Corporate governance, leadership structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from Taiwan

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 13, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 824-835

  Lin, Ying Fen ^a  

^a NATIONAL DONG HWA UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Compensation; Corporate governance; Stewardship theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744526898     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00473.x     Document Type: Article

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