Understanding organizational safety using value-focused thinking

Risk Analysis

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 1029-1041

  Merrick, Jason R W ^a   Grabowski, Martha ^b   Ayyalasomayajula, Premnath ^b   Harrald, John R ^c  

^a VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE   (United States)

^c GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Decision analysis; Organizational safety; Value focused thinking

Indexed keywords

MARINE TRANSORTATION; ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY; VALUE-FOCUSED THINKING;

DECISION THEORY; PERSONNEL; RISK MANAGEMENT; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS; WATERWAY TRANSPORTATION;

ACCIDENT PREVENTION;

ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK; SAFETY;

ACCIDENT; DECISION MAKING; EMPLOYEE; MANAGER; MODEL; OPERATOR; ORGANIZATION; PROBABILITY; REVIEW; RISK MANAGEMENT; SAFETY; TANK; THINKING; TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT;

EID: 27644591406     PISSN: 02724332     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2005.00654.x     Document Type: Review

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