Recovery recovered

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 171-206

  Glaister, Stephen Murray ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

AGM; Belief contraction; Belief revision; Logic of theory change; Recovery

Indexed keywords

EID: 27144466907     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004781319263     Document Type: Article

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