Constitutional politics and presidential power in Kuchma's Ukraine

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 52, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 23-31

  Protsyk, Oleh ^a  

^a European Centre for Minority Issues   (Germany)

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EID: 27144546963     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2005.11052212     Document Type: Review

References (42)

1. For a detailed discussion of the Soviet constitutional framework and the changes to the 1978 constitution of the Ukrainian SSR during Kravchuk's presidency, see Kataryna Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001);
2. Olexiy Haran, Volodymr Kulyk, and Oleksandr Maiboroda, Stanovlennia Vladnyh Structur v Ukraini (Development of Power Structures in Ukraine) (Kyiv: Den, 1997).
3. Bohdan Harasymiw, Post-Communist Ukraine (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002).
4. For an excellent discussion of the main issues raised in the process of drafting a new constitution, see Wolczuk, Moulding of Ukraine.
5. On issues related specifically to the separation of powers, see also Charles R. Wise and Trevor L. Brown, "The Separation of Powers in Ukraine," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32, no. 1 (January 1999): 23-44.
6. The decree and veto provisions gave the president great power in legislative matters. There were only two significant restrictions on his decree-making authority: (1) economic decrees took effect for only three years, and (2) decrees could not violate existing laws. The presidential veto could only be overridden by a two-thirds vote in parliament.
7. See Oleh Protsyk, "Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine," Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 7 (November 2003): 1077-95.
8. For a discussion of the causes and consequences of intra-executive competition in Ukraine, see Oleh Protsyk, "Ruling with Decrees: Presidential Decree Making in Russia and Ukraine," Europe Asia Studies 56, no. 5 (July 2004): 637-60.
9. For a discussion of the constitutional referendum and implementation campaigns, see the articles by Serhiy Rakhmanin and Oleksandr Yurchuk in various issues of the weekly Dzerkalo tyzhnia (January/November 2000).
10. There is a substantial literature on the institutional factors, ranging from parliamentary procedural rules to electoral laws, that constitute the most immediate causes of the persistent fragmentation in parliament. See Sarah Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000);
11. Paul D'Anieri, "Institutional Design and the Ineffectiveness of Ukrainian and Russian Parliaments" (University of Kansas, 2000);
12. Erik S. Herron, "Causes and Consequences of Fluid Faction Membership in Ukraine," Europe-Asia Studies 54, no. 4 (June 2002): 625-40;
13. Oleh Protsyk and Andrew Wilson, "Centre Politics in Russia and Ukraine: Patronage, Power, and Virtuality," Party Politics 9, no. 6 (November 2003): 703-29;
14. Sarah Whitmore, "Faction Institutionalization and Parliamentary Development in Ukraine," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19, no. 4 (December 2003): 41-64.
15. Wolczuk, Moulding of Ukraine
16. To date, there has been little systematic research on the use of the veto by the Ukrainian president. One exception is Vladimir A. Pigenko, "The Power of Veto: Some Observations on Institutional Politics in Ukraine" (Indiana University, 2000).
17. For a discussion of the early activity of the Constitutional Court, see Trevor L. Brown and Charles R. Wise, "Constitutional Courts and Legislative-Executive Relations: The Case of Ukraine," Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (January 2004): 143-69;
18. Kataryna Wolczuk, "The Constitutional Court of Ukraine: The Politics of Survival," Law and Philosophy Library, no. 62 (2002): 327-48;
19. Wolczuk, Moulding of Ukraine;
20. Bohdan Futey, "Comments on the Law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine," East European Constitutional Review 6, no. 2/3 (spring/summer 1997).
21. For criticism of the alleged partisanship of the Court's later decisions, see Bohdan Futey, "Comments on the Recent Attempts to Amend the Constitution of Ukraine," press release, January 9, 2004, available at www.brama.com/news/press/2004/01/040109judgefutey_ukraine consitution.html;
22. Paul D'Anieri, "Leonid Kuchma and the Personalization of the Ukrainian Presidency," Problems of Post-Communism 50, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 58-65.
23. See, for example, Taras Kuzio, "Is Kuchma Genuine in His Political Reforms?" RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report (September 3, 2002).
24. For a detailed analysis of the December 2004 constitutional amendments, see Ihor Koliushko and Viktor Tymoshyk, "A vy chytali proyekt 4180? Krytychna otsinka politychnoi reformy" (Have You Read Bill 4180? A Critical Assessment of Ukrainian Political Reform), Ukrayinska pravda (December 15, 2004).
25. See D'Anieri, "Leonid Kuchma";
26. Mykola Riabchuk, "A Perilous Way to Freedom: The Independent Mass Media in the Blackmail State," Journal of Ukrainian Studies 26, no. 1/2 (summer/winter 2001): 93-133;
27. Keith A. Darden, "Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine Under Kuchma," East European Constitutional Review 10, no. 2/3 (spring/ summer 2001): 67-71.
28. See Wolczuk, Moulding of Ukraine, for a discussion of the legal norms regulating presidential decree-making activity prior to the adoption of the 1996 constitution.
29. See Protsyk, "Ruling with Decrees," for a discussion of conceptualization and classification of details of presidential decree-making activity.
30. See Harasymiw, Post-Communist Ukraine,
31. and Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, eds., State and Institution Building in Ukraine (New York: St. Martin's Press: 1999), for a detailed discussion of state reforms.
32. The enforcement of presidential decrees is obviously an important issue for any study that attempts to make inferences from the patterns of presidential decree-making. The seriousness of the potential bias in overestimating the impact of presidential interventions, however, would depend on the issue area. For example, implementation and enforcement problems are relatively minor in examinations of presidential decrees that create, eliminate, or reorganize government agencies. Such decrees entail very specific and concrete actions that can be easily monitored by the presidential office and as a result are usually promptly executed. This is, of course, not the case with many decrees that try to set some new long-term economic policies.
33. See, for example, Decree No. 276, "On Immediate Measures for Realization of the Address of President of Ukraine to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 'Ukraine: Strategy of Economic and Social Development for the Period of 2000-2004,'" February 23, 2000.
34. For a discussion of some progress in economic reforms in comparison with Kravchuk's presidency, see, for example, Jeffrey Sachs and Aleksandr Pivovarsky, "Ukraine's Painful Economic Transition," ACE: Analysis of Current Events (August 1997).
35. For a discussion of some examples of specific presidential decrees benefiting special interests, see Pavlo Havrysh, "Naftohazovi schemy presydenta" (The President's Natural Gas Scheme), Ukrayinska pravda (March 30, 2005).
36. Decree No. 453, "On Establishing Sumy National University" (April 20, 2004).
37. For details of the conflict that followed the issuance of this decree and the impact of the conflict on the Orange Revolution, see the Institute of Mass Media Information's coverage of the events at http://imi.org.ua/ ?read=211:2/.
38. Koliushko and Tymoshchuk, "A vy chytaly."
39. Deputy Valentyna Semeniuk's statement at the National Press Club of Reforms on February 11, 2004 (information about the statement was accessed at www.glavred.com).
40. See also Yevhen Zakharov, "Proekt Navzdohinnoi Dekuchmizatsii" (Project of De-Kuchmaization), Krytyka, nos. 1/2 (2005).
41. For names of the best-known personalities on the award list, see the editorial "Pid zavisu svoho pravlinnia Kuchma rozdav 500 nahorod" (Kuchma Handed Out 500 Awards at the End of His Rule), Ukrayinska pravda (January 21, 2005).
42. See details on the initiative "Academichna Chesnota" (Academic Virtue) at http://maidan.org.ua/static/mai/1104774694.html (January 3, 2005).