Stylised facts and the contribution of simulation to the economic analysis of budgeting

JASSS

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2005, Pages

  Heine, Bernd O ^a   Meyer, Matthias ^a   Strangfeld, Oliver ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Collusion; Computer Simulation; Game Theory; Groves Mechanism; Methodology; Stylised Facts

Indexed keywords

EID: 27744508877     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. ALBERT, H (1963/1967). Modell-Platonismus: der neo-klassische Stil des ökonomischen Denkens in kritischer Beleuchtung. In Topitsch, E (Ed.): Logik der Sozialwissenschaften. 4th ed. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, pp. 406-434.
2. AXELROD, R (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
3. AXELROD, R (1997). Evolving new Strategies: the Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In Axelrod, R (Ed.): The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 10-32.
4. BAKER, J (1999). Developments in Antitrust Economics. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 181-194.
5. BANERJI, A and MEENAKSHI, J V (2004). Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Markets in Northern India: an Asymmetric Structural Auctions Analysis. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 236-253.
6. BECKMANN, M (2004). Art Auctions and Bidding Rings: Empirical Evidence from German Auction Data. Journal of Cultural Economics, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 125-141.
7. BLAUG, M (1998). The Positive-Normative Distinction. In Davis, J B, Hands, D W and Mäki, U (Ed.): The Handbook of Economic Methodology. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 370-374.
8. BOLAND, L A (1987/1994). Stylized Facts. In Eatwell, J, Milgate, M and Newman, P (Ed.): The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 4. repr. with corrections. London: Macmillan Press, pp. 535-536.
9. BUDDE J, GÖX, R and LUHMER, A (1998). Absprachen beim Groves-Mechanismus: eine spieltheoretische Analyse. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 3-20.
10. BURGESS, S and METCALFE, P (1999). Incentives in Organisations: a Selective Overview of the Literature with Application to the Public Sector. (CMPO) Working Paper: 99/016. University of Bristol, Bristol.
11. CARLEY, K (1992). Organizational Learning and Personnel Turnover. Organizational Science, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 20-46.
12. CHANG, M-H and HARRINGTON, J E (in press). Agent-Based Computational Economics. In Judd, K L and Tesfatsion, L (Ed.): Agent-Based Models of Organisations: Handbook of Computational Economics II. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
13. CHE, Y-K and KIM, J (2004). Collusion-Proof Implementation of Optimal Mechanisms. Working Paper. University of Wisconsin Madison.
14. COHEN, M (1999). Commentary on the Organization Science Special Issue on Complexity. Organization Science, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 373-376.
15. CRESWELL, J W (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
16. DELIANO, M (2000). Computersimulation als Instrument zur Analyse von Anreizsystemen: eine Untersuchung am Beispiel des Groves-Mechanismus. Munich: Privat Publishing House.
17. DOREE, A G (2004). Collusion in the Dutch Construction Industry: an Industrial Organization Perspective. Building Research & Information, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 146-156.
18. FEINBERG, R M and HUSTED, T A (1993). An Experimental Test of Discount-Rate Effects on Collusive Behavior in Duopoly Markets. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 153-160.
19. FILSON, D (2001). Market Power and Cartel Formation: Theory and an Empirical Test. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 465-480.
20. FOGEL (1993). Evolving Behaviors in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Evolutionary Computation, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 77-97.
21. FRAAS, A G and GREER, D F (1977). Market Structure and Price Collusion: an Empirical Analysis. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 21-44.
22. FRIEDMAN, M (1953/1989). The Methodology of Positive Economics. In Friedman, M (Ed.): Essays in Positive Economics. 15th ed. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, pp. 3-43.
23. FUDENBERG, D and MASKIN, E (1986). The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 533-554.
24. GARDNER, R (1995). Games for Business and Economics. New York: Wiley.
25. GROVES, T (1973). Incentives in Teams. Econometrica, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 617-631.
26. GROVES, T and LOEB, M (1979). Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm. Management Science, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 221-230.
27. HANDS, D W (2001). Reflection Without Rules-Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
28. HAUSMAN, D M (1994/1995). Why Look Under the Hood? In Hausman, D M (Ed.): The Philosophy of Economics: an Anthology. 2. ed., reprint. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 217-222.
29. HOLLAND, J H and MILLER, J H (1991). Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory. American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 365-370.
30. HUCK, S and NORMANN, H-T (1999). Learning in Cournot Oligopoly: an Experiment. Economic Journal, Vol. 109, No. 454, pp. 80-95.
31. HUCK, S, NORMANN, H-T and OECHSSLER, J R (2004). Two are Few and Four are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 435-446.
32. HUCK, S, WIELAND, M and NORMANN, H-T (2001). Stackelberg Beats Cournot: on Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets. The Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 474, pp. 749-765.
33. KALDOR, N (1961/1968). Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth. In Lutz, F A and Hague, D C (Ed.): The Theory of Capital. Reprint. London: Macmillan, pp. 177-222.
34. KAMERSCHEN, D R and MORGAN, J E J (2004). Collusion Analysis of the Alabama Liquid Asphalt Markets. Applied Economics, Vol. 7, No. 36, pp. 673-693.
35. KIRCHKAMP, O (2000). Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 239.
36. KRAPP, M (2000). Relative Leistungsbewertung im dynamischen Kontext: eine Analyse der Kollusionsproblematik bei wiederholter Delegation. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 257-277.
37. KREPS, D M (1990/1991). Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
38. KREPS, D M and WILSON, R (1982). Sequential Equilibria. Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 863-894.
39. KUNZ, A H and PFEIFFER, T (1999). Investitionsbudgetierung und implizite Verträge: Wie resistent ist der Groves-Mechanismus bei dynamischer Interaktion? Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, Vol. 53, No. 8, pp. 203-222.
40. LAMBERT, R A (2001). Contracting Theory and Accounting. Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 32, No. 1-3, pp. 3-87.
41. LAWSON, T (1989). Abstraction, Tendencies and Stylised Facts: a Realist Approach to Economic Analysis. Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 59-78.
42. LINDENBERG, S (1992). The Method of Decreasing Abstraction. In Coleman, J S and Fararo, T J (Ed.): Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique. Newsbury Park: Sage Publications, pp. 3-20.
43. MACY, M (1996). Natural Selection and Social Learning in Prisoner's Dilemma. In Liebrand, W B G and Messick, D M (Ed.): Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research. Berlin, pp. 235-266.
44. MAKI, U (1998). Realism. In Davis, J B, Hands, D W and Mäki, U (Ed.): The Handbook of Economic Methodology. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 404-409.
45. MARCET, A and NICOLINI, J P (2003). Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning. American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 5, pp. 1476-1498.
46. MEYER, M (2004). Prinzipale, Agenten und ökonomische Methode. Von einseitiger Steuerung zu wechselseitiger Abstimmung. Tübingen: Mohr.
47. MILGROM, P R and ROBERTS, J (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersy.: Prentice-Hall.
48. MODELL, S (2005). Triangulation between Case Study and Survey Methods in Management Accounting Research: an Assessment of Validity Implications. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 231-254.
49. MUELLER, U (1987). Optimal Retaliation for Optimal Cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 692-724.
50. NACHBAR, J H (1992). Evolution in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 307-326.
51. OKRUHLIK, K (1994/1998). Gender and the Biological Sciences. In Curd, M and Cover, J A (Ed.): Philosophy of Science: the Central Issues. New York: Norton, pp. 192-208.
52. OLSEN, W (2004). Triangulation in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods Can Really Be Mixed. Developments in Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 103-121.
53. POPPER, K R (1934/1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books.
54. POPPER, K R (1946/1996). Why are the Calculi of Logic and Arithmetic Applicable to Reality? In Popper, K R (Ed.): Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific Knowledge. 5th ed. (rev.). London: Routledge, pp. 201-214.
55. PORTER, R H (1983). A Study of Cartel Stability: the Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886. Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 301-314.
56. ROBERTS, K (1987/1994). Collusion. In Eatwell, J, Milgate, M and Newman, P (Ed.): The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 4. repr. with corrections. London: Macmillan Press, pp. 482-484.
57. SLADE, M E (1987). Interfirm Rivalry in Repeated Games: an Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 499-516.
58. SOLOW, R M (1969/1988). Growth Theory: an Exposition. Paperback ed. New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
59. WALLER, W S and BISHOP, R A (1990). An Experimental Study of Incentive Pay Schemes, Communication, and Intrafirm Resource Allocation. Accounting Review, Vol. 65, No. 4, pp. 812-836.
60. WU, J and AXELROD, R (1995). How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 183-189.