Rigging elections with violence

Public Choice

Volumn 125, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 189-202

  Chaturvedi, Ashish ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28444481337     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3415-6     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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