Optimal workfare with voluntary and involuntary unemployment

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 107, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 459-474

  Kreiner, Claus Thustrup ^a   Tranæs, Torben ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b 2tv DK 1307 Copenhagen   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Active labor market policy; Unemployment; Unemployment insurance

Indexed keywords

LABOR MARKET; LABOR POLICY; UNEMPLOYMENT; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

EID: 27844492821     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00418.x     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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