Price improvement in dealership markets

Journal of Business

Volumn 78, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 1137-1171

  Rhodes Kropf, Matthew ^a  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27644494028     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/430857     Document Type: Review

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