The ideology of state supreme court chief justices

Judicature

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 78-86

  Langer, Laura ^a   Wilhelm, Teena ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28044462213     PISSN: 00225800     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (84)

1. Bob Johnson, "Judge Says State Now in Compliance with Order to Move Monument," Associated Press State and Local Wire, August 29, 2003.
2. For ease of presentation, our use of the phrase "state supreme court" is synonymous with "state courts of last resort."
3. See Nicholas O. Alozie, Selection Methods and the Recruitment of Women to State Courts of Last Resort, 77 SOC. SCI. Q. 110 (1996);
4. Chris Bonneau, The composition of state supreme courts, 2000, 85 JUDICATURE 26 (2001);
5. Kathleen A. Bratton and Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of Appointment Diversity in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 504-18 (2002);
6. Mark S. Hurwitz and Drew Noble Lanier, Women and minorities on state and federal appellate benches, 1985 and 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84 (2001);
7. Mark S. Hurwitz and Drew Noble Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity: The. Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts, 4 STATE POL. & POL'Y Q. 329 (2003);
8. Henry R. Glick and Craig F. Emmert, Selection systems and judicial characteristics: The recruitment of state supreme court judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228 (1987);
9. Elliot E. Slotnick, Review Essay on Judicial Recruitment and Selection, 13 JUST. SYS. J. 109-124 (1988).
10. Laura Langer, Jody McMullen, Nick Ray, and Dan Stratton, Recruitment of Chief Justices on State Supreme Courts: A Choice Between Institutional and Personal Goals, 65 J. POL. 656 (2003).
11. "Chief Justice Tries to Pre-Empt Legislative Proposal," Associated Press State and Local Wire, January 31, 2003;
12. "Chief Justice Says Lawmakers Trying to Punish Court Line," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Phoenix), December 4, 2003;
13. "State Leaders Say Chief Justice' Actions Will be Forgotten: Others Say it Hurt Credibility," Associated Press State and Local Wire, May 27, 2001;
14. "[Chief Justice] Starcher Tries to Use Court-Legislator Conflict," Associated Press State and Local Wire, January 26, 2003;
15. "Dems Talk Politics with Chief Justice," Rocky Mountain News, April 19, 2001, at 33A.
16. See Charles H. Sheldon, The Incidence and Structure of Dissensus on a State Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES, Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman (eds.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999);
17. Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme Courts, 52 J. POL. 54 (1990).
18. Langer et al., supra n. 4, at 657.
19. Laura Langer, Gabe Sanchez, and Jeff Williams, "The Size of Majority Opinion Coalitions on State Supreme Courts: A Test of the Threat Hypothesis," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 2004.
20. David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR, Sheldon Goldman and Austin Sarat (eds.) (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1960);
21. Walter Murphy, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964);
22. S. Sidney Ulmer, Exploring Dissent Patterns of the Chief Justices: John Marshall to Warren Burger, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS, Sheldon Goldman and Charles L. Lamb (eds.) (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1986);
23. Thomas G. Walker, Lee J. Epstein, and William J. Dixon, On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361 (1988) ;
24. Stacie L. Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 54J. POL. 1158 (1992);
25. Gregory A. Caldeira and Christopher J. W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874-902 (1998).
26. Murphy, supra n, 9;
27. S. Sidney Ulmer, The Use of Power on the Supreme Court: The Opinion Assignments of Earl Warren, 1953-1960, 30 J. PUB. L. 49 (1970);
28. David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinions, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 652 (1972);
29. David W., Rohde and Harold J. Spaeth, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976);
30. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
31. Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421 (1996);
32. see also Elliot E. Slotnick, Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion Assignment from Taft to Burger, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 60 (1979);
33. Saul Brenner, Issue Specialization as a Variable in Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reexamination, 35 W. POL. Q. 204 (1984);
34. Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, Issue Specialization in Majority Opinion Assignment in the Burger Court, 39 W. POL. Q. 520-27 (1986);
35. Saul Brenner and Jan Palmer, The time taken to write opinions as a determinant of opinion assignments, 72 JUDICATURE 179 (1988);
36. Sue Davis, Power on the Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion assignments, 74 JUDICATURE 66 (1990).
37. Murphy, supra n. 9;
38. Rohde, supra n. 10;
39. Rohde and Spaeth, supra n. 10.
40. Richard L. Pacelle,Jr., THE TRANSFORMATION OK THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991);
41. Sue Davis, The Chief Justice and Judicial Decision-Making: The Institutional Basis for Leadership on the Supreme Court, in Clayton and Gillman, supra n. 6.
42. Segal and Spaeth, supra n. 10;
43. Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive. Theory of Law and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997);
44. but see Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1998).
45. Langer et al., supra n. 4.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Glick and Emmert, supra n. 3;
48. Slotnick, supra n. 3;
49. Charles H. Sheldon and Linda Maule, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUSTICES (Pullman, Wash.: Washington State University Press, 1997);
50. Bonneau, supra n. 3;
51. Hurwitz and Lanier, Women and Minorities, supra n. 3;
52. Hurwitz and Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity, supra n. 3.
53. See, e.g., Hurwitz and Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity, supra n. 3;
54. Daniel Berkowitz and Karen Clay, "The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States," Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh Mimeo (2004).
55. See, e.g., Colleen P. Danos, "Judicial Election and Judicial Independence Concerns: Stepping Up to the Plate." National Center for State Courts Memorandum IS98.1305 1-33 (1999);
56. Berkowitz and Clay, supra n. 18.
57. See Langer et al., supra n. 4.
58. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Olga Shvetsova, Selecting Selection Systems, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, Stephen B. Burbank and Berry Friedman (eds.) (American Academy of Political and Social Science/Sage Publications, 2002).
59. Id.
60. In this paper we use a measure of judicial preferences developed in Paul Brace, Laura Langer, and Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court Justices, 62 J. POL 387 (2000).
61. For annual estimates of citizen and government ideology, we use the measures from William J. Berry, Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson, Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998). Brace, Langer, and Hall use the ideology of the appointing government or citizenry to infer justice ideology. This score becomes our base ideology measure for each justice. We then adjust the base ideology score for the party affiliation of each justice. This is done by estimating a simple regression model where the base ideology score for each justice is the dependent variable and party of justice (1=democrat; 0 otherwise) is the independent variable. The regression coefficient for party of justice is used to weight the ideology score. These ideology scores were subjected to a battery of validity tests. We updated these measures for our study because the Brace et al. scores end in 1993. Additionally, we collected the data necessary to create natural courts for every state-year during 1968 to 2004. Finally, we identified every state supreme court justice, including the chiefs on the benches as of August 1, 2005, the date each chief justice was elevated to this position, and the justice's corresponding ideology when he or she was initially selected to serve as an associate justice on the bench. Ad hoc judges, temporary judges, and retired justices were excluded from ideology scores and identification of median justice ideology. Berry et al. provide a single measure of state government ideology and citizen ideology for each state and every year from 1970 to 1999. This measure is computed from the voting scores of each state's Republican and Democrat congressional delegations, which are scored by such interest groups as Americans for Democratic Action and Americans for Constitutional Action. A weighted average is then computed, based on each legislative chamber's ideology and the governor's ideology. The weighted average also takes into consideration the power of the governor and the strength of party in each chamber. The ideology scores were also subjected to validity tests. These measures were updated for the purposes of our study.
62. Berry et al., supra n. 23.
63. See, e.g., Brace et al., supra n. 23;
64. Glick and Emmert, supra n. 3.
65. See, e.g., Segal and Spaeth, supra n. 10;
66. Charles M. Cameron, Albert D. Cover, and Jeffrey A. Segal, Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525 (1990);
67. Bryon J.Moraski and Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 109 (1999);
68. Christine Nemacheck, "Justice Confirmed: Ideology and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco (2001).
69. One way to explain random selection systems is to consider five justices sitting on the bench; each name is put into a hat. The senior justice then selects one name from the hat and that justice is elevated to the chief justice position. In rotation systems, each justice takes a turn serving as chief justice. Once every sitting justice has served as chief justice, the rotation starts over.
70. Paul Davenport, "High Court Lets Stands Budget Vetoes Challenged by Republicans," Associated Press State and Local Wire (Phoenix), December 4, 2003.
71. Paul Davenport, "Chief Justice Urges Law-makers to Scrap Proposed Court Changes", Associated Press State and Local Wire (Phoenix), February 12, 2004, at 6.
72. Davenport, supra n. 28
73. Matt Gouras, "Chief Justice Tries to Preempt Legislative Proposal," Associated Press State and Local Wire, January 31, 2003.
74. Id.
75. Bob Anez, "Chief Justice: Lack of Funding Could Lead to Constitutional Clash," Associated Press State and Local Wire, March 29, 2002, at 5.
76. AP, "State Leaders Say Chief Justice's Actions Will Be Forgotten; Others Say Hurts Credibility," Associated Press State and Local Wire, May 27, 2001, at A-8;
77. Barbour Clay, S.C. Lawmakers Raise Controversial Religious Issues, The Post and Courier, February 15, 2004, at 3B.
78. AP, Justice Returning Jeep Rather Than Be Labeled a Fat Cat: Starcher Turns in Keys After Gazette Questions Need for a State Vehicle, Charleston Gazette, May 25, 2000, at 7A.
79. Bob Kelly, High Court Makes Surprise Move; Nobody, Not Even Larry Starcher, Is Wrong All the Time, Charleston Daily Mail, December 9, 2003, at 4A.
80. Id.
81. Lawrence Messina, Starcher Tries to Use Court-Legislator Conflict, Associated Press State and Local Wire, January 26, 2003.
82. See e.g., Corey Taule, Changes Called for in Judicial Elections, Idaho Falls Post Register, September 17, 2002, at Al.
83. Jim Fisher, The Last Thing Idaho Wants Is an Independent Judiciary, Lewiston Morning Tribune, October 31, 2001, at 10A.
84. See e.g., Langer et al., supra n. 4.