Religious parties and democracy: A comparative assessment of Israel and Turkey

Democratization

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 283-307

  Tepe, Sultan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Democracy; Israel; Parties; Religion; Turkey

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON; PARTY POLITICS; RELIGION;

ASIA; EURASIA; ISRAEL; MIDDLE EAST; TURKEY;

EID: 27944510965     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: 1743890X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340500126731     Document Type: Review

References (81)

1. Most of the interviews were conducted by the author in Turkey and Israel between 1998 and 2005 through the financial support provided by the Ford Foundation, the University of Texas at Austin, and the United States Institute of Peace. Each interview lasted on average 45 minutes. More than 200 party leaders, advisers and party members from Shas, Mafdal, the Prosperity Party and the JDP were interviewed, and some of the leaders were interviewed more than once. All of the interviews were granted on condition of confidentiality. Only those interviewees who gave express permission are cited here by name.
2. For a detailed discussion of such views see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (London: Hurst & Co., 1998);
3. Ayse Oncu, Caglar Keyder and Saad Eddin Ibrahim (ed.); Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1994);
4. Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: The Secular-Religious Impasse (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
5. For a review of such views see Hakan M. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003);
6. Ziya Onis, 'Political Islam at the Crossroads from Hegemony to Coexistence', Contemporary Politics, Vol.7, No.4 (2001), pp.213-48;
7. Yoav Peled, 'Toward a Redefinition of Jewish Nationalism in Israel? The Enigma of Shas', Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.21, No.4 (1998), pp.703-27;
8. Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the Military (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).
9. By the 'permeable structure' of religious and secular values, I mean that what we classify as secular and religion values are porous and often shape each other.
10. In most introductory level textbooks on the Middle East Israel and Turkey are excluded, or treated as exceptional cases, thereby perpetuating the view that these countries are unique and do not fit the overall pattern of the Middle East Politics.
11. Zionist nationalism and Kemalist nationalism created two different forms of secularism. In Israel, the nationalist religious block gained concessions from the state which created a relatively autonomous religious block. In Turkey, Kemalist nationalism subsumed the religious sphere by controlling religious education and public religious practices. For a more detailed discussion see Alan Dowty, 'Zionism's Greatest Conceit (Israel's Relation to its Jewish Past)', Israel Studies, Vol.3, No.1 (Spring 1998), pp.19-50;
12. Boas Evron, Jewish State or Israeli Nation? (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995);
13. Binnaz Toprak, 'Islam and Secular State in Turkey', in Cigdem Balim et al. (eds), Turkey: Political, Social, and Economic Challenges in the 1990s (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp.91-5;
14. Mimar Türksinan; Türkiye' de Siyasal Sosyalleşme ve Siyasal Sembolizm [Political Socialization and Political Symbolism in Turkey] (Istanbul: Birey Yayinlari, 2000).
15. The 'historical coalition' consisting of religious and secular Zionist parties, Hamizrahi and Mapai (Labour), passed the Status Quo agreement in the 1935 Zionist Congress. More than being a consensual agreement, it provided a modus vivendi to secure the cooperation of the religious parties in the formation of the state. The specific agreements of the original Status Quo included: (i) the recognition of the Sabbath as the day of rest of the Jewish population and its public observance; (ii) keeping the dietary laws in public institutions and government-run or subsidized bodies and services; (iii) assigning to the Rabbinate and the Rabbinical Courts official authority for marriages, divorces, or burials on the basis of Halakha; (iv) enabling the existence of a religious track in the national school system, and the establishment of an independent ultra-religious school system which is not supervised by the state; (v) public financing for religious services for various communities and for religious institutions. In Turkey the Directorate of Religious Affairs was established by the Law of 1924, Section 429 to educate religious clergy and to coordinate activities of the mosque, thus regulating all religious services under the auspices of the state. For further details see Ben Halpern and Jehuda Reinharz, Zionism and the Creation of a New Society (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2000);
16. Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: The Secular-Religious Impasse (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
17. In Turkey, the Republican People's Party (RPP)-dominated one-party system ended in 1950. The RPP's strict secular policies were challenged by the populist policies of the Democratic Party. In a similar way, Israel's Labour Zionism political dominance ended in 1977 with the electoral victory of Likud. Like its Turkish counterpart, Likud capitalized on the masses' reaction to the Alignment's (Labour) secular and elite-centric policies.
18. Despite growing opposition to 'the Middle East exceptionalism', the conviction that the politics of this region are unique continues to limit the assessments of its religious parties. For a discussion of the treatment of the Middle East as an 'exception' see Simon Bromley; 'Middle East Exceptionalism - Myth or Reality?', in David Potter (ed.), Democratization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp.321-9.
19. The Sephardi and Ashkenazi distinction refers to the two separate regional-religious traditions in today's Israel. Sephardi is used to denote the Jewry of the Middle Eastern and African origin while Ashkenazi describes the Jewry of European origin. Ironically, both names, Ashkenazi and Sephardi, originally described German (Ashkenaz) and Spanish (Sepharad) Jewry in Europe. The terms were reinvented in Israel to denote two separate cultural and political groups. Although Mizrahim, easterners, was used as an alternative to Sephardi, the term Sephardi is used to capture the cultural differences. For a more detailed discussion of the relative political positioning of Ashkenazi and Sephardi goups see Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, Being Israeli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
20. In the 2003 elections, Shas lost a significant number of seats. Nevertheless, the party remains the third largest party in the Israeli parliament. The conclusion that the election results usher in the end of Shas's ascendancy is premature at this point.
21. Due to the significance of the term, the founder of the secular Zionist ideology, Theodor Herzl, often referred to the idea of redemption. In his political speeches and writings he drew on religious parables and prophecies about redemption to describe the Zionist movement's goals and potentials. For example, the rebuilding of the temple, holds an important place in the idea of redemption. For a discussion of Herzl's gradual appropriation of religion in his public appeals, see Melman Yossi, The New Israelis: An Intimate View of a Changing People (New York: Carol Pub. Group, 1992).
22. After the 1967 war, the idea that redemption will come through divine revelation became more dominant and resulted in splits and mergers of various religious organizations. For a discussion of the religious interpretations of the state and its territories see Menachem Friedman, 'The State of Israel as a Theological Dilemma', in Baruch Kimmerling (ed.), The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989).
23. This quote is taken from Moshe Feiglin's explanations which attributed the failure of Mafdal's movement to the inevitable tension between Zionism and Judaism. A full text of his assessment of this tension can be found at 'What's Happened to the Mafdal?' at 〈http://www.manhigut.org〉.
24. Avraham Yitzchak HaCohen Kook (1865-1935) was the first Chief Rabbi in Eretz Israel and an influential leader of religious Zionism. A yeshivah (religious school) Kook established in Jerusalem, known as Merkaz ha-Rav, is one of the few yeshivot whose students serve in the Israeli army. Kook is considered to be the leading ideologue and activist of Religious Zionism. Quoted in Arthur Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea; a Historical Analysis and Reader (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959).
25. For an argument stating that Mafdal's ideology is grounded in attempts to nationalize Judaism see Gary S. Schiff, Tradition and Politics: The Religious Parties of Israel (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1977).
26. For a more detailed assessment of the shift from the idea of 'normalization' to 'uniqueness' see Boas Evron, Jewish State or Israeli Nation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995).
27. Reiser Steward, The Politics of Leverage: The National Religious Party of Israel and Its Influence on Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
28. Personal Interview with Nahum Langental, June 1999. In fact, the party's programme declares that 'The concept of the "Land of Israel" is more than just a matter of security. Whoever does not believe in God, and in the Torah lacks the basis to take a strong stand in the struggle for Eretz Israel'; 〈www.mafdal.org.il〉.
29. For more detailed analysis of the Gush Eminum Movement, see among others Marcia Drezon-Tepler, Interest Groups and Political Change in Israel (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990);
30. Ian S. Lustick, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988) or
31. Harnoi Me'ir, Ha-Mitnahalim, (Sifriyat Ma'ariv, 1994).
32. Mafdal's party programme (a summary version) can be found at 〈www.hamafdal.org.il〉.
33. Herb Keinon, 'Goren Tells Troops: Disobey Orders', The Jerusalem Post, 20 December 1993.
34. Haredi (pl. haredim) literally means 'god feared', and is the popular name in Israeli politics to describe ultra-orthodox groups. The term distinguishes them from datim (literally 'religious'). Agudat Israel and United Torah Judaism represent the most conservative religious movements which see the electoral competition as a means to represent the ultra-orthodox communities against others. As the parties did not accept the Israeli state as a legitimate institution it refused any governmental posts until recently.
35. 'Counter-acculturation' means the deliberate distancing of religious groups from the secular world by creating alternative insular communities. For a discussion of these different forms of adaptation and transformation of religion see Samuel Heilman, 'Modern Jews and Persistence of Religion', in David Bromley (ed.), Religion and Social Order (Connecticut: Jai Press, 1991), pp.129-47.
36. Personal interview with David Tal, Jerusalem, June 1998.
37. Personal interview with David Tal, June 1999.
38. Dan Petreanu, 'An Enigma Called Der'I', The Jerusalem Post, 17 November 1989.
39. Personal interview with Avner Hai-shaki, June 1999.
40. One of the most distinctive slogans of Shas's electoral campaigns, 'Lehachzir 'Atarah Leyushnah', restoring the crown to its rightful place, exemplifies how the party redefines traditional religious ideas by claiming new policy positions. For an analysis of Shas' rhetoric see Yaacov Yadgar, 'Shas: As a Struggle To Create a New Field: A Bourdieuan Perspective of an Israeli Phenomenon', Sociology of Religion, Vol.64 (2003), pp.223-46.
41. Ovadia Yosef, in addresses at Shas rallies from 1999 to 2003, invited all Shas supporters to work towards building a community of Torah.
42. Responsa means opinions given by the rabbi to his followers, in which he interprets Jewish religious law on a particular issue. Responsa are politically important texts. They clarify how religious authorities relate the religious tradition to current events and interpret religious symbols and rules for the masses. Ovadia Yosef's charismatic role in the party makes these responsa an especially important source for understanding the religious bases of Shas' positions.
43. Messianic approaches, for example, see 'today' only as an unfolding future. As the future is already determined by religious tradition, individuals just try to prevent deviations.
44. Quoted in Ezra Kopelowitz and Matthew Diamond, 'Religion that Strengthens Democracy: An Analysis of Religious Political Strategies in Israel', Theory and Society, Vol.27 (1998), pp.671-708.
45. One might argue that the idea of redemption acquired a central role in Mafdal's ideology, because its founders were struggling with the idea of nationalism. One of the results of this struggle was the reintroduction of nationalism as a redemptive ideology in the nineteenth century.
46. Ovadia Yosef, 'Nothing Must Stand in the Way of Saving Life', The Jerusalem Post, 6 October 1989.
47. Quoted in Aaron Willis, Sephardic Torah Guardians: Ritual and the Politics of Piety, unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1993.
48. The competition between Shas and Mafdal forces them to modify their position. One might identify a process that include 'haredization of the Mafdal' and the growing religious nationalism of Shas. Yet this convergence remains at the surface level and does not eliminate the substantial differences between these two parties.
49. 〈http://www.mafdal.org.il〉.
50. Personal interview with Nissim Zeev (one the founders of Shas Party), July 1999.
51. There are important differences between the terms 'laicism' and 'secularism' which are beyond the scope of this paper. The term 'laicism', rather than 'secularism', is popularly used in Turkey to refer to the ideational differentiation between religious and state institutions. For a comprehensive discussion of the historical construction and disparate uses of laicism and secularism see Andrew Davison, Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
52. Considering that the Justice and Development Party's most recent electoral victory has been accompanied by the Prosperity Party's unprecedented failure, one can argue that the dichotomous structure of Turkey's Islamist parties continues.
53. For instance, see Burak Arikan, 'Turkish Ultra-nationalists Under Review: A Study of the Nationalist Action Party', Nations and Nationalism, Vol.8, No.3 (2002), pp. 357-375;
54. Tanil Bora, 'Nationalist Discourses in Turkey', South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol.102, No.2-3 (2003), pp. 433-452;
55. Kemal Can and Tanil Bora, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah (State, Hearth, Monastry) (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2002).
56. Despite the party's official announcement of its ideological position as a Turkish Islamist party, some students of Turkish politics are still reluctant to acknowledge the party's Islamist foundation. This reluctance can be attributed to a lack of systematic studies on the party's ideology and the prevalence of the party's image as 'ultra-nationalist', formed during the 1970s. For a discussion of the religious foundations of the NAP see Sultan Tepe, 'Kemalism, Islamism, and the Nationalist Action Party', Turkish Studies, Vol.1, No.2 (2000), pp.59-72.
57. According to the NAP leadership, Islamic beliefs have always been an inherent part of Turkish identity. Even pre-Islamic Turkish traditions contained the traces of Islamic beliefs, and Turkish tribes were always monotheistic and maintained moral standards comparable to those of Islam. When the Turks adopted Islam, they completed their ethical and spiritual growth. In other words, by embracing Islam, the Turks only unveiled the hidden Islamic principles intrinsic to their national characteristics.
58. Türkeş Alparslan, Dokuz Işik (Istanbul: Kamer Yayinlari, 1998).
59. The dominant role of the state in organizing society and controlling social changes is extensively discussed in the NAP's party programme. In the NAP's policy statement it is argued that 'Yusuf Akcura's three forms of politics: Turkism, Ottomanism and Islamism all aimed to protect, and were means to maintain, the state. All these streams of thoughts were replaced by Kemalist nationalism', The NAP's Policy Statement (Ankara: NAP 1999).
60. Personal interview with Nejdet Sevinc, one of the leading ideologues of the NAP, March 2000.
61. Personal interview with Omer Izgu, May 2000.
62. The NAP's policy statement is available at 〈http://www.mhp.org. tr〉.
63. According to the NAP's interpretation of Sura Hucurat, 'we created you as groups of people and tribes so you can get to know each other better', legitimizes the idea of nation. For an extensive debate on the compatibility of NAP's view and Islam see Hasan Kücük, 'Türk Islam Ülküsü' (Turkish-Islamic Ideal), Büyük Kurultay, 9 February 1998.
64. As an example of how the idea of nation is argued to be an Islamic construct see Oǧuz Ünal, 'Fazilet Millet Kavramini Reddediyor' (The Virtue Party Rejects Nation), Büyük Kurultay, 1 February 1999.
65. İbrahim Aydemir, Türk Müslümanliǧi, (Turkish Muslimnes), Büyük Kurultay, 21 September 1998.
66. For similar ideas see Metin Kaplan, 'Turancilik Nedir?' (What is Turanism?), Ülkü Ocaǧi Dergisi, Num.66, October 1999.
67. Although there are significant differences between the Prosperity and the Justice and Development Party both parties share the legacy of the milli gorus movement, Turkey's first openly Islamist political movement. The current JDP leader, Tayyip Erdogan, was an apprentice of milli gorus leader Necmettin Erbakan, today's Prosperity Party's leader, until he established the Justice and Development Party. Reflecting their close personal and ideological ties, Erdogan named his first son after Erbakan. Erdogan claims that he has changed many of his ideas since his defection from milli gorus. However, there is an ongoing debate in Turkey as to the degree and sincerity of this change. As the Constitutional Court outlaws any party that is a continuation of a banned party, the JDP is especially careful in distancing itself from the rhetoric and ideas of the predecessors of the Prosperity Party. Rusen Cakir Rusen and Fehmi Calmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Bir Donusum Oykusu (Recep Tayyip Erdogan: The Story of a Transformation) (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 2001).
68. Personal interview with Bulent Arinc, the current head of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, April 2000.
69. Deborah Sontag, 'The Erdogan Experiment', The New York Times, 11 May 2003; speech given by Tayyip Erdogan at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2002.
70. In Ali Haydar Aksal's view, nationalism is a tribal feeling that undermines unity and order. 'In regions such as the Middle East there are essentially too many cultural groups to be represented by nation-states. The only forces that can undermine the peace and stability in Middle Eastern Islamic geography are nationalist tendencies.' A. Haydar Aksal, 'Gelisiguzel' (Randomly), Milli Gazete, 18 March 1997.
71. While the party opposes any involvement with culture as a dangerous experiment, it regards the protection of the essence of the Turkish Islamic culture against 'foreign influences' as a part of its political duty. Drawing on an essentialized understanding of the culture, the party programme states that 'the party would uncompromisingly promote the opening of art galleries exhibiting classical Turkish Islamic art and publications of the main works of the Turkish national culture'.
72. Personal interview with Lutfu Esengun, May 2000.
73. Mevlut Ozcan, 'Sabir' (Patience), Milli Gazete, 4 February 1997.
74. Interview with Reaci Kutan, the former leader of the Prosperity Party, Yeni Safak, 24 May 1998.
75. Personal interview with Yalcin Akdogan, the author of JDP's Conservative Democracy, June 2004. For the text of the declaration of 'Conservative Democracy' visit 〈http://www.akparti.org.tr/muhafazakar.doc〉.
76. Mehmed Sevket Eygi's article in Milli Gazete lists ten different policies that exemplify how the state violates its own principle of laicization by regulating religious education, rituals and expressions. For instance, in addition to the state's involvement with or control of religious personnel at religious institutions, the state has reserved a right to confiscate any of the properties belonging to the evkaf-i-islamiyye, Islamic foundations, and may decide single-handedly to sell or rent this property. The state directly controls the curriculum and teaching at religious schools without even delegating this authority to the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The state intervenes in the matter of Islamic clothing, especially the veiling of Muslim women. The state also organizes pilgrimages to Mecca and prohibits pilgrimages through any means other than the one regulated by the state. While Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Assyrians choose their chief priests and rabbis, the fact that Muslims are not allowed to elect their religious leaders further establishes that Turkey is far from being secular. Sevket Eygi, Milli Gazete, 3 March 1997.
77. Personal interview with Bulent Arinc, May 2000.
78. Necmettin Erbakan, 'Duzeltilmesi Gereken Kavram Kargasasi' (Conceptual Controversy that Needs to be Dealt with), Milli Gazete, 8 March 1997.
79. In various statements Tayyip Erdogan has described the JDP's political agenda as the establishment of a western model of secularism. A detailed discussion of the party's view on secularism can be found in its programme available at 〈http://www.akparti.org〉. A description of Tayyip Erdogan's ideas on religion and state can found in his talk entitled 'Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom', given at American Enterprise Institute on 29 January 2004.
80. The Medina Agreemnt refers to the social agreement negotiated by Mohammed that resulted in granting the Jewish and polytheist communities the right to live according to their ownn legal rules in Medina. For discussion of the agreement see Hamza Ates, 'Towards a Distinctive Model? Reconciling the Views of Contemporary Muslim Thinkers on an Ideal State for Muslim Societies', Religion, State and Society, Vol.31, No.4 (December 2003), pp.347-66.
81. The name Alevi sometimes appears in English as Alawi, Alawite, Alouite or Alevi-Bektashi. The Alevi beliefs differ radically from the orthodox Sunni beliefs, the dominant tradition in Turkey. Estimates regarding the size of the Alevi population range from 10 to 12 million.