Anatomy of the rise and fall of a price-fixing conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and christie's

Journal of Competition Law and Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 3-20

  Ashenfelter, Orley ^a   Graddy, Kathryn ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27844545291     PISSN: 17446414     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhi003     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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