;

EID: 28944431757     PISSN: 13534505     EISSN: 14643677     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/intqhc/mzi055     Document Type: Article

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