Efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 23, Issue 9-10, 2005, Pages 777-801

  Motta, Massimo ^a,b   Vasconcelos, Helder ^c  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^c BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Efficiency offence; Endogenous mergers; Foresight

Indexed keywords

EFFICIENCY GAINS; EFFICIENCY OFFENCE; ENDOGENOUS MERGERS; FORESIGHT;

GAME THEORY; MARKETING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PUBLIC POLICY;

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS;

EID: 28044445291     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.08.001     Document Type: Article

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