The Mussa theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard)

IMF Staff Papers

Volumn 52, Issue SPEC. ISS., 2005, Pages 64-84

  Jeanne, Olivier ^a   Zettelmeyer, Jeromin ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27844517366     PISSN: 10207635     EISSN: 15645150     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (32)

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